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Environmental disputes occur frequently, particularly in contexts of poor natural 
resource management and vague law, but while some of these disputes end quickly 
without fatalities, some escalate to violence or become persistent contentious 
juggernauts that are increasingly hard to end. What makes a sequence of contentious 
events more likely to escalate to violence or persistent contention? This dissertation 
argues that strategic interactions in the form of violence, government behavior, and 
scarcity type signal the likelihood that the government will support claimant 
demands, and thus determine whether desperate claimants must escalate to maintain 
access to environmental goods and services necessary for survival. I also argue that 
there are material constraints from current repression and violence, and that timing 
matters. I test these propositions in two sets of logistic regressions, using new sub-
national data from Indonesia and an in-depth case study. I find empirical support for 
the claims that prior violence, structural scarcity, and past government repression 
  
increase the likelihood of continued contention. The same variables except for past 
government repression also increase the likelihood of violence. Current government 
repression reduced the likelihood of both violence and continued contention, but as 
time passed it exerted a more pernicious effect on violence and resolution. In other 
words, timing mattered, although dense events were surprisingly less likely to yield 
violence or continued contention. This project indicated that there are significant 
opportunities for reducing the likelihood of violence and persistent contention 
through policy changes, potentially reducing the suffering of individuals, the 
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Chapter 1: The Global Problem of Local Environmental Violence 
 
I. Introduction 
On January 12, 2012 a large protest jammed the streets of Jakarta. Protesters 
demanded that the government return land to traditional farmers that had been granted 
to large corporations, and rewrite land policy so that these conflicts would not 
continue in the future. About 4,500 protesters blocked traffic and vandalized 
buildings at locations around the city. This protest in Jakarta followed a series of 
violent events in Bima, Mesuji, and Tulang Bawang, where disputes between farmers 
and corporations backed by the police had recently turned fatal.1 
The profusion of land-related conflicts in Indonesia have arisen from a 
combination of contradictory land laws, natural resource extraction and an increase in 
plantations, decentralizing policy, police corruption and violence, and demographic 
stresses. But the key factor in this contention is inadequate and often counter-
productive actions by the state in its dealings with local farmers. As the government 
sells land-use rights to corporations for plantations – many of which are palm oil 
plantations – farmers who have worked this land for generations are pushed into a 
situation of desperation. They rely on this land to make a living and feed themselves, 
and thus resist attempts to repurpose it. This resistance comes in a wide variety of 
forms, and differs in the degree of violence and contention.  
                                                 




In Bima at the end of 2011, police killed three civilians in a clash over 
territory claimed by a gold mine. “Thousands of protesters rioted on Thursday in 
Bima … where they set fire to the district head's office to demand an end to the gold 
exploration plan, which they said would damage their land and livelihoods.”2 
Protests, politically motivated arson attacks, and assaults on security forces, corporate 
figures, or politicians arising from environmental issues, particularly land disputes, 
are common across Indonesia.  
"The early months of 2012 have seen several violent land disputes in 
Indonesia. The latest ones — in Bima, West Nusa Tenggara, and in 
Mesuji, Lampung— both involve a mix of local residents, private 
companies and the government, and they both have roots in land 
seizures. They also resemble most present-day conflicts, in that they 
are the direct consequence of unjust policy choices, widening 
socioeconomic gaps and increasing competition over scarce 
resources."3 
 
In some cases violent resistance by local populations has been a successful 
political strategy. In Bima in 2012, activists succeeded in getting the government to 
revoke permits for a local gold mine through a series of protests in which several 
civilians were shot and buildings burned.4 However, there are also clear negative 
repercussions of this contention—not only are the deaths due to these interactions 
with the state tragic, but this contention also damages state capability and legitimacy. 
“These conflicts have potential to erode state capacity in various ways, 
although only the community-level conflicts have the realistic 
likelihood of turning violent -- some already have. Even short of 
violence, local forest conflicts are poisoning relationships between 
                                                 
2 Kate Hodal, “Indonesian Protests Force Government to Revoke Gold Mining Permits,” The Guardian, 
January 27, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/27/indonesian-government-mining-
permits-protests. 
3 Inggrid Galuh Mustikawati, “Turning the Tide in Indonesia’s Chronic Land Conflicts | The Jakarta 
Globe,” February 27, 2012, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/opinion/turning-the-tide-in-indonesias-
chronic-land-conflicts/500697. 
4 Kate Hodal, “Indonesian Protests Force Government to Revoke Gold Mining Permits.” 
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local communities and government agencies and increasing local 
resistance to both forest production and conservation efforts. And 
conflicts within the elite over the distribution of forest resource rents 
threaten to weaken the coherence of power centers within the New 
Order constellation. As these conflicts grow, they are compounded by 
increasing absolute scarcity of forest resources and intensifying 
population pressures on the forest frontier.”5 
 
While violence has erupted in places like Bima, only ten percent of 
environmental disputes in Indonesia ever move from nonviolent strategies of 
contention to violence. What accounts for this variation in whether or not sequences 
of events eventually turn violent? Furthermore, some sequences of contention over 
the environment in Indonesia persist over long periods of time with many protests, 
riots, clashes, and other types of interaction between claimants and the state while 
others are single, isolated events that do not continue or recur. How can we explain 
this second dimension of variation in patterns of contention in Indonesian 
environmental disputes? 
 
II. A Global Problem 
Environmental disputes generally, and land conflicts specifically, have 
become a global problem. Environmental change on a global level has opened the 
door for a variety of new environmental disputes, and land conflicts in a broad 
spectrum of developing countries, including Malaysia, Vietnam, Sudan, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone, have increasingly made international news.6  
                                                 
5 Charles Victor Barber, “Case Study of Indonesia, Summary,” accessed July 6, 2012, 
http://www.homerdixon.com/projects/state/indon/indonsum.htm. 





Land-grabbing in particular poses a variety of problems for food security, 
international investment, and as we will see – security. According to Oxfam, 
230,000,000 hectares of farmland (approximately 575 million acres) -- roughly the 
size of western Europe -- have been ‘grabbed’ between 2001 and 2012, 
predominantly in the developing world.7 These land deals have already sparked a fair 
deal of controversy and unrest, and given the rate at which they are occurring, will 
likely continue to do so. 
“Makunike writes of protestors in Sierra Leone blocking access to a 
Belgian investment site. In Kenya’s Tana Delta, locals speak of being 
forcibly evicted in order to accommodate investor plans for a sugar 
plantation, and vow to fight back “with guns and sticks… It will be 
war. The day is coming.” In Uganda people have already retaliated. In 
April 2011, a mob killed an Indian man while protesting an Indian 
investment firm’s decision to chop down a rainforest to make more 
space for sugarcane production.”8 
 
Although the factors that have created a legal gray-area in Indonesia that facilitates 
land grabs are particular to the country, the dynamics of interaction between civilians 
and the government are not unique. The situation in Cambodia paints a very similar 
picture to that of Indonesia and many other land disputes;  
“Cambodian land laws are a problem because it is hard to prove who 
has lived on a plot of land long enough to claim the land legally. This 
leads to controversies between the government and the people who 
live on the land. The major issue is that the government sometimes 
leases land to private companies that people have been living on or 
farming for generations. Many Cambodians are not well educated 
enough that they can use their education to generate income, so they 
depend on natural resources such as water for fishing, land for 
                                                 
7 “‘The Global Farms Race’: Comprehensive Study of Large-Scale Land Acquisitions Launches at Wilson 
Center,” New Security Beat, accessed December 1, 2013, 
http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2012/11/the-global-farms-race-comprehensive-study-large-scale-
land-acquisitions-launches-wilson-center/. 
8 Michael Kugelman, Susan L Levenstein, and Atkin, The Global Farms Race Land Grabs, Agricultural 




farming, or wild products, particularly indigenous people. If there are 
shortages of these major natural resources, people will certainly face 
hardships.”9 
 
Despite this growing global problem, little attention has been paid to land 
disputes. The experience of these disputes tends to be localized, and they do not 
receive the same monitoring and research as war and terrorism. One Indonesian 
farmer commented, “In our Indonesian villages, we don't currently talk about any 
particular "world crisis." We talk about the continuing daily struggle to make a living 
in extremely harsh conditions.”10 
As Indonesia has imposed moratoriums on logging, companies seeking land 
are starting to “move aggressively into Africa.”11 We can expect that this type of 
dispute will spread globally, and that unrest in Indonesia may be an unfortunate 
model of what we will see more of in years to come. Studying which factors 
differentiate violent from non-violent environmental disputes in Indonesia may help 
us to curtail violence not only on the archipelago but in other developing countries. A 
recent United Nations report on land conflict noted,  
“A systematic approach to land grievances and conflicts can contribute 
to the following results: enhanced attention to immediate disputes as 
well as the underlying structural causes of conflict; improved 
coordination amongst diverse actors engaged in dispute resolution – 
traditional leaders, local governments, courts, police and security 
forces, and national political leaders; increased likelihood that small 
disputes can be brought to a conclusion before they escalate into more 
serious conflicts; greater contribution to good governance, rule of law 
                                                 
9 “Dark Forests: Interview With Bopha Phorn on Investigating Land Deals, Logging, Gender Issues in 
Cambodia,” New Security Beat, accessed December 1, 2013, 
http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2013/11/dark-forests-interview-bopha-phorn-investigating-land-
deals-logging-gender-issues-cambodia/. 
10 Henry Saragih, “Indonesian Farmers: Crisis as Usual - CNN.com,” CNN, January 23, 2012, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/23/business/saragih-world-economic-forum-opinion/index.html. 
11 Kugelman and Levenstein, The Global Farms Race Land Grabs, Agricultural Investment, and the 
Scramble for Food Security. 
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and the achievement of a wide range of social, economic and 
peacebuilding objectives.”12 
 
Better understanding of how violence and persistent contention develop from 
environmental disputes can help us improve governance, economic development, 
civilian welfare, and security. It is therefore critical to improve our theories of why 
some disputes escalate, while others fade away.  
 
III. Contradictions and Gaps in Scholarship 
Given the importance of understanding the roots of conflict, it is perhaps 
surprising that so little research has focused on low-level violence. The academic 
literature has focused primarily on larger-scale conflicts – even at their lowest-level 
of intensity it analyzes only those conflicts that generate at least 25 battle deaths 
annually.13 Conflicts where only a handful of people are killed do not register in this 
literature, and thus while there is a thriving body of research on conflicts that achieve 
battle-death thresholds, there is little understanding of what drives some disputes 
toward fatalities while and others resolve without any deaths at all. This gap in the 
literature is partially explained by a dearth of broad, reliable data at such low levels, 
but recent datasets have begun to open up this avenue of inquiry. If we are to 
understand how larger conflicts develop to the point of reaching 25 battle deaths, 
analyzing these roots of conflict is critical.  
                                                 
12 United Nations, Land and Conflict: Toolkit and Guidance for Preventing and Managing Land and 
Natural Resource Conflict, 2012, 
http://www.un.org/en/events/environmentconflictday/pdf/GN_Land_Consultation.pdf. 




Furthermore, low-level violent disputes can wrack up a large number of 
diffuse fatalities which may actually exceed 25 deaths although they often do not take 
place on a battlefield, nor are they immediately recognized as belonging to the same 
conflict. These types of conflict may be the new face of violence, and understanding 
their dynamics is crucial to minimizing casualties.  
“In the twenty-first century, much of the political violence that we witness 
looks quite different from conventional war. Collective violence no longer 
primarily concerns contests between the armies of major states, in which 
soldiers are the main violent actors. Instead, civilians are often the targets of 
violence, its practitioners, or both. Episodes of political violence pit the state 
against segments of the citizenry, often defined in religious, ethnic, and 
national terms. Non-state actors within states have in turn launched violent 
challenges to the state, attacking representatives of state power, state symbols, 
and state institutions, but typically seeking to avoid direct combat with state 
armies. Insurgents, terrorists, and rioters are thus unlike the trained, 
regimented forces of major wars, not simply because they are different kinds 
of actors, but because the very nature of warfare they employ differs. These 
types of violent conflicts are hardly new, but the reduction in the incidence of 
major, instate warfare has served to turn scholars’ attention to conflict among 
domestic actors and prompted a renewed interest in the study of 
unconventional conflict.”14 
 
In order to establish what happens before conflicts reach 25 battle deaths, we 
must start with what we know happens after 25 battle deaths, drawing on the existing 
conflict literature. Civil conflict research has focused on the importance of 
opportunity structure – that is, either state weakness or rebel strength of some variety 
– as the most important factor in conflict initiation. Bargaining theories of civil 
conflict initiation, conduct, and conclusion have also flourished, drawing out 
additional variables. Environmental conflict has an uneasy relationship to this 
literature; since conflict over scarce resources should reduce the capability of those 
who rely on the land for survival, the broader conflict literature would expect less 
                                                 
14 Erica Chenoweth, Adria Lawrence, and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 
Rethinking Violence States and Non-State Actors in Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010), 2. 
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violence, not more. Starvation should make potential rebels less capable of engaging 
in warfare. When environmental degradation creates a food shortage, therefore, we 
should not expect hungry civilians to initiate conflict.  Yet environmental conflict 
scholars have shown a strong correlative relationship between some kinds of 
environmental scarcity and violence. Hungry civilians sometimes take up arms 
against their government or their neighbors. This apparent contradiction is puzzling – 
why should environmental scarcities yield violence? Why do some hungry civilians 
pursue violence while others do not? The literature has not yet developed suitable 
mechanistic understandings of why this occurs.  
 
IV. My Contribution 
This project attempts to fill these gaps in the literature and offer some policy 
guidance regarding which strategies may be effective to curtail violence and 
contention in environmental disputes. The rest of the dissertation follows in seven 
chapters.  
First, I delve into the literature regarding low level conflict, escalation, and 
environmental disputes in chapter two. This chapter lays out the previous research 
that undergirds this project from conflict, contentious politics, and environmental 
literatures, and also clarifies and expands on the gaps in the literature.  
 I then outline in chapter three an interactive bargaining theory of patterns in 
low-level disputes that yield violence and continued contention. Focusing on the 
factors that influence society-side strategic choices, I hypothesize that scarcity type, 
past and present repression and violence, and the timing of events impact the 
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likelihood of violence and the likelihood that contention will end. I also offer brief 
illustrative examples to demonstrate where segments of this theory are evident in 
history. 
The fourth chapter details my proposal to test the hypotheses laid out in 
chapter three in two sets of logit models and a single case study. I identify Indonesia 
as a good site of inquiry and detail the background of environmental disputes there. I 
then describe the Indonesian dispute event data which I will use to test the 
hypotheses, including detailed information regarding the coding of each variable, and 
provide some preliminary descriptive statistics.  
Chapter five quantitatively tests the hypotheses developed in chapter three 
using methods proposed in chapter four. Structural scarcities, as opposed to simple 
scarcities, and the presence of a death in the last year of that sequence increased the 
likelihood of violence, while current government repression reduced the incidence of 
violence. These relationships were largely robust to alternate model specifications 
accounting for variation across space and time, although the effect of prior death did 
appear to be somewhat dependent on sub-district. The effect of risk-enhancing 
conditions also declined as years passed (for the one significant lagged variable), but 
contrary to expectations dense events were less likely to yield violence.  
In the second set of models, current repression and simple types of scarcity 
increased the likelihood that contention would end, while past repression and 
violence, and structural types of scarcity reduced the likelihood of contention ending. 
The effect of current violence increased the likelihood of contention ending, but just 
missed standard levels of significance.  Substitution theory was not supported, instead 
 10 
 
the effect of repression in past and present iterations works like a gateway – fewer 
sequences of events continue past current repression, but those that do tend to persist. 
The results of the second set of models, however, were not robust to alternate model 
specifications accounting for variation across space and time. Only scarcity remained 
significant in model two, and scarcity and past government action remained 
significant in models three and four. The effects of past violence decreased slightly 
over time as expected, although past government action behaved irregularly, and 
closely clustered events were surprisingly more likely to end the contentious 
sequence.  
The sixth chapter then examines a single case in a qualitative study of Mesuji, 
Indonesia. The case study finds mixed support for the correlations identified in the 
previous chapter and provides insights into the mechanisms at play. Structural 
scarcities and past repression played their expected role in increasing the chances of 
contention and violence.  The effects of current repression were overall unclear, but 
did not support substitution theory since claimants utilized the same strategies before 
and after repression. Past violence was clearly linked to higher levels of contention, 
but not necessarily violence, and in two out of three violent events current violence 
did seem to curtail contention. The effect of event density may be explained in part by 
the time necessary to mobilize and arm non-professional militants, and in part by less-
information-rich environments. Finally, the case study shows that claimants did not 
pursue only a single strategy at one time, rather the range of acceptable strategies 
varied over time. 
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The case study also identifies a handful of complicating factors. These include 
the cross-district nature of the salient locality, manipulation by elites and general 
profiteering in an atmosphere of ambiguous legal standards and poor legal 
enforcement, and finally the ways in which the state and company interests 
intersected and diverged.  
I conclude in chapter seven with a review of the findings of this dissertation 
and their generalizability, a discussion of policy implications, and areas for future 
research. This section emphasizes the opportunity for mitigating violence and 
persistent contention through avoiding utilizing violence as a means of state control, 
and using repression only as a last resort due to its strong incendiary effects when 
contentious sequences do continue. It also demonstrates the large impact removing 
inequitable policies of environmental distribution can have, as well as the role of 
building positive state-society relationships to minimize the detrimental effect of past 
violence. I conclude that while there is still much work to be in researching low-level 
violence and contention, drawing on the contentious politics, and civil and 
environmental conflict literatures has provided a number of useful first steps in 













This project situates itself between several bodies of literature, all of which 
offer significant insights to explain why some low-level environmental disputes 
become violent or persist over time while others do not. In some cases, however, 
contradictions exist between the expectations of each literature. Understanding why 
these contradictions exist, and exploring some of the potential explanations requires a 
review of the current state of conflict, contentious politics, and environmental 
research.   
This chapter will review the prior research that undergirds and motivates my 
project. It highlights the gaps in the literature on low-level violence and escalation 
and discusses the particular relevance of these contentious episodes in environmental 
disputes. It then reviews what it means to characterize violence and contention as 
means of bargaining and information exchange and identifies specific types of 
environmental scarcities that relay information. It also discusses how this project 
addresses a key contradiction between the expectations of the conflict literature and 
the reality of environmental scarcity disputes. Lastly, it provides an overview of the 
factors that the conflict literature has concluded are important determinants of conflict 
onset—capability and repression, ethnic fractionalization, and the presence of a larger 




II. Low-Level Violence and Escalation 
Relatively little research has been published exploring the dynamics of 
extremely low levels of conflict and violence, as opposed to the standard levels of 
civil conflict and war measured at a minimum of 25 battlefield deaths per year.15 
Recently, however, there have been increasing calls for attention to the process of 
escalation and low-level violence as the nature of violence in the international sphere 
changes from inter- to intra-state, and as studies of particular types of conflict indicate 
that the mechanisms in play lead predominantly to low-level violence.16 Low-level 
violence is often politically motivated—race riots, land conflict, terrorist attacks, and 
other types of violent protest are all demands for state action on a political issue. This 
kind of violence is diffuse, but can be repetitive and wide-spread. Incidents are local, 
but the issues that motivate the action can be seen across the region and country. 
These low-level, diffuse, repetitive, contentious incidents present a number of 
complications in defining, measuring, and analyzing interactions. As Walter 
comments:  
“Economic models, however, remain frustratingly vague about what is 
meant by repeated play. Does it matter whether a government 
encounters the same challenger again and again, or if it encounters a 
series of different ones over time? If the situation includes a series of 
different players, how similar must each of the players be in order for 
inferences to be drawn?”17 
 
                                                 
15 PRIO, “Armed Conflicts Version 4-2008 - CSCW.” 
16 P. Barron et al., “Understanding Violent Conflict in Indonesia: A Mixed Methods Approach,” Social 




17 Barbara F. Walter, Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are so Violent (Cambridge 




Walter argues that there are three key factors in identifying repeated play—
repetition, issue specificity, and observability. In other words, actors do not need to 
be identical, only maintain the same topical focus, and repeated incidents cannot be 
hidden if they are to inform the decisions of the actors involved. In general, gaining a 
better grasp on the mechanisms of low-level contention will allow researchers to 
create more accurate models that capture the complicated relationships between 
interacting parties. Walter provides a starting point but further research is necessary 
to fill in cases beneath the civil conflict level of violence.  
Another gap that needs to be addressed to predict likely patterns in contention 
is the possibility of repetition without escalation and the factors that make escalation 
more or less likely. Both in the academic literature and in journalistic accounts of 
violence, we rely heavily on assumptions about the nature of conflict escalation.18 
Generally we assume that large events come from small ones—that actors escalate to 
violence when they cannot achieve their ends through regular politics or non-violent 
contention. In her analysis of the escalation of low-level identity conflicts, Tajima 
comments, “Many commentators have attributed the increased violence to the 
weakened state institutions which allowed latent conflicts to explode from what 
began as seemingly minor incidents.”19 However, the literature is not robust enough 
to back up this assumption, particularly at low levels of violence.20 This hole in the 
field is due primarily to the difficulty in acquiring good data at such low levels over a 
                                                 
18 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (Yale University Press, 
1987). 
19 Y. Tajima, “Mobilizing for Violence: The Case of Lampung, Indonesia,” World Bank Press, Jakarta, 
2004, http://psflibrary.org/catalog/repository/mobilizing_for_violence.pdf. 
20 Nicholas Sambanis and Zinn, Annalisa, “From Protest to Violence: Conflict Escalation in Self-
Determination Movements,” n.d. 
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reasonable amount of time and across a large geographic area. Where studies are 
available, they have often focused only on individual disputes or on a very limited 
number of cases, making it difficult to identify the key factors that cause or prevent 
escalation. 21   
The assumption of escalation obscures the fact that low-level conflicts are 
important in their own right. Death tolls, while diffuse, can often become quite high, 
as in cases of race riots and the civil rights movement in the U.S. and ethnic rioting in 
Nigeria. Low-level violence can also be the prelude to civil war, as in land disputes 
and cattle raiding in Sudan.22 Barron et al. comment, “If these forms of violence 
cumulatively have serious human security impacts, or if they are a precursor to larger 
outbreaks of unrest, an important part of the picture is missing.”23 
Finally, this loose understanding of escalation creates the impression that it is 
a natural product of unsuccessful political solutions when in fact we do not 
thoroughly understand the mechanisms at play.  In Moroccan nationalist struggles, 
experts claim that “the eruption of violence makes considerable sense, particularly 
when non-violent means have made little headway in achieving nationalist aims.”24 
However, viewing violence as “exist[ing] at the upper end of a continuum of 
                                                 
21 For Example: E. Aspinall, “The Construction of Grievance: Natural Resources and Identity in a 
Separatist Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 6 (2007): 950; T. F. Homer-Dixon, 
“Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,” International Security, 1994, 5–
40; Patrick Meier, Doug Bond, and Joe Bond, “Environmental Influences on Pastoral Conflict in the 
Horn of Africa,” Political Geography 26, no. 6 (2007): 716 – 735, doi:DOI: 
10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.06.001; L. A Kuznar and R. Sedlmeyer, “Collective Violence in Darfur: An 
Agent-Based Model of Pastoral Nomad/sedentary Peasant Interaction,” UC Los Angeles: Human 
Complex Systems. Retrieved from: Http://www. Escholarship. org/uc/item/67x4t8ts, 2005. 
22 N. Sambanis, “Using Case Studies to Expand the Economic Models of Civil War,” Perspectives on 
Politics, no. 2 (June 2004): 259–279. 
23 Barron et al., “Understanding Violent Conflict in Indonesia: A Mixed Methods Approach.” 
24 Chenoweth, Lawrence, and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Rethinking Violence 
States and Non-State Actors in Conflict, 144. 
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conflict”25 is a potentially problematic assumption. Not only are there numerous cases 
where political failure did not yield violence, but “violence is not a quantitative 
degree of conflict but a qualitative form of conflict, with its own dynamics.”26 In 
other words, there should be specific determinants of the outbreak of violence over 
non-violence and understanding these patterns of escalation may be vitally important 
to understanding when and why wars begin, and provide hints about how to recognize 
and head off larger conflicts at early stages. Barron et al. comment:  
“… we still do not have a good theory for why the small sparks of 
localized violence and tensions erupt into the large fires of inter-group 
collective violence. Developing such a theory is important for 
understanding not only the deadly outbreaks of communal violence in 
the past, but also (a) the potential for small-scale conflict and routine 
violence elsewhere in the archipelago to escalate, and (b) the scope for 
interventions—by the government and/or civil society. If, with the aid 
of theory, we can understand how to prevent sparks from becoming 
fires, perhaps one can also hope for fewer and less deadly violent 
conflicts in the future.”27 
 
Scholars are increasingly beginning to call for such research to fill holes in 
our understanding of conflict escalation mechanisms and to suggest initial 
mechanisms for investigation. Barron et al. go on to parlay some of the field’s 
shortcomings into avenues for research:  
“First, the comparative work has not fully considered the processes of 
escalation, which turned existent social tensions into smaller-scale acts 
of conflict to larger-scale episodes of violence. Second, the 
explanations have largely been structural, and hence often rather 
deterministic, focusing on demographic shifts, economic balance, and 
changing access to political power, and have underplayed the 
importance of the processes of mobilization. Third, there has been an 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 Rogers Brubaker and David Laitin, “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence,” Annual Review of Sociology 24 
(1998): 423–452. 
27 Barron et al., “Understanding Violent Conflict in Indonesia: A Mixed Methods Approach,” 19. 
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overriding emphasis on macro explanations for the outbreak of 
violence in certain localities.”28 
 
Other authors argue that a key determinant in escalation is the expectation of success, 
drawing on research showing that non-violent movements are more effective and less 
costly therefore that violent options are only preferable if non-violent options have no 
expectation of success. In their study of the effectiveness of civil resistance, Stephan 
and Chenoweth note, “Our findings show that nonviolent campaigns have achieved 
success 53 percent of the time, compared with 26 percent for violent resistance 
campaigns.”29 Research into this area has identified the ability to prompt security 
force defections, education level, and institutional strength as important mediating 
factors determining whether nonviolent tactics will be effective, assuming that 
violence ensues when these strategies are ineffective.30   
In order to answer the question of how groups weigh these options, and when 
one choice is more likely than another, we need to look at them side by side, rather 
than studying non-violent protest and war independently. For instance, Sambanis 
comments: 
“Nigeria, for example, has been a false positive war prediction for 
many years, but it has seen a lot of ethnic rioting. It would be valuable 
for our theories and for policy design to understand why a country 
such as Nigeria, which has not had a civil war in the past 15 years or 
so, but has rather had a lot of rioting with high numbers of deaths.”31 
 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 20. 
29 M. J. Stephan and E. Chenoweth, “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent 
Conflict,” International Security 33, no. 1 (2008): 8. 
30 R. Shaykhutdinov, “Education for Peace: Protest Strategies of Ethnic Resistance Movements,” 
Journal of Peace Education 8, no. 2 (2011): 143–155; S. E. Nepstad, Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil 
Resistance in the Late 20th Century (Oxford Univ Pr on Demand, 2011); Stephan and Chenoweth, 
“Why Civil Resistance Works.” 
31 Sambanis, “Using Case Studies to Expand the Economic Models of Civil War.” 
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Examining various levels of violence may help us explain some of these false-
positives predicted in the opportunity literature.32 By employing a net of diverse 
approaches that  better captures the dynamics in question, research into lower levels 
of violence will complement—rather than replace—discrete studies of war and 
protest.  
This approach thus takes as a prerequisite acceptance of the field of 
contentious politics—that is, an acceptance that while the occurrence of protest, riot, 
and war may have different characteristics in some ways, that “we can learn more 
about all of them by comparing their dynamics than by looking at each on its own.”33 
McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly define contentious politics as: 
“episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and 
their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object 
of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, 
affect the interests of at least one of the claimants.”34 
 
In asking the question, “why protest, and not war?” for example, one assumes 
that the menu of options for groups engaged in contention includes both of those 
options, and that there is some mechanism that prompts a choice for one action or the 
other.  Barron et al. comment, “…if we do not study peace and violence together, we 
cannot conclusively show which factors were really causal in producing either.”35 The 
same holds true of looking at both violent and non-violent iterations of contention. 
                                                 
32 Michael D. Ward, Brian D. Greenhill, and Kristin M. Bakke, “The Perils of Policy by P-Value: 
Predicting Civil Conflicts,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 4 (July 1, 2010): 363–375, 
doi:10.1177/0022343309356491; P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, vol. 56 
(Oxford Univ Press, 2004); J. D. Fearon and D. D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 
American Political Science Review 97, no. 01 (2003): 75–90. 
33 Doug McAdam, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 4. 
34 Ibid., 5. 
35 Barron et al., “Understanding Violent Conflict in Indonesia: A Mixed Methods Approach,” 19. 
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This approach does not assume that the processes and structures leading to either 
protest or war are the same, rather it allows us to examine how these mechanisms 
may differ from each other. Nor does it assume that the same rules apply once 
conflict is initiated—war can break from “regular politics” without voiding the 
observations of contentious politics regarding the onset processes. 
There is a need, in short, for research on the roots of larger conflict and the 
mechanisms whereby violence escalates from non-violent strategies to low levels of 
violence. This approach should analyze non-violence next to violence to expose the 
underlying relationships and mechanisms that lead some disputes to escalate. To do 
this we must also analyze repeated events in contentious sequences, which poses data 
challenges, but has great potential to supplant existing assumptions about low level 
conflict and escalation with empirically supported findings.  
 
III. Environmental Disputes as Sites of Low-Level Conflict 
Looking at the universe of low-level conflict cases, prior research indicates 
several issues that are likely to generate these types of conflicts. Studying these likely 
cases provides a starting point for creating a theory about the factors that lead to low-
level violence. Certain types of disputes are more likely to evolve in this manner, and 
the most prominent of these types appears to be land and environment conflicts.36  
Homer-Dixon’s classic research in the field of environmental conflict 
comments that “violence tends to be subnational, diffuse, and persistent.”37 While a 
healthy body of literature has shown this conflict to be largely within, rather than 
                                                 
36 Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict.” 
37 T. F. Homer-Dixon and J. Blitt, Ecoviolence: Links among Environment, Population and Security 
(Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 11. 
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across states, there has been limited work tracking what mechanisms link 
environmental factors with violence below the 25 battlefield deaths threshold.38  
The past ten years have seen a blossoming of quantitative work in the field, 
but unfortunately much of this early research has been contradictory. Hauge and 
Ellingson found that soil degradation, population density, water scarcity, and 
deforestation all increase the risk of civil conflict and civil war, while in the same 
year Esty et al. published a paper finding no direct effects on state failure.39 De Soysa 
found that population density increases the risk of conflict, while Collier and 
Hoeffler, and Hegre and Sambanis found no effect of population density.40 Miguel, 
Satyanath, and Sergenti found that deviation from standard rainfall increases the risk 
of civil war and civil conflict--as did subsequent research by Saleyhan and Hendrix, 
and Hendrix and Glaser--although they also found that water scarcity decreases the 
risk of war and conflict, while Raleigh and Urdal found that water scarcity increases 
the risk of conflict.41  Another study by Raleigh and Kniveton found that rainfall 
                                                 
38 A. T. Wolf, S. B. Yoffe, and M. Giordano, “International Waters: Identifying Basins at Risk,” Water 
Policy 5, no. 1 (2003): 29–60; Thomas Bernauer and Tobias Siegfried, “Climate Change and 
International Water Conflict in Central Asia,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 
227–239, doi:10.1177/0022343311425843; Anna Kalbhenn, “Liberal Peace and Shared Resources—A 
Fair-Weather Phenomenon?,” Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 6 (November 1, 2011): 715–735, 
doi:10.1177/0022343311420459. 
39 W. Hauge and T. Ellingsen, “Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict,” Journal 
of Peace Research, 1998, 299–317; D.C Esty et al., “State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings” 
(Science Applications International Corporation, 1998). 
40 I. De Soysa, “Ecoviolence: Shrinking Pie, or Honey Pot?,” Global Environmental Politics 2, no. 4 
(2002): 1–34; Collier and Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War; H. Hegre and N. Sambanis, 
“Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 4 
(2006): 508. 
41 E. Miguel, S. Satyanath, and E. Sergenti, “Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental 
Variables Approach,” Journal of Political Economy, 2004, 725–753; Cullen S. Hendrix and Sarah M. 
Glaser, “Trends and Triggers: Climate, Climate Change and Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 
Political Geography 26, no. 6 (2007): 695 – 715, doi:DOI: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.06.006; C. Raleigh 
and H. Urdal, “Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Armed Conflict,” Political Geography 
26, no. 6 (2007): 674–694; C. S Hendrix and I. Salehyan, “Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict 
in Africa,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1 (January 2012): 35–50. 
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abundance significant effected social unrest.42 The most recent wave of environmental 
conflict research has focused on establishing correlations that take into account 
spatial and temporal factors in addition to examining a variety of definitions of 
scarcity and climate change, including temperature, rainfall, and alternative 
approaches such as vulnerability, and indirect effects.43   
Generally speaking, this growing body of work has found a significant 
correlation between some cases of environmental change and conflict. A 2013 meta-
study of the climate-violence field published in Science concluded that the role of the 
climate in interpersonal and intergroup conflict is “substantial.”44 A following 
Economist article commented that: 
“The results leave no room for doubt: higher temperatures and more extreme 
rainfall patterns (leading to drought or flood) really do coincide with an 
increased frequency of conflict for all types of violence. For once, the 
direction of causation seems clear-cut: temperature might conceivably lead to 
a civil war, but a civil war is unlikely to affect temperature (other than 
metaphorically). Precisely how the chain of causation works remains unclear 
for now.”45 
                                                 
42 Clionadh Raleigh and Dominic Kniveton, “Come Rain or Shine: An Analysis of Conflict and Climate 
Variability in East Africa,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 51–64, 
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Despite this growing consensus about the correlation between climate and 
conflict, the lack of clarity regarding the specific mechanisms at play has made many 
leading scholars cautious. Idean Saleyhan (co-author of an important quantitative 
study of rainfall and conflict in Africa) and Halvard Buhaug (another leading scholar 
based at PRIO) were both quoted in another followup Nature article voicing their 
skepticism that the meta-study in question was reliable, lacking information about the 
mechanisms at play.46 Their concerns represent some basic challenges for the field—
how to scope the level of analysis, how to address the role of the political context, and 
the potentially different mechanisms linking scarcity or abundance to conflict. 
Uncritically examining correlation across all varieties of violence without identifying 
the mechanisms poses significant problems; vividly illustrated by the Science article’s 
sweeping conclusion that climate change leads to both civil war and a baseball pitcher 
striking a batter in a game. While not precluding the possibility that climate does 
impact both of these things, we must compare them in consistent ways that account 
for the very different pathways between an overheated pitcher losing her temper and a 
political organization waging war on the state. In the introduction to a recent special 
edition of the Climate Change journal focused on the climate-conflict connection, the 
authors comment: 
“While there is increasing evidence that changes in climatic conditions 
seem to be associated with conflicts, we remain unable to provide clear 
explanations as to how this can happen.”47 
 
                                                 
46 Lauren Morello, “Warming Climate Drives Human Conflict,” Nature, August 1, 2013, 
doi:10.1038/nature.2013.13464. 
47 François Gemenne et al., “Climate and Security: Evidence, Emerging Risks, and a New Agenda,” 
Climatic Change 123, no. 1 (March 1, 2014): 6, doi:10.1007/s10584-014-1074-7. 
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Different states with various capabilities, institutional structures, and interests 
will respond very differently to environmental problems, meaning that a similar 
change in rainfall in ancient Egypt will have very different results than in modern 
Canada. Similarly, comparing cases of environmental scarcity and abundance without 
attending the very different pathways through which these conditions yield violence 
clouds our understanding of the environment-conflict relationship. Finally, the 
sensitivity of these large-N studies to alternate model-specification, indicates that we 
must better understand the mechanisms in play in order to understand why various 
measures of a similar concept yield diverging results.48 
The central issue remains one of unspecified mechanisms—as Josh Busby 
(University of Texas) comments on the New Security Beat blog, “there is far more to 
be gained by focusing on the diverse causal processes connecting climate effects and 
conflict—in short, when and why—rather than further exploring broad 
associations.”49 This backlash within the field to Hsiang et al’s meta-study is 
ultimately a call for better theory.  
Where recent theory-building and qualitative work has been attempted, it has 
pointed at likely directions of further research but done little to answer underlying 
questions about unifying mechanisms seen across multiple cases. For example, 
Deligiannis proposes “a household-livelihood framework,” that would highlight low-
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level conflict,50 but unfortunately data availability makes this level of analysis 
impractical across cases.  
Currently, we cannot decisively answer how environmental scarcity 
contributes to violence, whether the pathways to violence through one environmental 
condition vary from others, and whether environmental factors contribute primarily to 
low-scale violence as opposed to civil conflict and war. Research on the dynamics of 
low-level violence in environmental cases can fill these holes in our understanding of 
how and when environmental factors contribute to violence and perhaps clarify some 
of the contradictions in earlier studies.  
 
IV. Information and Bargaining as Key Factors in Conflict Onset 
The bargaining theory of civil conflict onset has become an important strand 
of conflict research, and the mechanisms and findings of these studies can also inform 
theories regarding lower levels of conflict. The conflict literature has a long history of 
addressing the structural constraints on the outbreak of violence, but research has also 
demonstrated that interactive strategic considerations play a role in conflict outbreak, 
violent conduct, and peace-making.  
The bargaining theory of conflict onset—which has experienced significant 
explanatory success in both IR and comparative politics—suggests that actors pursue 
war even when it is a highly costly activity because of three main factors: private 
information, commitment problems, and issue indivisibilities.51 The private 
                                                 
50 Tom Deligiannis, “The Evolution of Environment-Conflict Research: Toward a Livelihood 
Framework,” Global Environmental Politics 12, no. 1 (2012): 78–100. 
51 R. H. Wagner, “Bargaining and War,” American Journal of Political Science, 2000, 469–484; B. L. 
Slantchev, “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations,” American Political Science Review 
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information strand argues that actors have incentives to maintain private information 
about their capabilities and resolve in an attempt to achieve a better outcome at a 
lower cost. Opponents then are engaged in a process of seeking information about 
commitment and capabilities from each other through those actions that provide the 
most credible signals. Violence most credibly communicates information about 
capabilities and commitment due to its high cost. Thus, actors ‘bargain’ via violence 
even when a more optimal situation might be available in a world of perfect 
information.52 Violence is therefore a relatively rare event, yet it does still occur. 
Chenoweth and Lawrence comment,  
“…domestic actors who seek concessions from the state typically do not 
resort to violence; attacking the state is an extreme form of conflict. Yet… 
relatively little attention has been paid to understanding why erstwhile non-
violent actors sometimes suddenly turn violent. Given that violence can drag 
on for years, be immensely destructive, and impose costs on the actors 
involved and on society in general, the move to abandon non-violent ways of 
resolving conflict in favor of violence is difficult to explain.”53 
 
In the civil conflict context, “a contributing factor in the outbreak of violence 
is a government’s private information about its willingness to negotiate,” says 
Barbara Walter. She describes the bargaining process in secessionist ethnic conflicts 
as “a complex strategic interaction where governments are actively seeking to deter 
separatists, and separatists are carefully seeking to uncover if and when the 
                                                                                                                                           
97, no. 04 (2004): 621–632; S. Werner and A. Yuen, “Making and Keeping Peace,” International 
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government will grant concessions.”54 She argues that one of the ways that ethnic 
groups gauge the likely action of the state is observing past state action and concludes 
that past state violence will diminish the prospects for future violence since the state 
has developed a reputation for refusing to acquiesce.55 
The observation that strategic interaction (and not simply structural factors) 
affects the frequency of conflict onset is an important one, but Walter includes only 
two of many possible factors that actors consider when analyzing their possible 
courses of action. Given the degree of uncertainty in these considerations, however, 
more concrete assessments based on prior behavior may be the most credible. In other 
words, Walter focuses on the reputational information that contributes to claimants’ 
assessments of their likelihood of success, but this is not the only information that 
may matter. This other information may vary widely from case to case, but the most 
credible method of communication should lie in the actions of the state. 
Furthermore, Walter tends to qualify the government as an absolute type—
either resolute or irresolute—based on its behavior in the information exchange 
process. However, there is no reason to believe that all contentious issues, peoples, 
and areas will be dealt with equally. Governments are often resolute on certain 
issues—territorial issues most commonly, but also issues of particular salience to 
their electorate or selectorate—while they are flexible and willing to bargain on other 
issues. They may also privilege certain segments of the population above others—
urban over rural or one ethnic group over another. Thus the mechanism must allow 
for the information assessment process by the claimants to be much more localized—
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focusing on prior state action in response to similar claimants, as opposed to using 
prior action to determine an absolute type of government. 
Lastly, Walter acknowledges that due to data constraints she does not examine 
the shift from “conventional politics to more violent forms of protest, or whether 
government behavior before the outbreak of violence had any effect on what types of 
demands were made, or what strategies were pursued.”56 She also notes that the study 
cannot determine whether government accommodation to non-violent claims had any 
effect on group demands or violence. 
In cases of low-level contention, information is even scarcer than at the 
standard conflict levels.57 This should make the presence of previous interactions, and 
their informational content, more likely to color the strategic decisions of claimants. 
With this difference, there is good reason to expect that bargaining theory can apply 
to low-level violence. 
Overall, bargaining theories of civil conflict have provided important insights 
into the onset of violence, but these studies have focused on larger forms of conflict 
and have neglected lower levels of violence. Using the bargaining framework to 
analyze disputes before they even become violent may yield important insights into 
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V. Informational Content of Scarcity Type 
In additional to violence and past behavior, scarcity type and the division of 
environmental goods can have informational content. Thomas Homer-Dixon 
identifies three types of environmental scarcities: supply-induced (environmental 
change), demand-induced (demographic change), and structural scarcity (unequal 
distribution).58 Supply and demand scarcity are opposite sides of a coin—the ratio of 
people relying on natural resources to the measure of resources that are available—
while structural scarcity is an imposed inequity often constructed by the government. 
Simple scarcity is what we generally think of first, where the environment has been 
damaged or degraded in such a way that environmental goods (food, water, air, 
shelter, fuel) are no longer available or are insufficient to support the abundance of 
people attempting to live off of them. Structural scarcity, in contrast, describes a 
situation in which environmental goods are divided in an uneven manner so that parts 
of the population lack access to the environmental goods necessary for their survival. 
Often, when simple scarcity appears, governments also take action to guarantee 
access for privileged actors so that environmentally-impoverished actors are plunged 
into even deeper need.   These inequalities may exist across ethnic groupings, 
between state-owned and private enterprises, or between local farmers and foreign 
corporations.  
Many people do not immediately identify land disputes as a type of 
environmental scarcity conflict, but this is simply due to an overly narrow reading of 
“environmental” limited to cases of simple scarcity as opposed to structural scarcity. 
Access to land underlies the provisioning of most environmental goods, which are 
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generally assumed to be “free” environmental services. When the state denies land 
rights to some groups, it imposes structural inequities and creates environmental 
scarcity, posing significant challenges for survival in impoverished regions. Helliker 
and Murisa comment,  
“The majority (about sixty-five percent) of the rural poor in Southern Africa 
depend primarily on agriculture for social reproduction. In such a context, 
questions of access to land (and to land-based natural resources such as water) 
are critical to any discourse and practice in relation to inclusive pro-poor rural 
development.”59 
 
The conflict literature has typically dealt with land as an issue of national 
territory or economic value. However, at a lower level of analysis, land is one of the 
most important natural resources and shutting off access to land-based environmental 
services can directly threaten individuals’ survival and may prompt dissent and 
violence. Sudan has, for example, long been cited as a prime case of environmental 
conflict; violent conflict increased as environmental conditions caused greater 
competition between agriculturist and pastoralist groups over the same land.60 Land is 
in many ways the invisible natural resource—for years we have discussed timber or 
diamonds as natural resources under contention, but land that produces them is often 
left out of the conversation. Similarly, when we discuss the conflict potential of 
changing climate patterns and rainfall levels, we often fail to acknowledge that a 
farmer must have access to where the rain falls for it to make any difference.  
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There is a key distinction between the types of scarcities experienced in these 
various studies, regardless of whether they are shortages of water, land, food, or 
forest cover—the informational content of simple supply/demand scarcity as opposed 
to the unequal imposition of structural scarcity. While simple scarcity in a particular 
type of environmental good or service does not provide information about the intent 
of the state and may not alter the relative power balance between claimants and the 
government, unequal treatment by the government which causes the initial scarcity, a 
failure by the government to respond to calls to enforce a more equitable distribution, 
or behavior that exacerbates inequity through mitigation activities relays information 
about the government’s capability, its commitment, and the likelihood that it will 
respond to demands for assistance. Citizens understand that a government which 
discriminates against them is less likely to acquiesce to their demands—particularly 
when their competition for environmental goods is a favored ethnic group, company, 
or other actor—unless they bring other pressure to bear. This distinction may shed 
light on why some scarcities seem to matter for conflict onset and others do not. 
In sum, environmental scarcities can be categorized and differentiated in a 
great variety of ways—by the natural resource in question, by whether it is growing 
population or shrinking resources that initiated the scarcity, or by the speed of change 
relative to institutional capacity to adapt.  However, inequitable policies regarding the 
distribution of environmental goods and services send a signal to claimants that is 
particularly salient for the onset of violence. Applying a bargaining theory of conflict 
to low-level environmental disputes helps to reveal the important informational 
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differentiation between structural scarcities and simple scarcities. This could provide 
part of the missing mechanistic link that connects environmental scarcity to violence.  
 
VI. Transitioning Other Lessons from the Conflict Literature into Low-Level 
Contexts 
Bargaining theory of conflict initiation offers a variety of valuable insights 
that should hold even in a low-level violence context, but the conflict literature is a 
diverse body constituted of a number of research branches. Other important insights 
from the conflict literature that are relevant to understanding the emergence of low 
level environmental violence and persistent contention include the effect of 
capability, state repression, ethnic conflict, and the presence of a larger conflict 
region.  
 
6.1 Capability & Opportunity 
The bargaining literature on conflict does not generally assume that structural 
variables do not matter, merely that strategic interaction also matters. Primary among 
the structural constraints on conflict and war is the capability of rebels to rebel and 
the capability of the government to repress them. The general conflict literature has 
been relatively unified in its focus on capability as a contributing factor to conflict 
initiation and its dismissal of grievance-based arguments.  However, when we narrow 
our analysis to the environmental security literature, the findings have been 
potentially confounding to the expectations of the larger conflict field. This implies 
that looking at all conflicts without regard for their diverse onset mechanisms may be 
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counterproductive, while separating conflicts by onset-type may shed light on when 
and how violence appears.  
As discussed above, environmental conflicts are particularly puzzling when 
viewed through the general conflict literature since scarcity should yield reduced 
capability and disincentivize conflict. Scarcity arguments have generally been 
associated with grievance-side arguments, as opposed to the more dominant 
capability and opportunity-based arguments.61 However, grievance arguments have 
been repeatedly challenged in the modern conflict literature, not least by Fearon and 
Laitin who argue, “if, under the right environmental conditions, just 500 to 2,000 
active guerrillas can make for a long-running, destructive internal war, then the 
average level of grievance in a group may not matter that much.”62 On the other hand, 
capability and opportunity-based arguments do not explain the growing body of 
statistical research showing a correlative relationship between scarcity and violence. 
Gemenne et al. note in relation to climate conflict that “even the very destitute act in 
times of crisis to reduce their underlying vulnerability.”63 In order to resolve this 
contradiction we must better understand the mechanisms involved both in a change in 
relative capability, and the effects of scarcity.   
Fearon and Laitin argue, “rebellion is better explained by “opportunity” than 
by grievance.”64  By this logic, if actors are marked by relative incapability—where 
they have little to no capacity to pursue violence in opposition to a stronger force—
                                                 
61 Ole Magnus Theisen, “Blood and Soil? Resource Scarcity and Internal Armed Conflict Revisited,” 
Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 6 (November 1, 2008): 801 –818, doi:10.1177/0022343308096157. 
62 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 88. 
63 Gemenne et al., “Climate and Security,” 7. 
64 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 76;  For the grievance argument see: T. R 
Gurr, “Why Men Rebel,” 1970. 
 33 
 
we should not see them initiate conflict.65 Relative incapability can indicate either 
state strength or rebel weakness, where funding and arms are not adequate to make a 
viable stand against the government. Relatedly, Fearon and Laitin also argue that 
insurgents, being smaller weaker forces by definition, must be able to hide from 
government forces in inaccessible or remote areas—specifically, “rough terrain, 
poorly served by roads, at a distance from the centers of state power”—and they find 
significant support for the argument that mountainous territory is correlated with 
more violence.66 In short, remoteness makes violence more likely.67 
Absent a better understanding of the mechanisms for conflict initiation and 
escalation, the association of scarcity with both grievances and decreased capability 
has made it difficult even for scarcity-conflict scholars to understand why scarcity 
would yield conflict.68  If scarcity makes an actor less capable via hunger, loss of 
income, etc. then an argument based on capability would find the onset of violence in 
this case puzzling.  
The scarcity-conflict literature largely assumes that a lack of food, water, and 
shelter make insurgents less capable of engaging in effective combat.69 Combat 
practitioners like Che Guevara and Mao Tse-Tung also emphasize the importance of 
access to food, water, and shelter.70  Milward comments, “Most economic theorists of 
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war seem to have agreed on the fact that food is a good of unique strategic 
significance.”71  He notes that it is possible to replace steel or coal’s role in the 
economy, but that food is not substitutable for other goods.  A rebel army, for 
example, can find multiple ways of making cash to buy weapons, but without basic 
access to food, water, and shelter, they cannot survive. This indicates that increasing 
environmental scarcities should increase grievances but reduce opportunities for 
violence, making scarcity conflicts a contradiction in terms. Theisen states of 
scarcity-conflicts; 
“Environmental security conflict models rest, to a large extent, on the 
assumptions of relative deprivation theory, implying that renewable 
resource scarcity will give rise to socio-economic grievances that, in 
turn, spill over into conflict.”72 
 
The dominance of capability arguments in the conflict literature generally has 
given rise to resource abundance and resource capture arguments for conflict 
outbreak. However, in studies examining abundance as opposed to scarcity and 
conflict initiation, scarcity rarely shows a statistically significant positive effect. De 
Soysa relates rapacity to opportunity, and paucity to grievance, and concludes that:  
“…rapacity encouraged by an abundance of natural resources tends to 
fuel civil conflict. Paucity of natural resources, on the other hand, does 
not seem to be such a strong factor in determining the likelihood of 
civil strife, despite the recent upsurge of interest in environmental 
degradation and scarcity as a source of conflict.73 
 
Where the environmental conflict literature does address opportunity, it takes 
the form of state weakness. Homer-Dixon argues that environmental scarcities both 
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increase demands on the state and reduce the state’s ability to meet those demands 
due to falling revenues, infighting and fractionalization, and resource capture by 
elites. 74  He also argues that scarcities increase the likelihood of conflict between 
societal groups similarly by increasing grievances and opening opportunities: 
“The five key social effects of environmental scarcity…produce or 
exacerbate conflict among groups…by simultaneously increasing the 
grievances of the affected population and changing the structural of 
political opportunities so that it is more rational to act violently upon 
those grievances.”75 
 
However, Homer-Dixon never specifies why environmental scarcities should 
reduce the state’s capabilities while not reducing the population’s capabilities 
proportionately. Unless this relative capability is altered, it is unlikely that the 
opportunity structure for resistance would be significantly altered. He also does not 
address how and when conflict will ensue between social groups as a function of 
changing opportunity structures.  
Colin Kahl also advances a state-side scarcity-conflict argument, expanding 
on Homer-Dixon’s explanation along two specific mechanisms: 
“The modified version of the state failure hypothesis … suggests that 
violent conflicts occur when [demographic and environmental 
security] puts pressure on both society and the state, simultaneously 
increasing the incentives and opportunities for social groups to engage 
in violence via the logic of the security dilemma. State exploitation 
represents a second pathway to bloodshed. These conflicts occur when 
population and environmental pressures provide state elites and their 
allies with incentives and opportunities to instigate violence that serves 
their narrow self-interests.”76 
 
Similar to Homer-Dixon, he does not adequately address why states fail and 
societies do not. Raleigh and Urdal have attempted to address the question of state 
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failure or weakness as a step in the scarcity-conflict mechanism by conducting a 
large-N analysis examining state weakness as an intermediary between climate 
change and civil conflict.77  They found little evidence that state weakness is a 
significant mechanism linking climate change to violent conflict.  
Nor does the environmental security literature adequately capture the central 
role of power in conflict dynamics. This shortcoming has hobbled the environmental 
conflict literature’s ability to control for and model the interactions between the 
environment and state policies. In their review of the climate-security literuate, 
Gemenne at al. comment: 
“…power remains often absent from the literature on climate and 
security. Vulnerability is a function of power: the power of political 
processes and markets to deny some groups the freedoms and 
opportunities that they need to make choices in their interests and to 
act on those decisions, and the power of institutions to appropriate and 
divert processes that aim to overcome vulnerability.”78 
 
So if scarcity does not increase the relative capability of a military group, how 
can it exert a positive effect on the decision to pursue violence? A cost-benefit 
analysis by the claimants involved may incline them to violence when they have 
greater capability, and thus likelihood of success, relative to any future capability. In 
other words, when the costs of inaction are extreme and when environmental services 
that are crucial to survival become unavailable, claimants must alter the situation or 
die, increasing the likelihood of extreme measures like violence despite the relatively 
stronger repressive capabilities of the state. There may be options other than 
violence—migration, for example—but these cases of desperate scarcity may help us 
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to understand why the environmental conflict literature seems to defy the capability-
oriented expectations of conflict-studies.  
Ultimately, it is clear that relative capability is a crucial factor in conflict 
onset. However, it is also clear that environmental scarcities do yield violence, as 
reviewed in the environmental dispute section above. Research must seek to solve 
this puzzle of apparent decreased capability yielding greater levels of violence. 
Clarifying why this contradiction occurs may help to illuminate the mechanisms of 
low-level conflict generally, not just bridge the gap between environmental security 
and broader conflict literatures.  
 
6.2 State Repression 
In any interactive process there are as many perspectives and strategic logics 
as there are actors. There are discreet logics for governments using violence against 
their citizens and corporations may also have their own logics for utilizing private 
security companies which use repressive tactics against dissent. While there is a 
wealth of research addressing the government-side of this process, there is less that 
illustrates when and how other actors opt into violence.79 This largely overlooked 
society-side process of escalation may contain valuable insights into the mechanisms 
of escalation to violence. 
The repression literature has been bewitched by the question of whether 
repression sparks or subdues unrest. Chenoweth and Lawrence note,  
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“The effects of repression on regime opposition have been widely 
discussed in the literature on opposition in authoritarian regimes. Yet 
repression seems to have contradictory effects. On the one hand, it is 
thought to be a critical authoritarian tool capable of silencing 
opposition. But on the other hand, repression has also been said to spur 
opposition. For example, one historian wrote that repression stifled 
Tunisian nationalists in 1938, but fueled Tunisian nationalism in 1952. 
Repression apparently produces different results at different times. 
Even if repression does provoke opposition, it may do so by prompting 
further peaceful opposition or generating more popular support for the 
cause rather than by specifically causing violence.”80 
 
Many authors theorize that these diverging responses to repression represent the 
relationship between violence and different timeframes —that repression is 
immediately quelling but inflammatory in the long term.81 However, there is little 
empirical research that concludes such a time-variant relationship exists. Research 
has, however, concluded that conflict tends to cluster in both time and space, whether 
due to diffusion, neighborhood effects, refugee movements, or other mechanisms.82 
How exactly time matters for conflict is unclear though, nor are approaches to time 
uniform—sometimes authors refer to the effect of time as the distance between events 
or the density of events, and sometimes they clump all events within a calendar year. 
Davenport, for example, states in an early article that most of the repression literature 
concludes that frequency of dissident events  is the most important factor determining 
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state repression. 83 Other approaches gauge the change in a variable’s effect over time, 
while others merely differentiate present and past effects.84  
Another leading theory in the repression and dissent literature is substitution 
theory, originating with Lichbach and continuing in Will Moore’s work, which 
concludes that actors will opt into the strategy that most is most effective to meet 
their ends—when violent groups are confronted with repression, they will opt for 
nonviolent protest.85 In other words, this theory finds support for the effectiveness of 
repression at reducing violence but not necessarily contention. Despite failing to find 
support for the argument that repression may increase violence, or may increase it in 
the future, Moore opens his article by noting,  
“Repression sparks dissident behavior, yet repression also deters dissident 
behavior; statistical analyses of the relationship between the two indicate that 
both statements can be substantiated.”86  
 
The state-side strategic logic is thoroughly explored by a number of other 
scholars writing on the decision to target civilians and the nature of this targeting 
generally in the context of insurgencies. Valentino et al. argue that states are more 
likely to engage in mass killing against groups that employ guerilla tactics, 
insurgencies with large civilian support systems, and insurgents that threaten its 
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political survival.87  Kalyvas argues that indiscriminant violence is the product of low 
information and a preference for low-cost, short-term policies.88 Downes argues that 
governments target civilians out of desperation to achieve victory, reduce the costs of 
a war of attrition, and acquire territory.89 While these studies focus on an insurgency 
context in which large numbers of civilians are killed, they start to fill in the strategic 
logic of the state-side argument.  Other scholars have focused on repression of riots, 
protests, and other forms of contention. Davenport finds that conflict frequency, 
strategic variety, deviance from cultural norms, and degree of democracy are all 
correlated with political repression.90 Franklin finds that violent challenges in Latin 
American governments most often yield repression, and also that the degree of 
limitation of demands, regime type, and international criticism for human rights 
abuses are also significant determinants of repression.91 In a review of the repression 
literature, Davenport defines one of the most consistent and persistent findings across 
time and space:  
“When challenges to the status quo take place, authorities generally employ 
some form of repressive action to counter or eliminate the behavioral threat; in 
short, there appears to be a “Law of Coercive Responsiveness.”92 
 
While Davenport cites several areas where repression research is under-developed, he 
generally describes a booming subfield that has grown significantly over the last few 
decades.   
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My research will fit into the less-explored half of this literature. I argue that 
both sides of the state-society strategic logic are interesting, but that not every 
research question must address both sides of the equation, rather, the field generally is 
advanced when discrete projects fit together to inform the larger picture of an 
interactive strategic process. Research must attempt to flesh out the role of non-state 
actors in escalation to low levels of violence. 
 
6.3 Ethnic Impacts on Violence 
In addition to capability and repression, previous literature has highlighted 
ethnic divisions and fractionalization as factors in conflict initiation. Ethnic conflict, 
like environmental conflict, has mixed findings on the relationship between ethnic 
schisms and violence. Horowitz argues that plural societies are particularly prone to 
violence, while Anderson claims that it is barriers to minority group social mobility 
that lead to violence.93 Other scholars, such as Posner and Wilkinson, make a case for 
an institutional explanation that incentivizes violence and ethnic mobilization, and 
argue that leaders may strategically activate group identities in order to garner 
support.94 Birnir places the ethnic politics literature within the information and 
bargaining sub-field, identifying ethnic identities as ‘information short-cuts’ for 
voters.95 Fearon and Laitin, however, find little support for ethnic arguments in their 
                                                 
93 D. L Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, vol. 387 (Univ of California Pr, 1985); B. Anderson, 
Imagined Communities (London, 1983). 
94 Daniel N. Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2005); S. I 
Wilkinson, Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India (Cambridge Univ Pr, 
2006). 
95 J. K Birnir, Ethnicity and Electoral Politics (Cambridge Univ Pr, 2007). 
 42 
 
influential study.96 In short, whether ethnicity is regarded as a primordial division 
eternally separating groups of diverse people or a constructed category which elites 
manipulate for their own benefit, it has a disputed, but much studied place in conflict 
studies.  
In addition to looking at ethnicity for its own merits, several scholars have 
identified a particular tendency of ethnic violence to occur in cases of environmental 
competition. Martin notes that the natural disaster literature “finds that sudden 
environmental stress can, under certain social conditions, be a catalyst for deepening 
social segmentation and intensified intergroup competition and conflict.”97  He cites 
the inability of the magnitude of environmental events to account for social response 
as an illustration of this socially constructed intervening factor.  This tendency means 
that “…the surface manifestations of ‘ethnic conflict’ frequently obscure underlying 
causes that have motivated the ‘instrumentalization’ of ethnicity…”98  In other words, 
the environmental roots of conflicts may be masked by ethnic cleavages, which in 
fact are only conditioning the effect of scarcity. This argument is supported by a 
number of other authors: Aspinall argues that in Aceh, Indonesia, the impact of 
resource extraction was conditioned by the presence of identities that facilitated 
collective action, and Olzak argues that ethnic conflict occurs when ethnic groups 
compete over finite resources.99  
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One of the better developed mechanisms in the literature connecting scarcity 
and conflict is that of migration, competition, and conflict. Scarcity drives people 
from their land in search of food, water, grazing territory, fuel-wood, etc. These 
mobile populations move into territory in use by other populations, and may quickly 
over-tax the local environment, creating anew the scarcity that they fled. Even in 
cases where migrants do not decimate the landscape, their use may come in conflict 
with that of “host communities.” The division of the population into refugees and 
internally displaced people on the one hand and host communities on the other 
facilitates clear lines of identity construction, grievance, and conflict between the two 
groups. Other differences, like ethnic divisions, between the two populations can 
exacerbate this problem.100  
Despite the complex relationship between ethnic and environmental conflict, 
it is reasonable to take a conservative approach to identifying land conflicts—despite 
the tendency of ethnic conflict to occlude the underlying issues, these conflicts should 
be identified as ethnic until further research can clarify the relationship, particularly 
in large-N studies where limited time can be dedicated to attributing causes aside 
from the most obvious superficial issue. Particularly at low levels of conflict where 
ethnic mobilization is still minimal, this is a safe assumption. It is, however, useful to 
control for the effect of ethnic fractionalization in these low-level conflicts. 
 
6.4 Larger War and Conflict Environments 
Examining cases of low-level conflict adds an additional potential 
complication of housing these disputes within larger civil conflict environments. 
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Insecurity in the form of civil conflict or civil war makes policing difficult, and as 
such, unrelated violence may increase in contexts of mass violence.101 Individuals 
have less expectation that the rule of law will be enforced and may either take 
advantage of the lack or feel that they need to take matters into their own hands to 
defend their lands or families. Violence may also bleed over from other sources—
secessionist movements may lead to violence over mining pollution if actors frame 
the environmental damage as impacting the same group, as in areas of Aceh, or the 
proliferation of arms in a region may alter actors’ analysis of the benefits of 
violence.102 Larger conflicts create grievances and harden identities that create a 
feedback loop into more conflict at both higher and lower levels. A larger unrelated 
conflict environment in either case should yield more low-level violence.   
 
VII. Conclusion 
Current research largely neglects low-level violence, which obscures our 
understanding of the roots of larger conflict. In order to narrow this gap, a contentious 
politics approach that compares violent and non-violent strategies is necessary. 
Current research also tends to focus on the state-side of repression and dissent, with 
only limited research on the society-side logic. Increasing our mechanistic 
understanding of environmental conflict should help to clarify the relationships at 
play in low-level escalation, and framing disputes as interactive processes can also 
inform when and where violence or an end to contention is likely to occur. Viewed 
through a lens of signaling, the differentiation of simple or structural scarcities sheds 
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light on the likely actions of the state and thus the strategic choices faced by 
claimants. Similarly, scarcity type, past repression, and violence play an important 
signaling role, but we cannot dismiss the material impacts that current violence and 
repression can have on relative capability.  Other variables worth accounting for in 
analyzing patterns in contentious processes include ethnic fractionalization, 
government capability, and a larger conflict setting.  
Filling these gaps in the literature should help us to understand the roots of 
violent conflict, and also to reconcile the dissonance between the expectations of the 
conflict literature with regard to scarcity and the findings in the environmental 
literature. From a policy perspective, answering these questions may also help us to 
adopt strategies that mitigate violence and persistent contention, which can have 
significant costs in human lives, human development and welfare, economic 
development, and political stability.  
The next chapter moves to build on this literature and fill these gaps with an 
interactive bargaining theory of when violence and continuing contention are most 
likely in environmental disputes. It acknowledges material restraints on violence and 
contention posed by repression and violence and also argues that timing is a key 
factor in patterns of violence and contention. The subsequent chapters will then test 
this theory.  
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Chapter 3: Environmental Disputes as a Bargaining Process 
 
I. Intro 
The prior chapter identified key gaps in the literature, and also applicable 
theories that can help us to understand why some environmental disputes escalate to 
violence, or persist over time, while others do not. Of particular relevance is the 
shortage of research on low-level conflict, particularly those factors that make 
society-groups more likely to escalate, and also the contradictory expectations of the 
conflict and environmental conflict literatures with regard to capabilities. While 
accounting for structural permissive factors, viewing contentious sequences through 
an interactive bargaining lens should help us understand the mechanisms of 
escalation.  
In order to address these questions and gaps, I construct a theory below that 
identifies key factors which influence the sequence of events in contentious 
processes. My project attempts to model an interactive bargaining process between 
claimants and the state, focusing on the factors that influence strategic decisions by 
society groups making environmental claims. I argue that scarcity type, past 
repression, and previous violence all have signaling functions that indicate to 
claimants the likelihood of the government acquiescing to their demands without 
further escalation. I posit that constraints on capability in the form of current 
repression and violence also play a role in the likeliness of violence and continuing 
contention. Finally, I propose that the timing of events is critical to patterns in 
violence and contention.  
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The chapter below starts by giving some context for my theory by framing 
these disputes within sequences and within situations of environmental scarcity. It 
then lays out the logic of my theory and the factors that should be most important to 
violence and continuing contention in these sequences. Next, it attempts to 
demonstrate how this theory unfolds in the real world using a brief overview of 
conflict in Chiapas, Mexico. Finally, it translates my theory into a set of hypotheses 
for testing in future chapters.  
 
II. Events within Sequences of Environmental Disputes 
In order to elucidate some basic structure in this dissertation’s context, 
limitations, and unit of analysis, this section discusses what it means to focus on 
events within a sequence and to address mechanisms within environmental disputes 
particularly. First, clarifying how this research will analyze events and sequences is 
essential to building testable hypotheses. Second, identifying the context of this 
project as limited to environmental disputes helps us to understand where we may 
expect these findings to be generalizable, and why I made certain choices in 
methodology and testing. 
 
2.1 Sequences and Events 
Interactive processes depend on repetitive interactions linked into sequences 
of events. Focusing on series of interactions between society and state necessitates 
theorizing sequences of more and less likely events, in which we analyze earlier parts 
of the sequence for the likely process later in the sequence. Moore notes, 
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“…if one has an interest in interaction as a process, it makes a great deal of 
sense to try to conceptualize that process as a sequence of interactions, and 
such a conceptualization is rather distinct from traditional conceptualization of 
intranational conflict.”103 
 
In a sequence of contentious events, the process can escalate to violence, 
remain non-violent, or cease altogether. I theorize that strategic interaction which 
communicates the likelihood that the government will comply with society 
demands—as signaled by structural scarcity, government behavior, and prior 
violence—conditions the likelihood of violence and of continuing contention. This 
project cannot address the likelihood of any contentious event existing in the first 
place, but once the process has started (i.e., a contentious event has occurred) it traces 
the sequence of events that determine whether actors escalate to violence, maintain 
non-violence, or cease contentious activity entirely. In analyzing sequences, we must 
also be interested in the frequency or timing of the sequence. Is a more dense 
sequence of events the same as a more diffuse one? Does repression have the same 
effect when events come fast and furious compared to when events are only 
occasional? Does repression still matter if it occurred four years in the past? In order 
to allow for variance in these issues of timing and also view the sequence as the 
context of each event, the unit of analysis must be the interactions, or events, 
themselves.  
 
2.2 Environmental Disputes 
This dissertation aims to flesh out the mechanisms that link environmental 
factors to conflict in order to clarify the causation that is under-developed in 
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correlative studies of environmental conflict (as detailed in the previous chapter). As 
such, it focuses on environmental disputes to the exclusion of other types of dispute 
and does not attempt to compare or differentiate between these types. The 
conclusions drawn from this study, then, are limited to other environmental disputes.  
Part of my rationale for focusing on environmental disputes is their intriguing 
divergence from the expectations of conflict literature, as discussed in the previous 
chapter.  The environmental conflict literature shows that those most vulnerable to 
shortages of environmental goods are subsistence farmers with little capability to 
replace the food, water, income, and shelter that they acquire from their natural 
environment.  This population composes a large population of rural poor.  
“Most of the world’s poor are farmers; they share the same profession and the 
same challenges… They are tasked with growing enough food to support their 
families with only tenuous access to land and natural resources, the most basic 
of tools, and increasingly unpredictable weather patterns to deal with.”104 
 
The fact that this scarcity does not appear to reduce the prospects for violent 
conflict suggests that the context of environmental scarcity alters the society-side 
decision matrix by increasing the cost of inaction. Desperate actors struggling to 
survive may have little option but to reach for violence even when the state indicates 
that it is willing to repress the claimant violently.  
Risky violent behavior on the part of farmers should increase when survival is 
dependent on access to the resources being denied. Environmental scarcity, and little 
hope of institutional rescue, drives actors to take any action necessary to secure food 
or other environmental goods necessary for survival. While the costs of violence may 
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still be quite high, if the cost of inaction is likely death or extreme hardship, actors 
will be more willing to engage in that risky violence. Desperation to survive will 
drive some actors to violence even though under other circumstances they might opt 
for less risky strategies. In China, for example, despite relatively extreme repression, 
land disputes remain frequent.  
“The protest that has erupted in a village in China's Guangdong province has 
grabbed headlines around the world, but the issues at the heart of the dispute 
are alarmingly commonplace. Every year, China is plagued by tens of 
thousands of "mass incidents" - a catch-all phrase that the government uses to 
describe riots, protests and strikes. Many are about land rights. …And if there 
are disagreements, they can easily result in angry demonstrations, organised 
by villagers who often feel they have no other option.”105 
 
This is not to argue that capability is not important, but that particularly at low 
levels of violence, environmental scarcities make the high costs of violence less 
deterring.  I do not test this proposition, which is more suited to cross-conflict-type 
comparisons and would obscure my project’s focus on the mechanisms of one kind of 
conflict, but I utilize the insight to identify environmental disputes as a good location 
to explore the dynamics of low-level conflict processes.  
 
III. Strategic Interaction: Repression, Violence, and Scarcity in Low-Level 
Environmental Conflicts 
This section will build on the context and approach described above to first 
detail the process of interaction that occurs between claimants and the state. It will 
then delve into what makes violence and continued contention more or less likely for 
any given event in a contentious sequence. It will focus on the characteristics of prior 
                                                 




events in the sequence, the event itself, and the effect of time on violence and 
contention, while holding constant the other factors identified in the literature as 
important for conflict initiation.  
 
3.1 The Process 
The process begins with an interaction (either violent or non-violent) between 
claimants and the state regarding an environmental scarcity. This interaction signals 
the claimants’ demands and their commitment to reaching their political goals, as 
well as the state’s interests and commitment to a course of action. These signals lead 
to variation in the presence of violence and in the likelihood that contention will 
continue.  
Since I am diverging from the standard conflict literature’s definitions of 
violence at 25 or 1,000 battle-deaths, to look at lower-level conflicts that may have 
only generated a single fatality, I will first define what I mean by violence. I am 
building largely on Schock’s definition of violent political action as involving “the 
use of physical force or the threat of physical force against human beings in pursuit of 
political objectives.”106 This excludes methods such as sit-ins, non-violent protests, 
sabotage, strikes, and blockades, which may seem fiery, but do not involve violence 
against people.107 This is a narrower definition than common parlance, but it falls in 
line with the norms in the conflict literature in that it is concerned specifically with 
deaths (as opposed to other forms of contention that an average person might consider 
violence such as assault or vandalism).  
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Since contentious politics are not necessarily violent, I will also define my use 
of that term. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly define contentious politics as: 
“episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and 
their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object 
of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, 
affect the interests of at least one of the claimants.”108 
 
I adopt this definition and its exclusion of non-collective struggle, including crime. 
While environmental scarcity may also increase the crime rate in the area, this 
dissertation remains focused on political violence and does not explore that question. 
As McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly clarify, “episodic” refers to ad hoc political events 
and “public” refers to events of general (not private) interest that have political 
ramifications.109 These events can take a wide variety of forms. 
“Scholars have identified hundreds of nonviolent methods—including 
symbolic protests, economic boycotts, labor strikes, political and 
social non- cooperation, and nonviolent intervention—that groups 
have used to mobilize publics to oppose or support different policies, 
to delegitimize adversaries, and to remove or restrict adversaries’ 
sources of power. Nonviolent struggle takes place outside traditional 
political channels, making it distinct from other nonviolent political 
processes such as lobbying, electioneering, and legislating.”110 
 
The initial contentious interaction—violent or non-violent—can have both 
material and informational content. Material capabilities may be altered if the 
interaction is violent or attracts new participants to a societal movement, and 
information may be updated regarding interests, commitment, and capability. 
Following Fearon, Walter, and the bargaining theory of war, I propose that the most 
credible sources of information regarding the government’s stance are the 
government’s past and present actions on related issues in the same area, the presence 
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of violence in the past or present, and unequal treatment of various groups (i.e., 
structural scarcity). These signals impact claimants’ choices by indicating the likely 
consequences of their menu of actions. (The impacts on government choices of 
repression or violence against civilians are well covered in the literature, as discussed 
in the previous chapter.) McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly call this process collective 
attribution: 
“Collective attribution…involves (a) invention or importation and (b) 
diffusion of a shared definition concerning alterations in the likely 
consequences of possible actions (or, for that matter, failures to act) 
undertaken by some political actor.”111 
 
Claimants then choose a course of action based on the costs of action or 
inaction and their belief in the likelihood of success of nonviolent or violent 
strategies, based on the information they have gathered through their interactions with 
the state. According to McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, actors establish: 
“(1) a probability that the initiation of interaction X will produce outcome Y, 
and (2) a causal theory connecting Y to X. Thus the actor reasons from 
outcomes to appropriate interactions, from interactions to likely outcomes, or 
more plausibly both at once. Even in this radical simplification we sense the 
great importance of previous experience in shaping highly selective 
repertoires of contention.”112 
 
If the state has already responded supportively or seems likely to address the 
group’s concerns adequately without any escalation, then it is unlikely that violence 
will occur or contention will continue. Scott notes: 
“In the Third World it is rare for peasants to risk an outright confrontation 
with the authorities over taxes, cropping patterns, development policies, or 
onerous new laws; instead they are likely to nibble away at such policies by 
noncompliance, foot dragging, deception. In place of a land invasion, they 
prefer piecemeal squatting; in place of open mutiny, they prefer desertion; in 
place of attacks on public or private grain stores, they prefer pilfering. When 
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such stratagems are abandoned in favor of more quixotic action, it is usually a 
sign of great desperation.”113 
 
If demands can be met without continuing contention, then contention should 
not continue, and where continuing contention is necessary, nonviolence should be 
the preferable choice; not only is violence more costly, it also has a lower chance of 
success than nonviolent strategies.114 Although claimants should prefer to resolve 
issues without contention and barring that, nonviolently, they may interpret signals 
from the government to mean they stand no chance of success unless they change the 
cost-benefit analysis of the government. This cost-benefit analysis can be influenced 
through violence or through  non-violent events by what Chenoweth calls “seizing 
control of the conflict through widespread noncooperation and defiance.”115 The state 
must expend money, personnel, and time addressing the issue, and may lose 
legitimacy domestically or internationally by mishandling the situation. It is through 
convincing the state that these costs will increase if the state does not acquiesce to 
claimants’ demands that otherwise powerless groups can seek political change.  
 
3.2 Escalation Factors 
Claimants may decide to escalate if the state has demonstrated that it is 
unlikely to acquiesce to the claimants’ demands by responding repressively to prior 
events, engaging in violence in prior events, or by privileging other groups over the 
claimants.  However, claimants may also be constrained by changes in material 
capability due to current violence or repression. Lastly, very dense events may signal 
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a need to escalate if they suggest that the current tactics are not altering the state’s 
cost-benefit analysis. 
 
3.3 Repression  
Repressive behavior in prior events, like arresting, bullying, or threatening 
claimants, signals that the government is willing to expend resources to not comply 
with claimants’ demands. This is a more credible signal than “cheap talk” that costs 
the government nothing. Following Davenport and Goldstein, I define repression as 
involving: 
“…the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or 
organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state for the purpose of 
imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or 
beliefs believed to be challenging to government personnel, practices or 
institutions.”116 
 
While repression can include violence, I treat violence as a different concept 
and address it below.  In the face of repressive state behavior, claimants who believe 
that their survival depends on access to the environmental resource in question should 
be more likely to escalate to violence and continue contentious activity because they 
have little reason to believe their demands will be met without raising the costs for 
the government. This effect is illustrated in the escalation of the Mau Mau resistance 
into a full blown rebellion: 
“Popular reaction to the mass arrests was swift among the most committed of 
the Mau Mau initiates. Over the next few months, as many as 20,000 mostly 
young, poor (read landless), male Kikuyu fled to the forest reserves to the 
north and west of Nairobi. The active military phase of the struggle had 
begun. It grew out of a complicated, but by now familiar pattern of conflictual 
interaction among various challengers and state and nonstate elites 
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increasingly attuned to each other’s’ actions and to the shared sense of 
uncertainty and threat embodied in the developing situation. In this sense, the 
declared Emergency and the Kikuyu retreat to the mountains were but two of 
the later and more dramatic iterative moves in the escalating conflict.”117 
 
Even if the state eschews repression in one event and demonstrates that it is 
likely to pursue complete inaction, claimants will likely escalate since the threat-to-
survival posed by environmental scarcities persists. Hence, as the state’s actions 
become less compliant and more indicative of committed resistance, violence is more 
likely and curtailment of contention becomes less likely.  
However, the conflict literature also tells us that while state actions may signal 
the state’s intention and commitment and lead to more contention and violence in the 
future, the state can also successfully repress contention and violence. In short, much 
of the literature concludes that repression works at least so far as immediately 
reducing the incidence of violence.  However, other studies find mixed effects and 
show that repression may increase violence over the long-term or increase the 
incidence of nonviolent contentious politics through substitution.118 Hence the time-
variant effects of repression (past and present) and violence (past and present) do not 
vary uniformly across time. 
In the long term repression may stir up grievances, increasing violence 
through the process detailed above and in the previous chapter.  This long-term effect 
of repression has to do with the process of information dissemination and 
recruitment—in essence the lagged collective attribution process analyzing 
government signals and the likely consequences of each course of action. In India 
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government signaling over land disputes has driven many civilians to join the Maoist 
insurgency: 
“Sundar identified and condemned a raft of repressive government policies — 
from throwing locals off their land to commandeering schools — and insisted 
that such repression constitutes the prime reason for recruitment to the 
insurgency. “Injustice more than inequality” explains why people join the 
Maoists, she said.”119 
 
In other areas, short-term repressive action has controlled, but not eliminated, 
contentious action. As substitution theory suggests, repression may prompt actors to 
simply substitute the repressed strategy for a different one.120  In Pakistan, where the 
timber mafia has created environmental scarcities and inequities: 
“Growing protests from those threatened by the unchecked exploitation of the 
forests have led to reprisals by profiteers. Although widespread conflict has 
been avoided, incidents occur regularly.”121 
 
When the government is repressing the current event, material limitations 
should reduce the short-term incidence of violence while simultaneously making 
contention less likely to end since claimants will simply try to switch to other 
strategies of contention. Past repression, however, should have a uniform effect of 
increasing violence and contention. This time-differentiated effect on the likelihood 
of violence functions like a gateway, through which fewer contentious sequences 
pass, but those that do are increasingly likely to become violent. This effect of current 
repression on the likelihood of violence is different from the effect on the likelihood 
of ending contention—substitution theory argues that actors will replace violent 
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strategies with non-violent ones when faced with repression. Current repression 
should therefore successfully prevent violence, but not curtail contention.  
 
3.4 Violence 
Prior violence demonstrates even more than repression the government’s 
commitment to bear the costs of non-compliance with the claimant’s demands. Even 
if the state originally targets only a few ring-leaders, the group may understand this 
action as directed at the identity or claimant group as a whole.122 Similar to prior 
repression but on a magnified scale, cases of prior violence should be much more 
likely to see further violence and further contention. The increased magnitude of the 
effect of violence is the first major theorized difference between the impacts of 
violence and repression. Secondly, while I argue that the effect of current repression 
on violence is negative, for obvious reasons I do not theorize the effect of current 
violence on violence. 
Substitution theory stipulates that current violence, like current repression, 
leads claimants to alter strategies but not curtail contention entirely, in contrast with 
the expectations developed in the broader conflict literature that fatalities will reduce 
capability and the incidence of contention. This important branch of the repression 
and dissent literature expects that when confronted with violence claimants will 
simply substitute one strategy for another, which should not lead to the end of 
contention. Furthermore, the information signaled by this behavior will convince 
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claimants that they must continue contention to achieve their political demands. 
Current violence should then reduce the likelihood that contention ends.  
Given that the critical mechanism here is one of information exchange 
regarding commitment to particular policy demands or the status quo through 
signaling mechanisms (i.e. violence, unequal treatment, or contentious action), the 
initiating party is not a salient factor since both parties must choose to engage or not 
engage in a continuing process of interaction. A death in an event signals a strong 
commitment, on either side of a dispute, since repression, contention, and resistance 
all have to rise to a certain level for this kind of violence to occur. From a signaling 
perspective, who kills whom is irrelevant. Both parties have persisted in their 
demands (either for a political change, or for the cessation of contention) to such a 
degree that violence erupted. If, for example, angry claimants storm a police-line with 
broken bottles, and in the ensuing chaos a claimant is shot by a police officer, citing 
this as a case of police signaling is misleading. Rather, it is a signal of the 
commitment on both sides that each party did not back down to the point of violence. 
Additionally, each side may view the other as having “started it” through their actions 
or lack thereof. In the example above, the police may blame the claimants for 
charging their line, while the claimants may blame the police for having fired the shot 
that killed someone. Furthermore, while pre-contention periods may feature factors 
that make one group or another more likely to initiate contention and violence, this 
theory starts after this point of initiation, tracing the patterns of contentious sequences 
and not patterns leading to contentious sequences. If grievances are common, but 
violence is rare, this middle stage of mutual signaling and commitment between an 
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Structural scarcity demonstrates that the government is promoting interests 
distinctly in conflict with those of the claimants. When viewed through a bargaining 
theory framework, the signaling difference between “simple” supply/demand scarcity 
versus structural scarcity is the key distinction that leads structural scarcity to be 
particularly incendiary. Structural scarcity manifests as cases of access and control 
disputes, and will yield higher levels of violence since it communicates preferential 
treatment as opposed to simple shortage. This preferential treatment can be more 
effectively protested than simple scarcity cases, since, for example, governments do 
not have the ability to make the rain fall, but they do have the ability to rewrite land-
access laws. In some cases, governments can enact environmental protection 
regulations, or provide money for cleanup efforts, but cases of unequal distribution 
are still more alterable by policy changes than simple scarcity, meaning that violence 
and continuing contention are more likely because they can have a greater effect and 
the responsibility for the inequality lies with people, rather than the ecosystem. I 
propose that in cases where the government has showed its preference for another 
group over the claimants, violence and contention should be more likely because the 
claimants will interpret the inequitable policy as a signal of government intention and 
commitment, and will conclude that they need to change the government’s cost-





In examining sequences, not only the characteristics of a sequence or an event 
matter, but also the timing with which these characteristics and events occur. Time 
impacts the likelihood of violence and continuing contention in three ways. The first 
is discussed above for repression and violence—the effects of some factors vary 
depending on whether they are in the present or the past. The second effect of time is 
the declining impact of these effects as they move farther into the past. Third, dense, 
frequent events make violence and continuing contention more likely. 
Often when we discuss the effect of one thing on another, we assume either 
that this effect is consistent across time or that it occurs within a certain time period. 
When examining a sequence of events, however, it is important to explicitly note 
whether repression that occurred several years prior has the same effect as repression 
in the last year. The information signaled in events that occured farther in the past 
becomes less credible over time due to potential changes in the situation of the 
dispute, whether that be changes in personnel on either side, changes in capabilities 
and commitments, and shifts in policy preferences within the larger political picture. 
Hence, as time goes on, the effect of a past event on the likelihood of violence or 
contention should weaken.  
Density of events, or how much time passes between events, can vary from 
slow, infrequent contention to a fast and furious slew of interaction. Studies focused 
on larger conflicts have found that violence tends to cluster in time and space.123 This 
makes intuitive sense since this clustering may indicate a high level of commitment 
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on both sides, leading to a tit-for-tat strategy of one-upmanship to credibly 
demonstrate that each side’s commitment is greater than their opponent’s. Frequent, 
densely clustered events also increase the risk of potential accidents, which could be 
the spark necessary to inflame violence and fuel persistent contention. Events that 
occur closer to the previous event should therefore be more likely to see violence and 
continuing contention.  
 
3.7 Other Factors that May Impact the Contentious Process 
Other branches of conflict research as discussed in the literature review have 
identified additional factors such as government capacity, remoteness, ethnic 
divisions, and the presence of a larger conflict in the region that will affect the 
likelihood of violence. The previous chapter has detailed standard expectations from 
each of these literatures—in short, greater government capacity and relatedly less 
remoteness should decrease the likelihood of violence, and I extend this expectation 
to continued contention as well. Ethnic divisions and a larger conflict region should 
increase the likelihood of violence and continued contention. I anticipate, however, 
that bargaining theories of conflict will be more salient in low-level conflict 
environments than these largely structural considerations.   
 
IV. How This Process Looks in the Real World: Chiapas, Mexico 
The process described above can be illustrated in the case of Chiapas 
Mexico.124 Chiapas’ environment for decades has been characterized by demographic 
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growth, deforestation, and soil degradation.  Beginning in the 1970s, access to 
government agricultural credit has favored large-scale beef producers.  Economic 
reforms have further separated subsistence farmers from industrial farmers, 
privileging the latter and showing very poor responsiveness to the former.  
Subsistence farmers have been frequently relegated to the least productive land, or 
dispossessed entirely. Unrest and later outright insurgency emerged, demanding a 
change in land policy.  
“The goal of the insurgency, therefore, was to force the government to renew 
its land redistribution efforts with greater honesty; it also hoped to force the 
government to reform the electoral process so that democracy could provide 
an outlet for peasant grievances.”125 
 
Over the length of the conflict, as national policies continued to move farmers 
off their lands, decimate the forest, and relocate subsistence farmers to increasingly 
poor areas, the disenfranchised farmers should have been less capable of resistance, 
but in fact conflict blossomed and escalated. 
“At the edge of the Lacandon, severe land scarcities produced fierce 
competition among farmers, rancheros, squatters, loggers, and indigena 
communities. Conflict grew increasingly frequent and violent from 1972 on as 
the pace of expulsions and intercommunity competition quickened. In the 
1980s, campesino and indigena communities – often in alliance with church 
members of all ranks and denominations – were involved in many protests, 
marches, and riots, mostly against the lack of respect for land rights by state 
elites.”126 
 
Structural inequalities were created and enforced by the state along several 
culturally relevant divisions, a signal to claimant groups about the state’s priorities:  
“As with many government policies, the limits were unevenly applied, and 
peasants in the Canadas region found themselves under a more rigorous 
                                                 
125 Ibid., 45. 
126 Ibid., 45. 
 64 
 
regime, enforced by caciques, than that applied to the growing number of 
rancheros near Palenque.”127 
 
By 1992 EZLN (Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional) began seriously 
arming and mobilizing, and a broad swath of poor Mexicans began to see the PRI 
(Partido Revolucionario Institucional) regime as illegitimate. Government actions 
against the populace both repressed contention and spread grievances. Homer-Dixon 
notes, 
“System legitimacy is therefore a critical intervening variable between rising 
poverty and civil conflict. The Zapatista leadership articulated and channeled 
peasant grievances so as to focus blame for the peasants' hardship on the PRI 
regime.”128 
 
The Zapatistas argued that PRI behavior “signaled that the PRI would never 
honor its land reform and redistribution commitments.”129 The onset of violence (as 
opposed to strategies of relocation and protest) was largely due to the changes in 
government policy that indicated not only a decline in claim strength for subsistence 
farmers, but also communicated the government’s lack of concern over their claims. 
A continued trend of violence over time convinced society that the government was 
committed to not acquiescing to their demands. Government actions also created 
structural scarcities, particularly of arable land necessary for the livelihood and 
survival of rural farmers. This combination of government actions made it clear that 
cooperative nonviolent strategies were not going to be effective in order for small-
time farmers to survive.  
The following section converts this story into a series of testable hypotheses. 
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V. Hypotheses  
The central contention of this dissertation is that structural scarcity, past and 
present state behavior and violence, and timing are important factors in the incidence 
of low-level violence and the likelihood that contention in environmental disputes 
will end. Information about the state’s likelihood of acquiescing to claims is most 
strongly communicated to claimants through past repression, past violence, and 
whether the scarcity is unequally imposed on a limited population. Current state 
violence and repression also signal state intent but their impact on materially 
capabilities has a stronger impact on claimants’ immediate ability to engage in 
contentious politics and violence. Violence and continuing contention are most likely 
when the state and its agents have demonstrated an unwillingness to capitulate to the 
claimant demands either through repressive actions, prior violence, or preferential 
treatment of other groups. These actions convey to claimants the government’s 
preferences and commitment, and can demonstrate that non-contentious claim-
making will have a low likelihood of success. Instead, actors understand that in order 
to improve their chances of convincing the government to acquiesce to their claims, 
they must alter its decision matrix through the use of violence and continuing 
contention.  
However, these actions also have a varying effect over time, first from past to 
present, with contemporary repression reducing the likelihood of violence but past 
repression increasing the likelihood of violence. Second, the effects of the past events 
on violence and continuing contention decline over time, with repression five years 
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ago extending contention less than repression in the last year. And third, dense 
sequences of events produce a greater likelihood of violence and continuing 
contention than diffuse sequences.  
These factors are nestled within the larger political and social structure that 
surrounds the conflict, which previous research has shown can be critical to the onset 
of violence. Key factors in this opportunity structure include state capacity, the 
presence of salient ethnic and religious cleavages, remoteness, and location in a larger 
civil conflict region.  
Although I am ultimately analyzing sequences of events, the unit of analysis 
here is the individual event nested within these sequences. I then ask, given the 
characteristics of the previous sequence and the current event, what is the likelihood 
of violence or of an end to contention? Since every sequence is slightly different (and 
the constellation of salient factors changes over time even in the same sequence in 
terms of types of scarcity, past and present violence, past and present repression, and 
timing), focusing on the likelihood of violence in any given event supplies more 
information about when we should anticipate violence or the curtailment of 
contention in each sequence, than focusing on the likelihood of violence in a whole 
sequence.  
The hypotheses below structure the theoretical story described above into 
testable statements and focus on the change in likelihood for a given event of either 
violence or an end of contention. In all cases, these apply in a context of 




1A) Past state repressive actions are more likely to lead to violence.  
 
1B) However, contemporary repression will reduce the likelihood of violence.  
 
1C) Past repression makes events less likely to conclude the contentious episodes. 
 
1D) Contemporary repression makes events less likely to conclude the contentious 
episodes.  
 
Informational content is communicated most credibly through action, so the 
best clue a claimant has to the likely reaction of the state is recent reactions to prior 
environmental disputes in the same locality. State responses can communicate a range 
of intentions, from likely repression of societal demands, through a neutral middle-
ground, to support for societal demands.  Importantly, this variable is independent 
from the violence variable—I analyze these two concepts separately, both in the 
independent and dependent variables. This allows me to examine cases where the 
state non-violently arrests protesters as a repressive strategy, the effect of which I 
propose may be separate from that of violence because of the different signaling 
value that it will have to claimants. Similarly, because of this different signaling 
strength and the possibly divergent expectations of the conflict literature and 
substitution theory and the corresponding mechanisms of material capabilities and 
strategic choice, I anticipate that these factors may not impact the likelihood of 
violence and continuing contention the same way, particularly as they vary from past 
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to present. Hence, the above set of repression hypotheses breaks out the effect of 
repression into four parts, by time and by the dependent variable.   
There are two dimensions upon which the effect of this variable varies—over 
time and the likeliness of violence and the conclusion of contention. Current 
government repression should reduce the incidence of violence in a given event by 
decreasing relative material capabilities, while past repression should increase the 
likelihood of violence by signaling government obstinacy.  In relation to the 
continuation of contention, past and present government actions should make actors 
less likely to conclude contention entirely; they should respond to repression by 
substituting a more appropriate contentious strategy. 
When there are multiple events in the same locality, holistic pictures of 
society-state relations are more salient than the most recent or most incendiary events. 
This holistic approach addresses the complete history of the locality within the time 
period, rather than only incorporating the most recent event or the most incendiary 
events. This is in line with Walter’s argument that, “it is the full range of 
information… about the government and its history that shapes their beliefs rather 
than any single isolated act at any one time.”130 She goes on to conclude,  
“…governments did not always lose a reputation for being tough simply by 
making one concession to one group… Reputations, therefore, did not have 
the grim reaper quality (where a single act of accommodation caused a 
government to be labeled weak forever) that the theory predicted.”131  
 
In short, government actions in the past should be aggregated in order to paint 
an accurate picture of the effects of a sequence of interactions over time. 
 
                                                 
130 Walter, Reputation and Civil War, 167. 
131 Ibid., 205. 
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2A) Preferential treatment of other groups resulting in structural scarcity is more 
likely to yield violence than simple scarcity. 
 
2B) Preferential treatment of other groups resulting in structural scarcity is less 
likely to conclude the contentious episodes. 
 
A second method by which the state can signal its unlikeliness to meet 
claimant demands is by treating other populations preferentially in the distribution of 
access to environmental goods and services. When the state distinguishes between 
different ethnic groups, provinces, or social, business, or political groups by 
rewarding one group with resources and favorable policies, the less-favored groups 
interpret this as an indicator that their demands are less likely to be met unless they 
bring additional pressure to bear to change the calculations of the government. Cases 
where the state is clearly favoring another group are more likely to yield violence 
than cases where degradation of environmental goods and services occurs without 
distributional inequalities and they are less likely to yield a cessation of contentious 
events.  
 
3A) Prior violence in a locality’s environmental disputes increases the likelihood of 
contemporary violence. 
 
3B) Prior violence in a locality’s environmental disputes decreases the likelihood 




3C) Contemporary death in any given event makes it less likely that an event will 
conclude contentious episodes.  
 
Prior violence in an area increases the likelihood of future violence and the 
likelihood that contention will continue because the past violent events have 
communicated a high state resistance to the claimants’ demands on similar issues. 
State engagement in violence—including the commitment of police and military to 
uphold certain policies or understandings—demonstrates a high level of commitment 
to countering the demands of claimants and a high tolerance for costs (in terms of the 
budget, the endangerment of security forces, and potential threats to regime 
legitimacy). Where prior violence has failed to force the state to capitulate, this is a 
credible commitment to continue countering claimant demands. As such, claimants 
should not expect the state to comply with their demands unless its cost-benefit 
analysis is altered through continued violence and contention. In short, prior violence 
tends to perpetuate itself, yielding higher levels of violence and more contention.  
Current violence’s effect on continued contention should be similar to that of 
current repression, except stronger. Since substitution theory argues that claimants 
will simply switch strategies and not curtail convention altogether and the violence 
signals an unwillingness of the government to capitulate, contention should be more 
likely to continue after violent events.  
Unlike non-fatal government repression and violence, deaths within a certain 
time period have a “grim reaper” quality—a single death overrides other events in 
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which no one was killed. The presence of death is a signal how far the state is willing 
to go in its commitment to non-capitulation, so non-fatal events do not weaken that 
signal in the way that mixed repression and support may.132  
Lastly, I have discussed past and present iterations of time above, but time is a 
complex issue and to account for the many ways time may impact violence and 
contention, a few other hypotheses must account for declining effects of past violence 
over time and the impact of event density. Previous research has concluded that 
conflict clusters in time and space, which would indicate that as events’ density and 
frequency increase, they are more likely to be violent and contention is more likely to 
continue. Dense back-and-forth contentious interactions indicate a high level of 
signaled commitment on both sides, necessitating escalation in order to demonstrate 
greater commitment and alter the other party’s analysis of the situation. Frequent 
events also increase opportunities for accidents and require excellent control on both 
sides.    
Similarly, when past violence and repression occur further back in time, their 
effect on the likelihood of violence and contention should decrease because changes 
that occur over time dilute the signals sent by past behavior.  
 
4A) As events occur farther from the previous event in the sequence, they will be 
less likely to be violent.  
 
4B) As events occur farther from the previous event in the sequence, they will be 
more likely to conclude.  





4C) As violence and repression move farther into the past, their effect on the 
likelihood of violence will become weaker. 
 
4D) As violence and repression move farther into the past, their effect on the 
likelihood of concluding contention will become weaker. 
 
The other factors that are important in determining the likelihood of violence 
revolve around the permissive factors that open a window to conflict or make it less 
likely. These factors must be controlled for in gauging the support which the evidence 
shows for the hypotheses above.  
First and foremost, when there is a strong state capability, violence is less able 
to emerge and contention is less likely to continue. Relatedly, when the areas in 
question are distant from the provincial capital and government resources, violence 
and continuing contention should be more likely. 
Secondly, where ethnic and religious cleavages are salient, a frame for 
understanding any non-preferential government behavior as structural discrimination 
already exists. This increases the likelihood that claimants pursue violence and 
continue contention since frames already exist within the population for viewing 
government policies as indications of the government’s unequal treatment of their 
ethnic group.  
Lastly, when land disputes emerge in regions that are already experiencing 
civil conflict, even if the conflict is unrelated to the land issue, they are more likely to 
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yield violence. The lack of rule of law and the environment of insecurity provide little 
assurance that violence will be punished, allowing predatory violence to run 
unchecked and incentivizing violent measures in defending land and family. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
This theory of violence and curtailment of contention in environmental 
disputes attempts to address the puzzling incidence of environmental conflict, and the 
under-explored patterns of escalation in low-level conflict through analyzing two 
potential outcomes in any event as part of a larger sequence of contention. Insights 
from the conflict, contentious politics, and environmental literature inform 
hypotheses about which factors make violence and contention more or less likely. 
This theory mixes an interactive bargaining model with material restraints on 
violence and contention posed by repression and violence and also argues that timing 
is a key factor in the effect of variables and the likelihood of violence and continued 
contention.  
In the following chapter, I propose a series of methods for testing the 
hypotheses described here and identify Indonesia as an excellent site of inquiry. I 
detail the variables and their coding and provide some preliminary descriptive 
statistics. The two subsequent chapters then analyze the quantitative data and trace an 





Chapter 4: Indonesian Land Policy and Data 
 
I. Introduction 
In the previous chapters I built a theory that identifies key factors which 
influence patterns in low-level violence and contention. This theory models an 
interactive bargaining process between claimants and the state, focusing on scarcity 
type and on repression and violence as signaling mechanisms, but also as potential 
influences on capability. It also argues that the timing of events matters for the 
likelihood of violence and continuing contention. This theory addresses theoretical 
gaps in the research literature, and should also help us to understand which factors 
matter most in policy decisions attempting to avoid further contention and violence.  
Analyzing low-level events involves looking at a large number of cases over 
short periods of time in limited areas. In other words, global long-term analysis is 
both impractical in terms of research resources and impossible due to a lack of 
consistent data. I therefor limit my analysis, and focus on Indonesia post-Suharto, 
where there is good variation on my independent variables without introducing 
possible complicating factors like regime type. Indonesia has experienced a spate of 
environmental disputes due to vague and contradictory land laws. These specific 
laws, detailed below, are limited to Indonesia, but the issue of unclear land law is not; 
many countries around the world face the same problem. New low-level data from 
Indonesia makes quantitative analysis possible (with additions from other data 
sources), and journalistic and academic case studies of Indonesian environmental 
disputes facilitate qualitative analysis as well. To test my theory against this data, I 
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propose utilizing two sets of logit models to find correlative relationships between my 
variables and violence or continuing contention, accounting for variation across time 
and space. I also closely analyze the sequence of events in Mesuji, Indonesia, to 
verify and flesh out the relationships identified in the quantitative analysis.  
This chapter proceeds to propose a site of inquiry, introduce a dataset, detail 
the coding for this data, show some preliminary descriptive statistics, and finally lay 
out several methods for testing the theory developed in the previous chapter.  
 
II. Indonesia 
In order to control for state-level factors such as regime type and GDP on the 
outbreak of violence, I will analyze a series of cases within a single state. Indonesia 
presents a good range on all of my variables and is an excellent location to explore 
the dynamics of low-level violence because of the wealth of recent data and the 
variation in environmental, institutional, and contentious factors across the country. It 
also features a contradictory and vague set of land and environment laws that enable 
regular contention over these issues. 
Indonesia is an amazingly diverse republic spread across an archipelago, with 
a relatively decentralized government. It features over 30 provinces and a handful of 
special regions, has a population of approximately 251 million people, a GDP per 
capita of $5,100, and 39% of the labor force works in agriculture.133 
Disputes over the environment have been frequent in Indonesia, and are 
partially the product of government policies that are unclear or inconsistent in their 
                                                 




application of land-use laws. Indonesian land law is composed of three often 
contradictory systems: Dutch colonial law, national laws of the Indonesian republic, 
and adat (customary or traditional) laws of the Indonesian people.  
“These three legal systems diverged in their policies towards forestry: the 
Dutch principally sought their own profit with little regard for indigenous 
law; the Republic's law, in theory, served the welfare of the majority of the 
population, but, in practice, ignored local laws in order to reap profits for the 
Indonesian elite and foreign investors; and, adat law preserved the rights of 
the indigenous peoples to own land, often communally.”134  
 
Dutch colonial law focused primarily on extraction, but the constitution and the Basic 
Agrarian Law (BAL) of 1960 paid lip service to the adat rights of local populations. 
However, they also claimed all natural resources for the use of the state, including 
land. 
“Article 33, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Constitution states: 
Branches of production which are important for the State and which affect the 
lives of most people, shall be controlled by the State. Land and water 
resources and the natural riches therein shall be controlled by the State and be 
made use of for the greatest welfare of the people.”135 
 
Conflicts between adat and state priorities were always resolved in the 
interests of the state. So while the constitution, and later the BAL, were the first 
documents to recognize adat rights, they did so largely theoretically. They also made 
no attempt to map or survey the land claimed under adat practices, which later led to 
most land in Indonesia being listed as state property.  
In 1962 the Land Reform Programme was initiated, which:  
“…involved the imposition of land ceilings and the redistribution of private 
and state lands. However, with the political turmoil in 1965 and the rise of the 
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Soeharto administration, agrarian reform implementation was stopped in 
1966-1967.”136  
 
Land redistribution was somewhat haphazard, and following the stoppage of reform 
in 1966 much of the land was returned to its original owners or passed to third-party 
hands. The purpose of the original land reform was perceived differently by state 
actors, indigenous populations, foreign companies, and others. While some felt that it 
was the material enactment of previous law that had called for redistribution of land 
to the poor, others saw it as a tool for the state and its cronies to gain access to 
important territory. The government, during this period, also passed a number of 
smaller laws that chipped away at the adat property rights promised by the BAL.  
“In 1963, the Indonesian government, like the nineteenth century Dutch 
colonial administrators, invited foreign investors to participate in logging in 
order to increase the flow of foreign capital in the archipelago. However, true 
forest exploitation did not begin until the government enacted the Basic 
Forestry Law of 1967; a law in theory designed to alleviate the economic and 
social problems the newly-installed government faced.”137 
 
This usage of land law to aid the state in overcoming economic difficulties 
continued into the 80s, when a drop in oil prices pushed the government to find other 
means of maintaining its economic growth rate. The government’s solution included a 
number of laws which facilitated land acquisition by foreign companies.  
“Among them were: Permendagri No. 12 (1984) – How to Make Land and 
Land Rights Available; Presidential Decision 53 (1989) – Promotion of 
Industrial Activities to Entice Relocation of Business and Extension of Usage 
Permits from 25 to 60 years; Presidential Decision 15 (1993) – Land Use for 
Public Good and Implementation of Land Registration (to end the red tape 
that slows down processing of land permits). In summary, the previous 
                                                 
136 Sahruddin Lubis, “Rumahku Indonesia: Land Reform Policy: Case of Indonesia Under New Order 
Government,” 2007, http://rumahkuindonesia.blogspot.jp/2007/08/land-reform-policy-case-of-
indonesia.html. 
137 Rossabi, “Legal Policies Surrounding the Degradation of Indonesia’s Forests.” 
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legislations further protected access to land by big corporations at the expense 
of the peasants.”138 
 
After the fall of the Suharto administration, the Habibie government attempted to 
address some of the problems with the previous land and forest tenure laws. In 1999 
they drafted a new Basic Forestry Law, once again recognizing adat rights, but also 
severely qualifying them. These restrictions required the state to acknowledge the 
adat community, but also mandated that the community have proof of their long-
standing presence in the area, that the forest have clear boundaries, and any number 
of other restrictions that essentially allowed the state to continue to ignore adat 
principles. Other regulations that emerged at this time determining the degree of 
provincial power and autonomy also assigned control over natural resources to 
district governments.139 
This pattern has resulted in many farmers being kicked off of land they have 
farmed their entire lives (and often land farmed by their ancestors) because the land is 
recognized as “state forest” and as such is eligible for sale or lease to corporations or 
plantations or can be designated as a national park—all without permission from the 
local community.  
“Many Indonesian farmers do not have any clear land titles, as it is 
estimated that only 40% of ownership can be proven by formal 
certificates. Moreover, some territories on the national mapping appear 
as "empty", even if they have been inhabited for generations. In 
principle, most of the farmers' communities are covered by customary 
laws that are also recognized by the state. However, land deals are 
extremely profitable both for the authorities and for the companies 
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who negotiate them. The lack of respect for people's rights to land 
makes it extremely easy for companies to brutally evict farmers.”140 
 
It is this confluence of contradictory policies that has created an environment that 
fosters conflict over land in Indonesia.  
Decentralization has also had an effect on the emergence of these conflicts—
laws and customs can vary from one district to another, so that the application of legal 
respect for adat practices can be very different across cases and it can be difficult for 
farmers to gauge how friendly the government is going to be to their claims. Bakker, 
in a study of the connection between land, ethnicity, and conflict in Indonesia 
documents this fracturing of policy norms: 
“The Dayak Lundayeh ethnic group live in the western part of Nunukan 
district and have strong representation in the district parliament. They 
managed to get their ulayat (communal customary) land claims recognised in 
a district regulation. Land rights in the eastern part of Nunukan, on the 
contrary, are fully managed according to national land laws. Much of this land 
is the property of ethnic Buginese, migrants to the area with no adat land in 
East Kalimantan. Landholders here possess land certificates issued by BPN 
(the National Land Agency) and register their land transactions with that 
agency. Bugis are the largest minority group in the eastern coastal area and 
also hold several seats in the district parliament.”141  
 
Generally speaking, scholars disagree on the effect of decentralization on 
governance in Indonesia. Some claim that decentralization allows solutions to be 
better tailored to the unique local situation. They also argue that local problem-
solving is more equitable than centralized decisions.142 On the other hand, some 
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authors argue that a decentralized system allows for the development of “privatized, 
corporatist agreements that fail to reflect diverse values and interests.”143 
Decentralization has also fostered battles for control over valuable fiefdoms, with 
local political candidates often promising vast tracts of land to corporations for 
campaign support.  
Against this backdrop of overlapping and contradictory land laws which often 
produced very different effects from their original meanings, land conflicts began to 
blossom across Indonesia in the late 1990s, spurred on by the collapse of Suharto’s 
long-standing New Order regime. Advocacy organizations and Peasant Unions began 
to sprout up, calling upon the government to respect in practice the adat property 
rights that so many official documents had proclaimed in principle. 
“Rural mobilisation accelerated further after the collapse of the New Order in 
1998. Around the country, peasants occupied land that had been taken from 
them – or from their parents – over the preceding thirty years. Peasant unions 
and other rural social movement organisations gained thousands of 
members.”144 
 
Bachriadi goes on to note that these organizations emerged despite the long-
standing repression of the New Order regime. However, these movements also 
quickly became fragmented, and developed along local issues rather than a shared 
grievance of peasant vs state. Farmers often attempted to retain or regain access to the 
natural resources their livelihoods required by occupying land they had farmed 
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previously, which did not lend itself to mass movements. This curtailed the 
mobilization potential of aggrieved farmers and led to a diffuse network of disputes 
and conflicts instead of a national campaign.145 The scarcities that prompted these 
land grabs were structural, rather than an absolute shortage. The Secretary General of 
the Indonesian Peasant Union commented, “We have the capacity and natural 
resources to feed the whole country yet we are deprived of our land…” and 
government policies have forced 2.16 million farmers from their farms. 146  
In recent years, the government has made promises to improve the land tenure 
laws, establishing an agency to map the entirety of Indonesia and to catalogue and 
resolve land conflicts. But little improvement has been seen on the ground and so 
conflict continues to disturb the Indonesian countryside. Counterproductive policies 
designed to facilitate foreign land investment have also angered many farmers and 
activists who claim that campaign promises have been violated. The government is 
often viewed as untrustworthy and “cheap talk” is not an effective means of 
communicating commitment to the population. Pius Ginting of Walhi, one of 
Indonesia’s largest environmental advocacy organizations, commented:  
"The Indonesian government has many times made this promise in the 
past, saying they want to protect the environment, but then their 
policies still continue… For example, they said they would stop 
mining in national parks, but then they changed the status of 'national 
park' to accommodate mining operations. So we don't believe their 
decision to revoke the permit, as we don't believe it is an honest 
commitment by the government."147 
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Despite some progress, including a two-year moratorium on logging in primary 
forests, there have been widespread claims that logging—both legal and illegal—
continues, often with the collusion of the state.148 
In short, land law in Indonesia is vague and contradictory, often permitting 
whatever policy the state prefers and offering few actual rights to farmers.  Disputes 
between farmers claiming adat rights to land and corporations who have received 
permits from the government to utilize land are common. Resistance is present, but 
has not evolved into a national movement. Instead small-scale land conflicts are a 
regular occurrence across Indonesia. Given the unsupportive government behavior 
and backlog of dispute cases, farmers have little faith that institutional methods such 
as court cases have any chance of success. In this context it is easy to see why land 
disputes often result in contention. 
Although the background to the conflicts detailed above is specific to 
Indonesia, many similarly vague and contradictory regulatory systems exist 
throughout the world. Countries such as Liberia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia, 
Kenya, Sudan, and Sierra Leone have all already experienced conflict due in part to 
unclear land laws.149 Focusing on recent data for Indonesia will illuminate patterns 
that are likely generalizable to many other countries where similar environmental 
regimes foster disputes and conflicts between groups that seek to use the same land.  
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My data covers all environmental conflicts between June 7th 1999—when 
Indonesia held free and fair elections after the fall of Suharto—and the end of June 
2010, across 21 provinces in Indonesia.150 This time period appears short by the 
standards of the conflict-year approach popular with much of the conflict literature, 
but event data over this period of time covers a multitude of disputes: 2,831 events. 
This data is recoded largely from a subset of the National Violence Monitoring 
System Indonesia (NVMS) conflict event database, with augmentation from other 
sources for control variables.151 The NVMS coding team (supported by JRI-Research, 
USAID SERASI, Bappenas, Conflict and Development Program, and The World 
Bank) identified these events through newspaper monitoring in national, provincial, 
and local papers across multiple languages, which allowed the study to track local 
violence on a smaller scale than previous studies have been able to identify.152 These 
events have been verified in cross-checks against multiple independent publications, 
and then have gone through a four-level quality-control process. Overall, the data is 
thorough and reliable. 
I also drew upon the Indonesian Sub-National Growth and Governance dataset 
(G&G), Baden Pusat Statistic (BPS), and various other sources to verify the dates of 
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larger conflicts across Indonesia.153 The G&G dataset (funded and led by Ausaid and 
the Institute of Development Studies),  
“draws together data on the economic characteristics and performance of 
Indonesia’s districts (Kabupaten/Kota) between the years 2001 and 2007 
along with data from a 2007 survey by KPPOD/Asia Foundation which 
measured the quality of economic governance at the district level.”154  
 
The G&G dataset also pulls heavily from surveys executed by Baden Pusat Statistik 
(BPS), the Indonesian national statistics agency.   
I also utilize data directly from BPS for official figures, including provincial 
government size and composition.155  BPS tracks a wide variety of variables, but 
limits what it makes publically available, and has only limited data available at the 
sub-national level.   
In order to verify the correct dates for other conflicts across Indonesia that 
might constitute larger conflict zones, I utilized PRIO data, and for communal 
conflicts I relied on various studies by Gerry van Klinken and also conflict timelines 
from the Ploughshares Fund.156  
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Environmental conflicts include those over land (public or private), natural 
resources (like water or minerals), access (to any kind of resource), and pollution 
(like environmental degradation or air pollution).  My data subset only includes 
conflicts coded as primarily about one of these categories (as opposed to conflicts 
which were coded as primarily electoral or identity-based, and secondarily 
environmental).  
NVMS captures conflict in a range of forms, including demonstrations, 
blockades, riots, group clashes, fights, lynching, terror attacks, vandalism, assault, 
sweeping (removing people from territory or searching by force), and kidnapping. 
There is a language difference in the terminology that NVMS and I use to classify 
these events: NVMS terms “violent” any of the forms above that did or could yield 
deaths, injuries, property damage, or impingement upon personal freedom. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, I define these as contentious events when they are 
non-fatal, drawing on the stronger signal sent by death, and reserve the term 
“violence” for contentious events that have at least one fatality. Additionally, only 
events demanding a policy change are coded—NVMS includes crime without 
political objectives as a separate category, but I do not include these cases. 
NVMS data is event data, in which each case is coded for date, location, and 
the various independent, dependent, and control variables. I am ultimately interested 
in sequences of events, but in order to understand why one part of a sequence might 
make a given outcome more or less likely after a given amount of time, I use 
individual events as the unit of analysis, and code them for the characteristics of their 
                                                                                                                                           




sequence up to and including the current event. This approach allows variation within 
a sequence over time, and can identify when in the sequence violence should occur or 
contention should end.  
Where the data was not time-variable, or was available only at higher levels of 
administrative regions (i.e., district or province as opposed to sub-district), all events 
within the larger group or over time are coded consistently on that variable. In other 
words, if sub-district was not available, I coded at the district level, and if annual data 
was not available I coded all events at the next available period of time. This level-of-
analysis and chronologically-specific data slippage is undesirable but unavoidable in 
order to include control variables. These adjustments were necessary on all the 
variables utilizing the Governance and Growth data (i.e., distance to provincial 
capital, G&G Security index, and ELF) or the BPS data (civil servants by province).  
Many of the events in the NVMS data were coded down to the village level, 
but I opted to code only to the sub-district (kecamatan) because conflict literature 
shows that conflict often exceeds village boundaries and because data is not 
consistently available to support this extreme degree of locality in the level of 
analysis. English-speaking researchers have translated the Indonesian administrative 
sub-divisions in a variety of ways, sometimes referring to kecamatan as districts 
while referring to kabupaten or kota (the level above kecamatan) as regencies or 
cities. However, I mirror the translation used by the national statistics agency to refer 
to the latter two as districts and kecamatan as sub-districts. The provinsi level above 
this is consistently referred to as a province. This formulation should make it easier 
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for an English-speaking audience to understand the levels involved as 
Province>District>Sub-district>Village.  
Indonesia began a process of decentralization after the fall of Suharto, and that 
process has brought with it a splintering of administrative districts. From 1999 to 
2012, the number of sub-districts has increased from approximately 4,038 to 6,543.157 
This increase presents particular problems for analysis—non-time-variable data from 
sources outside of NVMS are not necessarily coded for current districts. In other 
words, I had to track the genealogy of the districts and sub-districts to ensure that 
coding was consistent over time and that new or old sub-districts that do not currently 
appear on the NVMS event list locations were appropriately assigned to the dated 
data. The G&G data was intentionally coded per historic, rather than contemporary, 
district identities as districts began to split, a process which I reversed in order to 
assign the appropriate values of control variables to each event in my dataset. As the 
Growth and Governance codebook notes: “That is, if districts subsequently split after 
2001, we aggregated the data from the child districts so that our dataset shows a 
consistent series of variables for the geographical regions that comprised the districts 
in 2001.”158 Since the G&G data was coded to fit within 2001 sub-district 
delineations, but the NVMS data reflects the sub-district at the time of the event, 
G&G data was applied to these “child districts” as well.  
While I have tracked sub-district splits for the purpose of coding variables, I 
have not sequenced split sub-districts together. This is both because the process 
would be extremely unwieldy, and also because new sub-districts can be reasonably 
                                                 
157 kementerian Dalam Negeri Republik Indonesia, “Buku Induk Kode Data Wilayah 2013,” No 2013, 
http://www.kemendagri.go.id/pages/data-wilayah. 
158 McCulloch. N., “The Indonesian Sub-National Growth and Governance Dataset - Documentation.” 
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assumed to be re-evaluating or resetting their relationship with their new local 
government and the state government which allowed and facilitated their split. If 
significance is achieved even without this inclusion, it only strengthens the argument 
for the presence of a relationship between the causal variables I have outlined and the 
likelihood of violence and continuing contention.   
I had to significantly alter the data to recode the NVMS data and integrate 
other data sources in order to effectively test the theory I developed in chapter 3. For 
sequenced variables (prior violence and government actions over 1, 2, and 5 years, 
and final event), the events needed to be sorted by sub-district and date and then each 
event needed to be coded for prior events within the relevant time period and sub-
district. Other variables were added by sub-district, district, and province designations 
in addition to dates of the events. For a detailed description of the coding of each 
variable please see the detailed variable coding section below. The table below gives 
an overview of the variables.  
 
Table 4.1 Variable Overview 
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IV. Variable Coding 
This section breaks down each variable as summarized above and explains 
how and why it was coded as it was. It notes problems in the coding, and describes 
necessary transformation from the form of the original data. 
 
4.1 Death Binary 
The NVMS Data is coded for number of deaths in the any individual event.159 
I transformed this into a binary variable with a 0 for no death and a 1 for any number 
of deaths. The original range of deaths in environmental disputes goes from 0 to 8 
deaths for a single event with the majority of fatal events having only a single death.  
 
4.2 Final Event in Sequence 
After sequencing events by sub-district and date, events that had no following 
events for at least two years were coded “final” (1) and all events with an event in the 
next two years were coded “non-final” (0).  The two-year gap allows for a brief 
respite in contention without ending the sequence, including anniversary events that 
rekindle contention. Requiring two years, rather than just a one-year gap most closely 
approximates the approach taken in country-year studies, since a calendar year 
without violence actually indicates more than just January-December peace. For 
example, violence may end in April of the previous year, remain non-violent through 
the relevant calendar year coded as peaceful, and finally resume the following year in 
September. In other words, a calendar year approach examines cases where non-
violence has occurred at a minimum of one year and a maximum of just under three 
                                                 
159 Barron et al., “Understanding Violent Conflict in Indonesia: A Mixed Methods Approach.” 
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years.  The mean time between events lies at just less than one year, which indicates 
that a single year is a better measure of a standard time between events, and too short 
a time to gauge whether a sequence has actually ended. On the other hand, just shy of 
90 percent of the times between events fall within two years. This makes two years an 
empirically standard period of time with which to gauge whether an event concludes 
a contentious sequence. Two years better captures true “finality,” whereas a single 
year without contention may be simply a time for claimants to reorganize after a loss. 
The last two years of data were dropped since we cannot say whether an event 
was final or not without two years of subsequent data. This right-censoring reduces 
the total number of cases to 2,240.  
 
4.3 Prior Death 
Using Death Binary as a starting point, I sequenced the events by sub-district 
and then date, producing series of events over time in each sub-district. Looking back 
over the previous 1, 2, and 5 years within the sub-district, I coded each event for the 
presence of a death within the relevant time period. 1 indicates the presence of a fatal 
event, 0 indicates no fatal event.  
For events that occurred close to the start-date of my analysis, I coded the 1 
and 2 year variable by analyzing prior data available in NVMS which was excluded 
from my event list because it occurs before the political transition. However, the 
NVMS data set does not extend far enough before the transition for the 5 year 
variable so in these cases I dropped the left-censored data. This reduced the cases 




4.4 Scarcity Type  
Scarcity type distinguishes structural (equity-related) scarcity from simple 
scarcity. I recoded “dispute sub-type” from the NVMS dataset, compounding 
pollution and resource degradation types of conflicts into a 0 for simple scarcity, and 
land and access conflicts into a 1 for structural scarcity. Each environmental dispute 
recorded in NVMS identifies the proximate triggers from numerous newspaper 
articles. I combined natural resource disputes like those over water or mining, and 
pollution disputes like those over air pollution and other environmental degradation 
into a category of “simple scarcity.” I also combined public and private land disputes, 
and access disputes over natural resources into “structural scarcity.” I dropped man-
made resource and salary disputes including pay and industrial relations from the 
resource category because they are not relevant to my inquiry.  
 
4.5 Government Actions 
In order to create a variable that measures the impression that society has of 
the government’s prior receptiveness to their demands, I compiled information from a 
number of NVMS variables and constructed a tripartite response. From this response, 
I then sequenced the events geographically and over time and coded for previous 
events in the same sub-region. 
First, I created three categories from the various actors listed in NVMS. I have 
ignored those actors from NVMS that do not appear in my data sub-set. 
Table 4.2 Consolidation of Actors into Tripartite Categories 
NVMS Actors My Categories 
Government – elected or bureaucracy Government 
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(civil servant or government body, e.g. 
courts, Department of Health) 
TNI (Indonesian Armed Forces) 
Police 
Brimob (Police special forces) 




Afilliation with religious groups 










*Note: Further examination of the data 
revealed that designations of Unclear 
or Other always indicated a group of 
citizens whose affiliations were 
unknown.  Therefore I coded them as 
society. 
 
Next, I compared the categories of initiator (only looking at the primary actor, 
not supporting actors) and victim, along with intervening party, if there was one, and 
the result of the intervention. These results fall into five categories – no intervention, 
an intervention with no arrests, an intervention with arrests of the initiator (labeled 
just “arrest” below), an intervention with arrests of the victim, and an intervention 
that prompted further violence. Examining every possible combination of those 
factors, I developed the following rubric where 0 represents a pro-society action by 
the government, 1 represents a lack of action or neutral action by the government, and 
2 represents an anti-society action.  
Table 4.3 Coding Scheme for Government Action 
Initiator Victim Intervention Explanation 




When government actors act as 
unbiased conflict mediators 
they build credibility with 
society. However, when they 
arrest society groups they 
demonstrate a lack of 
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willingness to capitulate to the 
demands made by those 
groups.160 Conversely, when 
they arrest the members of the 
company that society has 
targeted they demonstrate a 
willingness to give society 
groups what they want. 
Government Intervention no 
arrests=2 
No intervention=2*  
Arrest=2 
Arrest victim=0 
In cases where government 
groups are already involved (as 
victims in this case), the only 
way for an intervening 
government group to 
demonstrate a willingness to 
acquiesce to society demands 
is to arrest the government 
group involved. Otherwise the 
involvement of a government 
in the base dispute overpowers 
the potential for the 
government to give an 
impression of willingness to 
capitulate. 
Society Intervention no 
arrests=0 
Any arrests=2 
When two society groups have 
a dispute, the government can 
become a mediating party or it 
can anger one or the other of 
the society groups by making 
arrests. 
Company Company Intervention no 
arrests=0 
Any arrests=0 
When companies have 
disputes, society benefits from 
the resolution of that dispute, 
so any intervention is viewed 
positively. 




The government in this case 
often represents in the interests 
of people against the interests 
of private companies. 
Intervention without arrests 
and arrests of company 
aggressors are seen as pro-
society. 
                                                 
160 As dictated by the institutional findings of; Patrick Barron and Joanne Sharpe, “Local Conflict in 
Post-Suharto Indonesia: Understanding Variations in Violence Levels and Forms Through Local 
Newspapers.,” Journal of East Asian Studies 8, no. 3 (December 2008): 395–423. 
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Interventions are seen as 
positive when a company 
attacks society groups so long 
as members of the society 
groups are not arrested. 




The government in this case 
often represents in the interests 
of people against the interests 
of private companies. 
Intervention without arrests 
and arrests of company actors 
are seen as pro-society. 
Government Intervention no 
arrests=0 
Any arrests=2 
When government groups have 
disputes, government 
interveners  can be a positive 
mediating force or can anger 
one side or the other (in this 
case representing the interests 
of people within the other 
factions) by making arrests on 
either side. 





In cases where government 
groups are already involved (as 
initiators in this case), the only 
way for an intervening 
government group to 
demonstrate a willingness to 
acquiesce to society demands 
is to arrest the government 
group involved. Otherwise the 
involvement of a government 
in the base dispute overpowers 
the potential for the 
government to give an 
impression of willingness to 
capitulate. 
* In all cases except the two starred combinations above in which the government was one of the two 
primary participants, when no intervention occurred cases were coded as a 1. In all cases where a 
government intruded but the violence became worse, disputes were coded as a 2.  
It is worth noting that the government can play multiple roles in this matrix: 
that of initiator, victim, or intervener.  The government is theoretically a tool of 
society, but often also works at cross-purposes with society. This complex 
relationship is characterized above as “supportive” actions shift depending on 
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whether the government is facing off against a society group or a company that is 
involved in a dispute with a society group.  
Each event in the dataset has been coded 0, 1, or 2 in accordance with the 
above rubric. There is some difficulty in defining how actors at the individual level 
perceive the government, because numerous factors may impact this impression, 
many of which may be idiosyncratic. However, generally speaking these clear signals 
from the government should, holding all other things constant, move public opinion 
in one direction or another.  
 
4.6 Past Government Action 
To compute past government action in the 1, 2, and 5 years preceding each 
event, I averaged the scores of all previous events in the sub-district within the 
specified time frame, including events back to 1997, which are not otherwise included 
in the dataset that begins June 7th 1999. (As discussed above, only events which 
occurred near the beginning of my data-set and lacked NVMS data for the 5 year 
precedent were left-censored.) This number represents predominantly pro-society 
actions (in the eyes of society groups in the region) when it approaches 0, and more 
anti-society actions when it approaches 2. Score near 1 suggest past government 
action is neutral. This approach addresses the complete history of the sub-district 
within the time period, rather than only incorporating the most recent event or the 
most incendiary events. This approach is in line with Walter’s argument that “It is the 
full range of information… about the government and its history that shapes their 
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beliefs rather than any single isolated act at any one time.”161 She goes on to 
conclude:  
“…governments did not always lose a reputation for being tough simply by 
making one concession to one group… Reputations, therefore, did not have 
the grim reaper quality (where a single act of accommodation caused a 
government to be labeled weak forever) that the theory predicted.”162  
 
This operationalization can balance incendiary negative events against a potential 
history of positive relations. 
 
4.7 Ticker (Density) 
Events were sequenced within sub-districts, and the number of days between 
an event and the prior event within the sub-district were recorded. This time period 
ranged from zero to almost ten years, with the vast majority of observations around 
zero. This variable was eventually logged to account for the bias in the distribution. 
All first events in a sub-district were dropped, reducing the total coded events to 
1,757. (1,319 for the second DV when the last two years were also dropped.) 
 
4.8 Civil Servants by Province 
The Indonesian state’s statistical agency (BPS) provides the 2009 number of 
civil servants by province.163 As the province is the lowest level that this data is 
available for across all regions of Indonesia, I have applied this data to all districts 
and sub-districts within each province.  Consistent numbers for earlier time periods 
are unavailable, so this data does not vary over time, although where spotty data is 
                                                 
161 Walter, Reputation and Civil War, 167. 
162 Ibid., 205. 
163 BPS Statistics Indonesia, “2011 Statistical Yearbook.” 
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available, the ratio of civil servants from one province to another seems to remain 
roughly the same barring provincial splits, although the total number of civil servants 
generally across all cases increases slowly over time. 
This proxy is not ideal as a measure of state capacity; however, due to limited 
available data, it is the closest proxy. For further analysis of the response of society 
actors to state actions (as opposed to state capacity), I also run a second model using 
sequencing and the likelihood of final events to address which state behaviors reduce 
contention. 
 
4.9 Distance to Provincial Capital  
I took this variable directly from the G&G KPPOD dataset, which includes 
district-level data on the straight-line distance from the district center to the provincial 
capital.164 In Indonesia the relevant measure is to provincial capital rather than 
national capital because of decentralization and the distribution of islands. State 
control, particularly on security issues, flows largely from provincial capitals. Due to 
the biased nature of the data, this variable was eventually logged before being used in 
the models. 
 
4.10 ELF  
The KPPOD draws on data from the Indonesian census to provide district-
level ethno-linguistic fractionalization numbers. The census measures population 
dynamics in 2000, and “traced 1,068 ethnics across regions in Indonesia. The ELF 
index can be defined as follows:  
                                                 




where  is the share of population ethnic group i in district j.”165  
 
4.11 Conflict Region 
In keeping with a 25 death level, I have coded all conflicts with 25 deaths per 
year, although these deaths do not necessarily have to have occurred on a “battlefield” 
nor does one of the actors need to be the state government. To identify these larger 
conflict regions, I first utilized the PRIO civil conflict dataset, which listed only the 
conflict in Aceh. Other conflicts were communal, and therefore not listed by PRIO.166 
Gerry van Klinken lists 6 other conflicts, and details their history in his book on 
communal violence in Indonesia.167 I verified these conflicts and dates with the 
Ploughshares project, a Canadian organization researching peacebuilding.168  
Table 4.4 Larger Conflict Regions 
Province Years Source 
West Kalimantan 1999 Klinken 
Maluku 1999-2002, 2004 Klinken 
Central Sulawesi 1999-2002 Klinken 
North Maluku 1999-2000 Klinken 
Central Kalimantan 2001 Klinken 
Aceh 1999-2005 PRIO 
West Papua 1999-2003 Klinken 
 
V. Descriptive Statistics 
                                                 
165 KPPOD, USAID, and The Asia Foundation, Local Economic Governance in Indonesia, 2007, 
http://www.kppod.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8&Itemid=47. 
166 PRIO, “Armed Conflicts Version 4-2008 - CSCW.” 
167 Klinken, Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia. 
168 “Indonesia – West Papua (Irian Jaya) (1969 – 2004)”; “Indonesia – Kalimantan (1996 – 2003)”; 
“Indonesia – Sulawesi (1998 – 2004)”; “Indonesia – Molucca (Maluku) Islands (1999 – 2006).” 
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There are a total of 2,863 events in my data. Violent incidents compose 9.5 
percent (271) of those events, and 5.2 percent (150) experienced a death in the prior 
year, 8 percent (231) experienced a death in the prior two years, and 12 percent (332) 
experienced a death in the prior 5 years. Events concluded contention in their sub-
district 39.5 percent (885) of the time. (N=2,240 due to dropping last two years of 
data.)  
Of all the events, 75.5 percent (2161) were over structural rather than simple 
scarcities.  
Government actions were predominantly neutral, with 79.7 percent (2,282) 
neutral (coded 1) events, 5.6 percent (160) events that supported society demands, 
and 14.7 percent (421) that repressed them. Overall, past government actions in the 
past 1, 2, and 5 years all averaged 1. 
Most of the events occurred between 2005 and 2009, with 2009 seeing the 
most events with 18.3 percent (525) followed closely by 2005 and the most deaths 
occurring in 2005 (18 percent of all fatal cases, 49 total events) followed closely by 
2008. This would tend to indicate that most of these disputes were not purely 
opportunistic in the weak phase immediately following the fall of Suharto. 
Interestingly, provinces that experienced the most contentious events did not 
necessarily also experience a higher percentage of violent events. Jawa Timur and 
Sumatera Utara each experienced the most total events, 427 and 482 respectively, yet 
of these events only 7.2 percent and 7.6 percent were violent. Whereas in Muluku 
there were only a total of 123 events, but 21.2 percent of these were violent.  
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Of cases where no one died, only 4.4 percent (113) had seen previous violence 
in the last year, whereas in cases where there were fatalities 13.7 percent (37) had 
seen prior violence. Similarly, in cases where no one died, 74 percent (1,918) of 
scarcities were structural, whereas in fatal cases 89.7 percent (243) were structural. 
Mean government action in the past did not change, however, averaging 1 (neutral) 
both in violent and nonviolent events. 
For the second dependent variable, final events had prior deaths in the last 
year in 3.8 percent (34) of cases, whereas non-final events had prior deaths in the last 
year in 6.4 percent (87) of cases. Final events were over structural scarcity issues 71.6 
percent (634) of the time, whereas non-final events were over structural scarcity 77.9 
percent (1,056) of the time. Finally, there were only very small differences between 
the percentages of government actions that were neutral, positive, or negative across 
final vs. non-final events. 
In violent events, 54.1 percent (119) concluded the sequences of events (45.9 
percent of violent events were not the final event), whereas nonviolent events 
concluded the sequence only 37.9 percent (766) of the time (62.1 percent of 
nonviolent events did not conclude the sequence.) 
The data utilized to code the government action variables also yields a few 
useful observations—the vast majority (62 percent) of disputes were initiated by 
society groups, while companies initiated 26 percent and the government initiated 
only 11 percent. Furthermore, a higher percentage of society-initiated disputes 
escalated to violence—13 percent as opposed to the 2 percent of government-initiated 
disputes that escalated to violence. This lends support to a society-side approach: if 
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society groups are starting most of these disputes and those disputes are more likely 
to become violent, understanding their strategic logic is particularly relevant. If these 
disputes were initiated primarily by government actors, then we might assume that 
government decisions to repress and the continuing fallout from that decision were 
the key factors in plotting conflict processes. However, the data tells a different story, 
and therefore a deeper examination of society-side factors (particularly placed within 
a context of the extensive prior research exploring state-side factors) is key to a 
complete understanding of intra-state violence.  
Most of the events were assaults and vandalism, followed by fights and group 
clashes. Of events where there was an intervention, a higher percentage of 
government interventions (as opposed to non-interventions and non-government 
interventions, and without considering statistical significance) coincide with violent 
events, but it is not clear what direction the causal arrow goes; whether governments 
tend to intervene in more potentially violent conflicts, or whether government 
presence tends to make conflicts more violent. 
Most events occurred close to other events in their sub-district. The vast 
majority of events cluster near zero days since the last event, but a few stretch up to 
3,845 days or approximately ten years. This constitutes the entire range of time that I 
examine, and indicates that some sub-districts saw contentious sequences end shortly 
after the fall of Suharto, only to flare up again ten years later. The graph below shows 
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These observations paint some interesting pictures, but in order to test any of 
the hypothesized relationships we must utilize a more complex set of models, which I 
detail below. 
 
VI. Methods and Models 
I will run the variables described above through two sets of four logistic 
regressions, one set per dependent variable. Each independent variable will have a 
basic model, a spatial model, an event density model, and a spatial and time-sensitive 
model.  
Binary dependent variables lead me to use logistic regressions and do not 
impose as stringent assumptions on the data as a probit model would have. 
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Frequently, event data is also used for survival analysis, but my research questions do 
not explore the length of time before conflict breaks out or ceases, rather I attempt to 
establish which factors matter in the eventual outbreak of violence or cessation of 
contention. I utilize time-sensitive variables because other researchers have indicated 
that the effect of these variables may not be constant over time. However, the core 
question remains ‘what?’ and not ‘when?’ As such, survival models are not 
appropriate to address my research questions, although future research may find such 
analysis productive. 
For each set of models, I will first run a basic logit analysis to capture the 
overall effect of the variables on the likelihood of violence and continued contention. 
The two basic models (using 1 prior year iterations of time-sensitive variables) are as 
follows –  
Logged odds (death) = 
a + b1 (death1) + b2 (scarc) + b3 (gvt1) + b4 (gvt) + b5 (ELF) + b6 (distln) + b7 
(conreg) + b8 (civser) 
 
Logged odds (fin) = 
 a + b1 (death1) + b2 (scarc) + b3 (gvt1) + b4 (gvt) + b5 (death) + b6 (distln) + b9 
(ELF)169 
 
Treating the two models independently will allow me to explore whether the 
factors that contribute to an escalation to violence are the same as those that 
                                                 
169 In the final event models conflict region and civil servant control variables are eventually dropped 
due to insignificance. 
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contribute to a de-escalation of contention, and the effect that various government 
actions have on the decisions of society groups. It also allows me to utilize the 
presence of a death in the current event as an independent variable in the second 
model exploring the likelihood that contention concludes. This is critical in 
establishing the role that fatalities have in encouraging or repressing contention. 
Alongside each other, these sets of models will hopefully illuminate the process that 
plays out once a contentious event has emerged. Moving a variable from a DV to an 
IV from my first set of models to the second might be construed as an indicator that a 
nested logit was called for, but in this case ending contention is not a subset of violent 
or non-violent choices, it can occur after either. Part of the function of this second DV 
is to establish whether it is correlated with either violence or non-violence.  Given the 
structure of a nested logit, I would have to select contention’s end as a sub-set of 
either violence or non-violence, however in the descriptive statistics there is no 
support for the argument that final events are a sub-set of violent events. Violent 
events can be final or non-final, and final events can be violent or non-violent, which 
makes a nested logit an inappropriate method of assessing these relationships. 
For each basic model, I will also produce predicted probabilities for violence 
or an end to contention in order to concretely illustrate the potential effect each 
variable has on the outbreak of violence or contention, particularly given that the 
effect of each varies depending on the values of the other variables in a logit model. 
To gauge whether 1, 2, and 5 prior year variables have a different effect, I will 
run the model for each time period and compare the coefficients. This is not intended 
primarily to measure the degree that time effects change, but instead to identify which 
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time period, relative to the others, has the greatest effect and whether time generally 
increases or decreases the effect of the variable in question. Different variables are 
included in the model to address current vs prior factors—for example, in the second 
(fin) model, death in the current event is included as an IV along with death in a prior 
time period, to address whether fatalities have a varying effect over time. 
Moving on from the basic models, I will then run three additional models for 
each set—for a total of four models for each dependent variable. The second model 
for each set will account for the cross-sectional nature of the data—that there may be 
variation particular to the sub-district that accounts for some or all of the total effect 
found in the basic model. Given the tendency of violence to perpetuate itself in space 
and time, it is reasonable to assume that some sub-districts will experience more 
violence and contention than others. The third model will include the ticker variable, 
accounting for time between events, or the density of contention. Not only should 
density play an independent role in the likelihood of violence or continued 
contention, but it may also impact the effect that the other variables in the model have 
on the dependent variable. The fourth model will account for both the cross-sectional 
data and event density. In each case, I will compare the variables across models that 
remain significant predictors of violence or continued contention.  
Lastly, I will trace the conflict process as a sequence in a single case study of 
Mesuji, Lampung, Indonesia. This case study is intended to verify and illustrate the 
mechanisms identified in the quantitative analysis. Since this case will be drawn 
entirely from other studies and journalistic accounts, the primary parameter for case 
selection is the availability of reliable information from multiple sources in English. 
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The case will not be limited to the same time period as the quantitative study, since 
events continue into 2013 and there is no reason to believe that mechanisms after 
2010 have changed. These selection criteria will bias the case toward one which is 
more likely to escalate – small or non-existent sequences of events don’t get studied 
or written about. As the purpose of the case study is to examine in more depth the 
escalation processes as identified in the quantitative analysis and to identify potential 
complicating factors, this is appropriate. However, the case study should not be 
construed as a generalizable test of the most likely turn of events, but rather as an 
extreme case in which violence is most likely. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
This chapter has laid out data and methodology for testing the theories 
developed in the previous chapter. In narrowing down the site of inquiry for testing 
these theories, I identified Indonesia as presenting good variation on my independent 
variables. I gave some background as to the thicket of laws and customs that have 
made environmental disputes frequent in Indonesia, while noting that many other 
countries, particularly in the developing world, feature similarly problematic laws, 
making patterns identified in Indonesia generalizable to many other countries.  
I have described the new National Violence Monitoring System Indonesia 
(NVMS) dataset as well as supplementary data-sources, and described how I have 
transformed this data into a set of coherent variables accounting for sequences within 
sub-districts. I then outlined two sets of logit models: one set to identify which factors 
are correlated with fatal events and one set to identify which factors are correlated 
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with an end to the contentious sequence. In each set of models I will account for the 
effects of time and space. To flesh out the mechanisms involved in these 
relationships, I will also conduct a single case study of Mesuji, Indonesia, to illustrate 
the escalation to violence. The following chapters move forward to run the tests 








 What factors make violence or continuing contention more likely? Current 
research has inadequately explored this question at levels below civil conflict. Nor 
has it been able to explain why environmental scarcities, which reduce capability, 
should yield conflict at all since this is at odds with the expectations of the conflict 
literature. Stepping into this puzzle, I proposed that a plausible theory of violence and 
continuing contention in environmental disputes is one of bargaining between 
desperate claimants and the government, in which certain factors such as violence, 
repression, and inequitable distribution of environmental goods and services signal 
the likelihood that the state will appease society groups without escalation and 
thereby make violence and contention more or less likely. To test these propositions, I 
transformed and expanded the NVMS dataset from Indonesia, sequencing events 
within sub-districts and coding each event for current and past variables in that 
sequence.  
In this chapter I will discuss the results of two logit models with different 
binary dependent variables—the first explaining when events are more likely to 
become fatal, and the second explaining when events are most likely to end a series of 
contentious events. In each model I also explore how time and space impact the 
likelihood of violence or continuing contention. In short, the first set of models, 
testing which factors make violence more or less likely, finds that structural scarcities 
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or a death in the last year increase the likelihood of violence, while current 
government repression reduces the incidence of violence. These findings are largely 
robust to alternate model specifications accounting for variation across space and 
time. This first set of models also finds that while the effect of risk-enhancing 
conditions declines as years pass (for the one significant lagged variable), the 
likelihood of violence increases as the time between events increases.  
The second set of models, testing which factors make contention more or less 
likely to continue, finds that current repression and simple types of scarcity increase 
the likelihood that contention will end, while past repression, past violence, and 
structural types of scarcity reduce the likelihood that contention will end. These 
results, however, were not robust to alternate model specifications accounting for 
variation across space and time. The effects of past violence decreased slightly over 
time as expected, although past government action behaved irregularly, and closely 
clustered events were surprisingly more likely to end the sequence.  
This chapter proceeds to first explore which variables make events more 
likely to be fatal, the strength of these effects, and variations across space and time. 
Then I repeat this process for the likelihood that contention will end in any given 
event.  The following chapter will then examine a sequence closely to verify and flesh 
out the relationships identified here.  
  
II. Fatal Events 
What makes violent events more likely in low-level environmental disputes? 
My theory anticipated that the likelihood of any environmental dispute becoming 
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violent is conditioned by structural scarcity, past violence, repressive government 
behavior over environmental disputes within the same sub-district in the last year, 
current government behavior in any given event, the recentness of these conditioning 
factors, and the frequency of events. 
To review, the expected relationships for this first dependent variable are 
identified in the six hypotheses below, as developed in chapter 3. 
1A) Past state repressive actions are more likely to lead to violence.  
1B) However, contemporary repression will reduce the likelihood of violence. 
2A) Preferential treatment of other groups resulting in structural scarcity is 
more likely to yield violence than simple scarcity. 
3A) Prior violence in a locality’s environmental disputes increases the 
likelihood of contemporary violence. 
4A) As events occur farther from the previous event in the sequence, they will 
be less likely to be violent. 
4C) As violence and repression move farther into the past, their effect on the 
likelihood of violence will become weaker. 
To test these propositions I utilize low-level environmental dispute data from 
Indonesia, covering the post-Suharto decade (1999-2010) and recoded as described in 
chapter 4. Just less than ten percent of these events were violent. I run four logit or 






2.1 Fatal Events Four Model Overview 
In examining the effect of my variables on the likelihood of violence in any 
given event, I ordered the events into sub-district sequences and coded each event for 
what had occurred in the history of that sequence and in the event itself. I then ran 
these variables through four models, the first basic model examines general patterns 
across Indonesia. The second model accounts for potential sub-district-specific 
random effects; in other words, is the effect of these variables specific to certain areas 
and therefore a product of that sub-district? The third model examines whether time 
between events is a relevant factor in the likelihood of violence, allowing us to 
examine whether violent events are partially a product of the density of events. And 
finally, the fourth model accounts for both spatial and chronological variation by 
combining models two and three. We can see that most of the variables remain 
statistically significant in each of the four models, with a few exceptions which will 
be discussed below. (See Table 5.6) This robustness to variations in model 
specification indicates that the effects are relatively consistent across both time and 
space.  
In the table below, I provide a complete overview of the coefficients, standard 
errors, and levels of significance, with total cases and the model’s overall explanatory 












Prior Death 0.96*** 0.53 1.45*** 1.03** 
Standard Error 0.22 0.28 0.26 0.33 
Scarcity Type 1.15*** 1.23*** 1.27*** 1.34*** 
Standard Error 0.21 0.23 0.35 0.37 
Past Government Action 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.14 
Standard Error 0.27 0.30 0.31 0.33 
Current Government Action -0.48** -0.53** -0.50* -0.50* 
Standard Error 0.15 0.17 0.21 0.23 
Civil Servants 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00* 0.00* 
Standard Error 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Distance (ln) 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.35*** 
Standard Error 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 
ELF -0.99*** -1.13*** -0.72 -0.93 
Standard Error 0.28 0.34 0.41 0.51 
Conflict Region 0.92* 0.91* -0.27 -0.37 
Standard Error 0.30 0.36 0.65 0.69 
Time Between Events (ln)  .04 0.14 
Standard Error   0.20 0.23 
Time Between Events (lnsq)  .01 -.003 
Standard Error   0.02 0.03 
Constant -3.07*** -3.30*** -4.21*** -4.60*** 
Standard Error 0.50 0.59 0.86 0.97 
N 2831 2831 1757170 1757 
Pseudo R2/Wald Chi2 .12*** 116.47*** .16*** 79.23*** 
*significant at .05 **significant at .01 ***significant at .001  
 
2.2 The Basic Model 
The basic model measures the effect of the variables generally, across 
Indonesia, without accounting for the cross-sectional nature of the sub-district 
                                                 
170 For models three and four, the N was reduced due to dropping the first event in every sequence. 
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sequences, or for the effect of time. It also provides us with a baseline against which 
we can measure the changes in the three other models. 
In the basic model, all the variables (including control variables) returned 
statistically significant results except for past government behavior. Both prior 
violence and structural types of scarcity increased the likelihood of violence. (See 
Table 5.7 below.) A death in the last year over environmental issues in the sub-district 
increased the odds of violence in an event by 162 percent, while structural scarcity (as 
opposed to simple scarcity) increased the odds of violence by 215 percent, supporting 
hypotheses 2A and 3A.  
 
Table 5.7 Fatal Events Basic Model Effects 
Model Estimates Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Odds Ratio Percent 
Change in 
Odds171 
Prior violence172 .96*** .22 2.62 162 
Scarcity type 1.15*** .21 3.15 215 
Current government 
action 
-.48*** .15 .62 -38 
Past government 
action173 
-.003 .27 .99 -1 
Civil servants 0*** 0 1 0 
Distance (ln) .309*** .04 1.36 36 
ELF .-.99*** .28 .37 -63 
Conflict region .92*** .30 2.50 150 
Constant 
 
-3.06*** .5   
Likelihood Ratio Pseudo R-
squared 
P-Value  N 
204 .12 .000  2831 
*significant at .05 **significant at .01 ***significant at .001 
 
                                                 
171 For a one-unit change in the independent variable. 
172 One year iteration of variable. 
173 One year iteration of variable. 
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On the other hand, current repression did appear to have a violence-reducing 
effect. While past government action fell well outside statistical significance, current 
government behavior becoming less supportive by one (over a range of two) reduced 
the odds of violence by 36 percent, showing support for hypothesis 1B, but giving no 
indication of whether past government action has any effect as in hypothesis 1A.  
The control variables all came back significant, but not necessarily with any 
substantive effect. The number of civil servants (as a proxy for government capability 
in the region) had an infinitesimally small effect, while distance from the provincial 
capital made violence slightly more likely, which is in line with findings from the 
conflict literature showing that violence is more likely in less-well-regulated 
hinterlands than central areas.174 Ethno linguistic fractionalization (ELF) reduced the 
likelihood of violence by 63 percent as it moved from homogenous to heterogeneous, 
against expectations, and the presence of a larger conflict in the region increased the 
likelihood of violence by 150 percent, as expected.  
 
2.3 Predicted Probabilities of Violence 
What do these numbers actually mean for the likelihood of violence given 
different conditions on the ground? In any specific constellation of conditions, we can 
use the results of the basic model to predict how a change in any one condition will 
                                                 
174 I use the log of distance because the data is skewed: most observations cluster around zero but 
there is a long tail of large distances and residuals have a large spike around -5, rather than clustering 
cleanly around zero.  I also analyzed whether using a log of civil servants was appropriate, but the 
residuals were distributed relatively evenly around zero, and scattering them against predicted values 
revealed that they are not heteroscedastic, just largely unrelated. Thus, the substantive effect of a 
one unit change in the number of civil servants is very small.  Since there are large differences in the 
numbers of civil servants, this variable is not entirely irrelevant, but changes would have to comprise 
hundreds of thousands of civil servants to make much of a difference.  
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impact the likelihood of violence. These predicted probabilities provide a more 
concrete way to examine the substantive impacts of scarcity, prior death, and current 
government action which the coefficients alone cannot illustrate. In this model, the 
predicted probability is the probability that violence will break out in a specific event, 
given specific values of the explanatory variables. Since predicted probabilities vary 
depending on the values assigned to other variables in the model, I will examine these 
variables in pairs. As I examine these pairs of variables below, all other variables, 
including other explanatory variables and control variables, are held at their means or 
modes.175  
For the first two variables, prior death and the presence of structural scarcity, 
both of which increase the likelihood of violence, the baseline probability of violence 
in their absence is 3 percent. If there is a prior death, but no structural scarcity in the 
current event, the probability of violence increases by 4 percentage points to 7 
percent, and if structural scarcity exists without prior death, the probability of 
violence increases by 5 percentage points to 8 percent. However, when both of these 
occur at the same time—when structural scarcity coincides with prior death—the 
probability of violence jumps to 19 percent. The graph below illustrates the much 
stronger effect that structural scarcity and prior violence have in combination.  
 
                                                 
175In model one, modal values were for structural scarcity and no prior death, with the control 
variable set at no presence of a larger conflict region. Mean for current government action was set to 
1.09 and past government action was set to 1.03. Mean number of civil servants was set to 215,130 
people, mean distance to the provincial capital was set to 100.03km, and mean ELF was set to .59.) 
 118 
 
Figure 5.8 Predicted Probabilities of Violence by Past Fatalities and Structural Scarcities 
 
 
The predicted probability of violence is lowest (5 percent) when the 
government is currently repressive and there have been no prior deaths, and this 
probability increases steadily as current government behavior becomes more 
supportive of claimants’ demands (see Figure 5.2). Notably, cases without a violent 
history where the government is not engaged in any current repressive behavior have 
exactly the same probability of violence (13 percent) as cases where the government 
is employing its repressive apparatus but there is prior violence. The presence of 
structural scarcity in these models—as it is the modal value of scarcity—explains the 
otherwise surprising base level of violence even without prior violence.  The 
probability of violence continues to increase as cases with prior violence move from 
repressive to supportive state responses. In short, violence is most likely (28 percent 
likelihood) in cases where the government is not responding repressively to societal 





























.5 1.5Support Neutral Repression
Current Government Action
No Past Violence Past Violence
How Do Govt Action and Past Violence Impact Violence?
 
 
The predicted probabilities for government action by scarcity type look very 
similar to those above but at slightly lower probabilities. This lower level of base 
probability is a product of using modal replies for dummy variables and does not 
indicate a necessarily higher impact on violence. All of the other graphs assume 
structural scarcity since this is the most common type of scarcity in Indonesia (i.e., 
the modal value), but in this last graph we also look at cases of simple scarcity where 
pollution or a complete lack of resources has prompted the dispute rather than 
questions of access to the land and its resources (see Figure 4.5). The greatest 
probability of violence, at 13 percent, exists when structural scarcity occurs without 
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government repression, and the least probability at only 2 percent, when simple 
scarcity occurs with government repression. 
 






















.5 1.5Support Neutral Repression
Current Government Action
Simple Scarcity Structural Scarcity
How Do Scarcity and Government Action Impact Violence?
 
 
If all three significant variables in the full model are set at their most violence-
prone values (structural scarcity with prior death and no repression) then the predicted 
probability of violence is 28 percent. When government repression occurs without 
prior death or structural scarcity, the predicted probability is at its lowest at 2 percent. 
As my variables move from the least to greatest risk of violence, the likeliness of 
violence changes substantively from an extremely low probability and increases by 
26 percentage points.  
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These predicted probabilities were derived from the basic model, and do not 
account for variation across space and time. The next sections will discuss alternate 
model specifications and test the robustness of these findings. 
 
2.4 Accounting for Variation across Sub-Districts 
The second model controls for the cross-sectional nature of the data, allowing 
us to see whether fixed effects of the sub-districts are impacting the relationships 
discussed above. The rho of the entire second model is .21, indicating that 21 percent 
the variance in the likelihood of violence can be attributed to the sub-districts. The 
only variable that drops out of statistical significance is prior death; all the other 
variables maintain their significance and direction, although the coefficients change 
to a certain degree. Accounting for variance across individual sub-districts causes the 
effect of all the significant variables to increase, although some only shift marginally. 
(See Table 5.6.) 
With over a thousand sub-districts it is difficult to visualize the distribution of 
violence across space. The graph below gives a visual overview of number of events 
and violent events by sub-district. (See Figure 5.11.) The visible spikes in a few 
districts of violent events demonstrate why the prior violence variable may have lost 
significance in this model. In other words, sub-districts with high fatalities are by 
definition more likely to have also had prior fatalities, but this model cannot tell us 
whether the spike is caused by this previous violence or by an underlying factor 
which makes a given sub-district inherently more violent. Larger conflict regions are 
controlled for, however, so there is a sub-district-specific effect or omitted variable 
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aside from other conflict making violence much more likely in these sub-districts. 
Further research should explore whether this is indeed an omitted variable, or an 
idiosyncratic effect in a few sub-districts that initiated violence which then violence 
perpetuated itself as I have described in Chapter 3.  

































































The fourth model accounts for both the cross-sectional sub-district effect and 
the effect of time between events (discussed in the section below). All the 
independent variables that were significant in the basic model remained significant, 
despite a drop in total events once the initial events in each sequence were dropped. 
When the effect of time between events is accounted for, prior death once more 
regains significance. However, the control variables, ELF and conflict region, lose 
significance.  
Overall, prior death seems to be relatively robust, showing significance in 
three of four models, but there may be variations across sub-districts that account for 
some of the effect of past violence. In other words, past violence is likely not 
randomly distributed across Indonesia. This is not particularly surprising, given that 
prior violence produces more violence, leading to a downward spiral of localized 
violence—this would produce some sub-districts with higher levels of violence. 
Further research should explore whether there are omitted variables that influence the 
distribution of violence, or whether this effect is purely idiosyncratic and dependent 
on a few unusual cases.  
 
2.5 The Effect of Time 
I utilize two approaches to analyze the effect of time on the probability of 
violence. The first is to examine how the effect of past violence and repression varies 
across 1, 2, and 5 years. The second is to measure how many days pass between 
events in the sequence and analyze how this time between events impacts the 
likelihood of violence.  
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The model above utilizes one year iterations of the past death and past 
government action variables, but do longer timeframes produce greater reactions 
through a buildup of grievances? Running the basic model with 1, 2, and 5 year 
iterations of these two variables indicates that the effect is strongest for past death in 
the last year, declining as time continues. (See Figure 4.2.) Past government action is 
not statistically significant in any iteration. The explanatory power for the entire 
model decreases with each extension of the time-frame, however. Taken together, 
these indicate that there is a slackening effect over time, with uncertainty in the effect 
of past government action over time. Further analysis using 2 and 5 year models does 
not reveal interesting time-sensitive patterns in the effect of my variables over time 
compared to the 1 year iteration.  In other words, a government’s reputation for 
violent intransigency does not grow, but rather declines as fatalities recede into the 
past. This suggests that recent violent events are more salient to the outbreak of 
violence than those farther in the past, although this observation is limited to the 
relatively short time-period of the post-Suharto years that constrains my data. This 
shows partial support for hypothesis 4A.  
 
Table 5.12 Effect of Lagged Variables on Violence over Time in Odds Ratios 
 1 Year Past 2 Years Past 5 Years Past 
Past Death 2.61 2.10 1.98 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Past Government 
Action 
.997 .1.09 .799 
P-value .991 .97 .4 
Pseudo R-squared of 











The second approach I have taken toward time is to analyze whether more 
densely packed events—events that happen closer together in time—are more likely 
to become violent. Since this data was biased with a long tail and a majority of data 
near 0 but some outliers up to 3,842 days out, I utilize the log and square log of this 
variable.  
Time between events is accounted for in the third and fourth models described 
at the beginning of this chapter. The Odds Ratios of the various models are reviewed 
here:  
 
Table 5.13 Review of Fatal Events Odds Ratios across Models 
 Basic 
Model 
Sub-Districts Time Both 
Past Death 2.62*** 1.69 4.25*** 2.79** 
Scarcity 3.15*** 3.41*** 3.56*** 3.8*** 
Current Govt 
Action 
0.62** 0.59** 0.61* 0.61* 
Past Govt Action 0.99 1.04 1.1 1.15 
Civil Servants 1*** 1*** 1* 1* 
Distance (ln) 1.36*** 1.4*** 1.37*** 1.4*** 
ELF 0.37*** 0.32** 0.49 0.4 
Conflict Region 2.5** 2.5* 0.76 0.69 
Time Since Last 
Event (ln) 
   1.04 1.16 
Time Since Last 
Event (lnsq) 
  1.01 1 
 
When accounting for the effect of time alone, the effect of prior death nearly 
doubles from the basic model, increasing the probability of violence by 325 percent, 
and is highly significant. The last model, accounting for both time and sub-districts, 
reduces the strength of the effect and remains significant. The other independent 
variables either increase slightly in the strength of their effect, or stay approximately 
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the same. The control variables ELF and conflict region drop out of significance once 
time is factored in. Overall, all the variables are robust to changes in the model to 
account for the effect of time.  
In hypothesis 4C, I proposed that events clustered in space would be more 
likely to be violent. In fact, in low-level environmental disputes in Indonesia, the 
opposite is true—events are more likely to become violent as they draw farther apart 
from each other. (See Figure 5.5.) In the graph below, the variables are compared to a 
baseline effect of time between events where all other independent and control 
variables are held at their means or modes.176 
 
                                                 
176 Modal values include no prior death, structural scarcity, and no larger conflict region. Mean values 
include current government action at 1.07, past government action at 1.05, civil servants at 195,977 
people, the log of distance at 2.72, ELF at .65, the log of time between events at 4.56, and the log 
squared at 24.12. 
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How Do the Variables Affect Violence Over Time?
 
  
As time since the last event increases, so does the likelihood that the next 
event will be violent and the impact of each of the variables. An event occurring 
immediately after a prior violent event, for example, has a 6 percent probability of 
violence, but as time stretches on this likelihood rises to over 20 percent. This is a 
correlative finding and does not explain why this relationship exists—whether only 
events more prone to violence persist over long periods of inaction, or whether these 
periods of inaction are necessary for the violence to occur, perhaps because of 
mobilization or preparation time. The case study in chapter 6 explores these 
mechanisms more deeply. Even without a clear causal explanation, this finding 
challenges the claim in the literature that violence clusters in time—at least for this 
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local, low-level violence and contention. While the effect of prior death is strongest 
for events within a year, as events get farther away from each other, they become 
more violent. 
 While these two findings related to time seem to be in conflict—one showing 
an increase in the likelihood of violence over time and the other a decrease—it is 
important to remember that these are measuring different patterns. The first examines 
whether prior death or prior repression have occurred within the set time period, and 
the strength of its influence over time on the likelihood of violence. The second 
examines the impact of the density of events on the likelihood of violence. The 
graphic below illustrates this difference. It shows the change in probability of 
violence at event X in differently timed sequences, given a prior event Y, and a past 




Figure 5.15 Two Effects of Time 
 
 
In sum, while past violence becomes less incendiary as time passes since the 
incident, as events grow less dense and frequent, the probability of violence increases 
as well as the effect of each variable on that probability. 
 
2.6 Conclusions for Fatal Events Model 
The first critical insight of my first set of models supports the argument that 
structural scarcity yields more violence than simple scarcity, significantly increasing 
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the likelihood of violence by over 200 percent in all the models. It also shows that 
past violence increases the likelihood of violence, but that some of this effect may be 
due to random sub-district effects. This is consistent with expectations derived from a 
bargaining theory of conflict that anticipate signaling of intention and commitment 
will influence the likelihood of violence.  
Additionally, it shows that government repression can quash the immediate 
likelihood of violence, although the variable for past repression was not significant, 
so no conclusions can be drawn about whether the effect of repression on violence 
varies over time. In short, the critical insight here is that repression works, at least in 
the short term. This is consistent with expectations from the conflict literature that 
focus on material capabilities and opportunities for violence. The likelihood of 
violence decreases as the state arrests, bullies, and credibly commits to a strategy of 
non-acquiescence against society.  
 Another critical insight is while the effect of past violence on the likelihood of 
current violence decreases over time, increasing the length of time between events 
actually increases the likelihood of violence. Contrary to findings from the larger 
conflict literature, violence does not cluster in time in low-level environmental 
disputes in Indonesia. I will discuss several possible mechanisms linking diffuse 
events with violence in Chapter 6. 
Lastly, the control variables did not all perform as expected. The size of the 
local government (as a proxy for government capability) had an infinitesimally small 
impact on the likelihood of violence. This may indicate that there is indeed little 
relationship between government capability and violence but rather that behavior is 
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more important than capacity, or it may be an indication of a poor proxy. Ethnic 
fragmentation also reduced the likelihood of violence, which is at odds with 
traditional expectations of the ethnic conflict literature.177 Only the presence of a 
larger conflict region and the log of distance to the provincial capital performed as 
expected, increasing the likelihood of violence. These surprises in the control 
variables represent the lack of research at very low levels of violence—with further 
research, facilitated by better data, we can begin to develop better models and 
controls.  
 
III. Ending Contentious Sequences 
What makes sequences of contention more likely to end? In my second set of 
models, I test which factors increase the likelihood that contention stops for at least 
two years. This contentious sequence may feature violent and/or nonviolent events. I 
use the explanatory variables featured in the models above, with one key change: the 
dependent variable from the previous models—whether the current event is fatal or 
not—has been changed into an independent variable to explore whether violent 
events are more likely to end contention or extend it.178  
Reviewing the expected relationships between my variables, I have seven 
hypotheses that relate to this dependent variable: 
                                                 
177 The ethnic conflict literature is broad and diverse. In this case I am referring primarily to classical 
arguments that increased plurality leads to greater violence. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict. 
178 Moving a variable from a DV in one set of models to an IV in the second set might be construed as 
an indicator that a nested logit was called for, but in this case ending contention is not a subset of 
violent or non-violent choices, it can occur after either. Part of the function of this new DV is to 
establish whether a two year end to contention is correlated with either violence or non-violence.  A 
nested logit would be an inappropriate method of assessing these relationships, because it would 
require pre-selecting contention’s end as a sub-set of either violence or non-violence.  
 132 
 
1C) Past repression makes events less likely to conclude the contentious 
episodes. 
1D) Contemporary repression makes events less likely to conclude the 
contentious episodes. 
2B) Preferential treatment of other groups resulting in structural scarcity is 
less likely to conclude the contentious episodes. 
3B) Prior violence in a locality’s environmental disputes decreases the 
likelihood that an event concludes the contentious episodes. 
3C) Contemporary violence in any given event makes it less likely that an 
event will conclude contentious episodes. 
4B) As events occur farther from the previous event in the sequence, they will 
be more likely to conclude. 
4D) As violence and repression move farther into the past, their effect on the 
likelihood of concluding contention will become weaker. 
To test these hypotheses I use the same dataset described in Chapter 4. In this 
data, final events compose approximately 40 percent of all the events. I use a set of 
four models to test for the likelihood of contention ending, which are detailed below.  
 
3.1 Ending Contention: Four Model Overview 
In this set of models, just like in the set of fatal events models, I sequenced the 
events by sub-district and coded each event for the past and present independent 
variables. In these models, however, the dependent variable is a binary coding of 
whether all contention ceases for the two years after the event. Like the fatal events 
 133 
 
analysis, I also use four models to examine the effect of these variables on contention. 
The first basic model looks at general trends across Indonesia. The second once again 
accounts for cross-sectional random effects due to the sub-district, and the third 
accounts for the effect of the spacing of events over time. Lastly, the fourth model 
accounts for both sub-district and time effects.  
This set of models is not particularly robust to alternate model specification. 
(See Table 5.9.) The only independent variable that remains significant across all four 
models is scarcity type. Prior death and current government action are significant 
only in the first model, while past government action is significant in all but the 
second model. With the exception of scarcity type, most of my variables’ effects on 
the conclusion of contention do not stand up well to alternate model specifications 
accounting for time and space. This is a very different pattern across models than the 
fatal events set. 
In the table below, I provide a complete overview of the coefficients, standard 
errors, and levels of significance in each variable across models, with the total cases 




Table 5.16 Ending Contention Master Table 












Prior Death -1.02*** -0.28 0.06 0.17 
Standard Error 0.22 0.29 0.24 0.32 
Scarcity Type -0.36** -0.35* -0.39* -0.44* 
Standard Error 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.22 
Past Govt Action -0.53** -0.45 -0.45* -0.58* 
Standard Error 0.19 0.26 0.22 0.27 
Current Govt Action 0.23* 0.21 0.27 0.28 
Standard Error 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.20 
Current Death 0.30 0.12 0.22 0.21 
Standard Error 0.16 0.21 0.24 0.30 
Distance (ln) 0.35*** 0.43*** 0.28*** 0.38*** 
Standard Error 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.06 
ELF -1.01*** -0.95*** -1.08*** -1.01* 
Standard Error 0.17 0.30 0.28 0.43 
Ticker (ln)   -0.50** -0.31 
Standard Error   0.15 0.20 
Ticker (lnsq)  .09*** .05* 
Standard Error   0.02 0.02 
Constant -0.49 -0.18 -0.83 -0.71 
Standard Error 0.29 0.44 0.53 0.71 
N 2223 2223 1319 1319 
Pseudo R2/Wald’s 
Chi2 
.14*** 127*** .16*** 89.86*** 
 
 
3.2 The Basic Model 
The basic model tests the effect of the variables across Indonesia generally, 
without accounting for the effect of time or sub-districts. It also provides us with a 
baseline for comparison with the other models. The total number of cases for this 
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model is slightly reduced to 2,223 since the dependent variable could not be coded for 
the last two years of data due to right-censoring.  
In the basic model all the variables except for a death in the current event 
were significant at standard levels. Prior violence, structural scarcity, and past 
government repression all made contention more likely to continue, while current 
government repression made it more likely to end.  
The presence of prior violence made conflict 64% less likely to end, 
supporting hypothesis 3B. A change from simple to structural scarcity decreased the 
likelihood of curtailment by 30 percent, supporting hypothesis 2B that unequal 
distribution of environmental goods and services is more inflammatory than disputes 
over simple environmental quantity and quality. These are both binary variables and 
this change represents their entire range. Hypothesis 3C received no support, 
however; the effect of fatalities in the current event was not statistically significant. 
The effect of current fatalities contradicted the expectations of substitution theory and 
decreased the likelihood that contention will continue, but this effect fell just outside 




Table 5.17 Ending Contentious Events Basic Model Effects 







Prior Violence180 -1.02*** .220 .36 -64 
Fatality in current 
event 
.30 .157 1.4 40 
Scarcity type -.36** .111 .7 -30 
Current government 
action 
.23* .111 1.26 26 
Past government 
action181 
-.53** .194 .59 -41 
Distance (ln) .35*** .027 1.4 40 
ELF -1.01*** .173 .36 -64 
Constant 
 
-.49 .294   
Likelihood Ratio Pseudo R-
squared 
P-Value  N 
426 .14 0.000  2223 
*significant at .10 **significant at .05 ***significant at .01  
 
The results above are surprising in that they do not support hypothesis 1D, 
that contemporary repression will make contention less likely to conclude. In the 
theory, I drew from substitution theory, which posits that while repression may lead 
claimants to change strategies, it does not necessarily lead them to end contention. 
(Substitution theory distinguishes this from repression’s effect on the likelihood of 
violence; repressed violent actors should eschew violence but switch between 
alternate forms of contention.) This expectation, however, is not upheld in this data. 
Instead, repression “works” to repress all contentious activity. Behavior by the state 
that represses the demands of the population (via arrests of claimants, bullying, and 
                                                 
179 For a one-unit change in the independent variable. 
180 One year iteration of variable. 
181 One year iteration of variable. 
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state-initiated sanctions against society groups) makes contention 26 percent more 
likely to conclude than neutral behavior. The same applies if the government makes a 
one-unit change from supporting the claimants to adopting neutral behavior, totaling a 
potential 52 percent increase in the likelihood of ending contention as the state moves 
from support to repression.  
Past repression, however, increases the likelihood that contention will 
continue, as expected in hypothesis 1C. A one-unit change in government behavior 
from support to neutrality or from neutrality to repression makes contention 41 
percent more likely to continue, totaling a potential 82 percent change if the 
government changes from support to repression.  
These divergent effects of repression in the past and present are particularly 
interesting when viewed side-by-side. The effect of repression is time-dependent—
while the immediate effect of repression is to increase the likelihood of ending 
contention, in the longer term, it decreases the likelihood of an end of contention. 
These two effects appear on the surface to be contradictory—if contention is less 
likely to continue, how does it fuel future conflict? As discussed in Chapter 3, my 
theory of the effect of violence differentiates these effects as products of two separate 
mechanisms—one of reducing material capabilities and one of signaling resolve. 
Although the current violence variable is not significant in this analysis, the model’s 
results suggest that these two mechanisms also explain the time-differentiated effects 
of repression—whereas initially because of substitution theory, I predicted both past 
and present violence and repression would create more persistent contention. Instead, 
these effects reveal mixed-mechanism gateways—contentious sequences which are 
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not deterred by current repression “pass through” the gateway and then become more 
likely to persist. In other words, not all contentious episodes will continue, but those 
that do build momentum. These higher-risk cases may then be on the track to further 
escalation and larger-scale violence. Which factors are most likely to create these 
contentious juggernauts? In order to better understand which sequences will survive 
past these gateways, we must explore which variables make contention more likely to 
continue after repression. This topic is addressed in detail in the predicted probability 
section below. 
Although the current violence variable lies just outside of typical measures of 
significance at .054, the past and present iterations of violence may form the same 
type of gateway as past and present repression, with current violence repressing 
contention but past violence making it more likely to continue. This tentatively 
contradicts the expectations of substitution theory, which would anticipate claimants 
merely switch tactics instead of curtailing contention, and supports an argument that 
current violence just temporarily reduces the material capabilities of claimants to 
engage in continued contention. However, my current model cannot decisively 
establish that this is what’s going on. The current violence variable is sensitive to 
adjustments in the specification of other variables in the model—when I first ran the 
model without using the log of distance, current violence was significant at the .001 
level. Why this model and variable are so sensitive to particular specifications is 
unclear, but the relationship between contention and current violence requires further 
research to clarify. It may be that current violence increases or decreases the 
likelihood of continuing contention only within certain parameters, which might 
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explain why altering the distance variable would create such a large change in the 
significance of current violence. 
The control variables in this model are once again poorly defined with only 
the log of distance and ethnolinguistic fractionalization testing statistically significant. 
Additionally, both of these surviving control variables behave unexpectedly. As 
distance from the provincial capital grows, contention becomes 40 percent less likely 
to continue, and as ethnic diversity increases, contention also drops off. These results 
bely the expectations of the general conflict literature that would hold that both 
distance from government centers and ethnic cleavages should increase the 
opportunities for conflict.182 This highlights the necessity for looking at violence and 
non-violence side-by-side, clarifying which patterns are transferrable from the 
conflict literature, and which are not. Further research on patterns in contention, 
assisted by better data on these low-level events, is necessary to better specify models 
and control variables. 
 
3.3 Predicted Probabilities of Contention Conclusion 
Different constellations of variables produce different probabilities that 
contention will end. Predicted probabilities in this model refer to the probability that 
any given event will conclude the sequence of events (i.e., that no further contention 
will occur for two years). As with the initial set of models, all variables not under 
                                                 
182 These literatures are broad and cover a variety of arguments. These control variables are drawn 
from dominant or classical arguments from each field. Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and 
Civil War”; Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict. 
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discussion will be held at their means or modes.183 I will start by examining the 
probability that conflict will end across the range of variables, given a gateway effect 
of repression. Second, given the importance of prior violence, I will analyze which 
factors best reduce the likelihood of continuing contention when prior violence has 
already occurred. And lastly, I will discuss the maximum and minimum predicted 
probabilities when all variables are set to their most and least incendiary values. 
Given what we have discovered above—that repression reduces the likelihood 
of continuing contention in the short term, but increases the likelihood of continuing 
contention in the long term—discovering which factors allow some contentious 
events to pass through this gateway of repression is critical to understanding which 
sequences of events persist over time.  
The graph below (see Figure 5.18) shows how predicted probabilities change 
for each of the significant independent variables as they interact with current levels of 
government support or repression. The central baseline is the effect of current 
government action on the probability of contention ending (holding all variables at 
their means or modes). The probability of contention ending when current 
government behavior is supportive of the claimants is 29 percent, increasing to 34 
percent when current government behavior is neutral, and rising to 40 percent when 
current government behavior is repressive. Compared to this baseline, simple scarcity 
and past supportive behavior from the government make contention more likely to 
end overall. 
                                                 
183 Modal values for the explanatory values include non-fatal, non-prior-death, and structural scarcity 
cases. Means of the explanatory variables are held at 1.09 for current government action, and 1.02 
for past government action. Control variables are held at .6 for ELF and 3.19 for the transformed 
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Impact on Probability by Current Government Behavior
 
 
Simple scarcity and current supportive government behavior have a 37 percent 
probability of ending contention for at least two years, increasing to 49 percent when 
current government behavior is repressive. The change in predicted probability 
between the baseline (structural scarcity) and simple scarcity, under conditions of 
current repression, is 9 percentage points. Although the two lines may appear to be 
parallel, current repression slightly increases the effect of scarcity type by 1 
percentage point. 
Past supportive behavior has a 42 percent probability of ending contention 
when paired with current supportive behavior, but current repression could increase 
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this to 53 percent. Past repressive behavior, on the other hand, has a 20 percent 
likelihood of ending contention when paired with current supportive behavior, 
increasing to a 28 percent probability when current behavior becomes repressive. 
While it may be difficult to see, these 11 and 8 percentage point differences cause 
very subtle divergences in these lines on the graph above as current behavior moves 
from supportive to repressive. Overall, current repression has the highest probability 
of ending contention (25 percentage points), as past government behavior moves from 
the supportive minimum to repressive maximum.  
The inclusion of prior fatalities in the model dramatically reduces the 
likelihood that a sequence of contentious events will end. When prior deaths are 
paired with current government support, the probability that contention will end is 13 
percent, which rises only 6 percentage points to 19 percent when current government 
behavior is repressive (as opposed to the 11 points rise of the baseline). In the context 
of current repressive behavior, just the presence of a prior death causes a divergence 
of 21 percentage points.  
To answer the question above—which variable matters most for sequences 
that can pass through a gateway of current repression and become persistent 
contentious juggernauts—it is now evident that past government behavior has the 
greatest effect across its entire range (25 percentage points, from minimum to 
maximum), followed by prior death (21 percentage points), and then scarcity (9 
percentage points.) Substantively speaking, however, past government behavior 
rarely moves from entirely supportive to entirely repressive, or vice versa. Instead, 
governments are often making a decision from a stance of relative neutrality, from 
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which only half the total effect shown above is possible. Hence, while past 
government behavior presents the largest potential statistical change, in reality this 
complete traversal of the range of prior government action should be very rare. 
Substantively speaking, this would make prior death the most important variable in 
the creation of contentious juggernauts.  
I discussed in Chapter 3 the expectation that violence is a stronger signal than 
repression, but I find little to support that statement in this data. Insignificance in the 
variables has made comparison impossible in all cases except between the effects of 
past repression and past violence on continuing contention.  In this case, as detailed 
above, realistic ranges of past repression—moving from neutrality to either support or 
repression or vice versa—indicate that repression probably has a weaker effect on 
continuing contention than the potential change across the entire range of action. 
Additionally, the differences between the effects of violence and repression are not 
particularly large. This does not allow me to address whether either violence or 
repression has a stronger signaling power. 
Given the importance of prior violence both generally and as a crucial factor 
in the creation of sequences that persist beyond repression, from a policy-building 
perspective we might ask what factors are most effective at mitigating this effect, 
when violence is unavoidable or has already occurred. In other words, if an area has 
experienced violence in the past, what constellation of variable values is most likely 
to end the contentious episodes?  
The condition with the greatest single significant likelihood of ending 
contention when prior violence has already occured is past government support, 
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which, holding all other variables at their means and modes, has a 25 percent 
likelihood of ending contention. Following closely behind this, situations of simple 
scarcity have a 22 percent chance of ending contention. On the other end of the scale, 
situtions of past repression have only a 10 percent probability of ending contention. 
(See Figure 5.19.)   
This suggests that from a policy perspective, building relationships composed 
of mostly supportive behaviors may be a worthwhile “investment” toward avoiding 
persistant contention. Additionally, states can dimish the likelihood of persistent 
conflict by removing structural inequalities in environmental and resource policies. 
Even though simple scarcities may still exist, addressing structural inequalities in 




Figure 5.19 Multi-Variable Predicted Probability of Contention Ending by Prior Violence 
 
 
As is evident in the graph above, past support and past repression have the 
highest probability and the lowest probability, respectively, of ending contention. As 
these are minimum and maximum values of the same variable, it is clear that past 
government behavior has the greatest potential percentage point change over its entire 
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range. (See Figure 5.20.) However, it is worth noting that since this variable extends 
from support, through neutrality, to repression, a government utilizing repression will 
probably not shift entirely to support and will therefore probably only experience half 
of the total effect graphed below, approximately 7.5 percentage points. This change in 
probability even over half the range for this variable, is still more than the change in 
probability caused by any other variable, emphasizing the importance of relationship 
building and signaling between state and society for ending contentious sequences. 
  
Figure 5.20 Change in Predicted Probability of Contention Ending Assuming Prior Violence 
 
 
Finally, if all of the explanatory variables are set to their most incendiary 
values, the probability of contention ending is only 11 percent.184 If all the same 
variables are set to their least incendiary, the probability of contention ending is 53 
                                                 
184 No fatalities in prior year, fatality in current event, simple scarcity, prior government support, and 
current government repression. Controls set to their means. 
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percent.185 This represents a significant variation in the likeliness that contention 
continues—and an opportunity for interrupting cycles of contention that may lead to 
violence.  
However, these predicted probabilities were derived from the basic model, not 
accounting for variation across space and time. The next sections will discuss 
alternate model specifications that test the robustness of these findings.  
 
3.4 Accounting for Variation across Sub-Districts 
The second model controls for the cross-sectional nature of the sub-districts, 
and allows us to address whether random effects of these areas are in fact driving the 
correlations found in the basic model. The rho of this model is .43, indicating that a 
large amount of the effect on contention continuance is due to sub-district effects. 
Accordingly, all of the independent variables except for scarcity type drop out of 
significance in this model. The coefficient of scarcity type remains the same. The 
control variables also remain significant. The total number of cases for this model 
remains at 2,223 just like the basic model for this dependent variable. The only cases 
that were dropped in both models were those in the last two years of observation in 
order to code the dependent variable.  
The graph below gives us an overview of the distribution of final events 
across space. Unlike the distribution of violence across space, there are no large 
outliers, but there is a subtle differentiation between sub-districts which have had one 
or two final events. What exactly does it mean to have multiple final events? It 
                                                 
185 Fatalities in prior year, no fatality in current event, structural scarcity, prior government 
repression, current government support. Controls set to their means. 
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indicates that contention has started, ended, remained quiet for two years, started 
again, and then ended again. Hence the variables that should drive the presence of 
multiple final events are those that are likely to rekindle contention in the long term. 
As such, the continuing significance of only scarcity type is not surprising. However, 
the random effects of the sub-districts does indicate that there are also other important 
variables explaining why contention ends, rekindles, and ends again in some sub-
districts, but not others.  
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Figure 5.21 Total Event and Concluding Events by Sub-District 
 
 
In the fourth model, both the sub-district effects and the effect of time 
between events (discussed below) are accounted for. This model drops to an N of 





































































dropped. The rho decreases to .35 from .43 in the second model, reducing the random 
explanatory power of the sub-districts when event timing is accounted for. In this 
model both scarcity type and past government action are statistically significant, with 
only a minor increase over the basic model in the coefficients for both. The control 
variables also maintain their significance. This indicates that fatalities (both in past 
and current form) and current government behavior are not equally distributed across 
Indonesia when event density is controlled for, and that other factors are likely 
driving this distribution. In the previous set of models, we saw that 21 percent of the 
variance in violence was explained by random sub-district effects, so this finding is 
not surprising. Further research is necessary to identify and account for any omitted 
variables that may be driving violence in some districts but not others. 
 
3.5 The Effects of Time 
In addition to looking at past and present iterations of the variables, I account 
for the effect of time in two ways. First, I compare the effect of the lagged variables 
in 1, 2, and 5 year iterations. Second, I gauge the effect of the frequency or density of 
events on the likelihood that contention ends.  
The two lagged variables are past death and repression. In the basic model 
both are run using a one year iteration. But does time enhance the effect of these 
variables, or decrease it? All three periods of time (1, 2, and 5 years) for past violence 
and past government action are statistically significant. (See Table 5.22.) The effect 
of past death decreases slightly over time, and the effect of past government action 
fluctuates within 9 percentage points, but both have substantive and statistical impacts 
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in all three time periods.186 The past death effect supports hypothesis 4D that the 
variable effects decline over time, but the effect of past government action is highest 
in the 2 year iteration, lowest in the 1 year iteration, and at a medium level at 5 years, 
which does not support 4D. Overall this mixed support for 4D shows that the effect 
over time varies across the variables. The uneven effect of past government action as 
time passes is puzzling, and should be explored in greater detail in further research. 
 
Table 5.22 Effect of Lagged Variables on Continued Contention Over Time in Odds Ratios 
 1 Year Past 2 Years Past 5 Years Past 
Past Death .36 .38 .47 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Past Government 
Action 
.59 .50 .56 
P-value .006 .000 .005 
Pseudo R-squared of 








While the effect of prior death does decline over time, it does so very slowly, 
making the end of contention more than 50 percent less likely even more than five 
years after the death. The effect of this variable persists, and effects should not be 
considered to be confined to only one year prior, although there will be a difference in 
degree of the effect as the time period lengthens. The very slow tapering of this effect 
over time is an important indicator of the lingering effect of violence, and the long 
period of time that violence can poison the state-society relationship.  
The second approach to the effect of time asks whether the time between 
events matters for the continuation of conflict. Do densely packed, frequent events 
make contention more likely to continue?  
                                                 
186 In looking at odds ratios, numbers closer to one indicate a weaker effect. 
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The last two models include the event density variable, the first modeling just 
time, and the second modeling both time and the cross-sectional effect of sub-
districts. Since the time between events is skewed with a long tail, with most events 
clustering close together near zero, but a few up to 3,842 days apart, I used the log 
and square log of this variable. The odds ratios of all the models are reviewed below: 
 
Table 5.23 Review of Continuing Contention Effects across Models in Odds Ratios 












Prior Death .36*** .76 1.06 1.19 
Scarcity Type .70** .71* .68* .64* 
Past Govt Action .59** .63 .64* .56* 
Current Govt Action 1.26* 1.23 1.31 1.32 
Current Death 1.35 1.13 1.24 1.24 
Distance (ln) 1.42*** 1.54*** 1.32*** 1.47*** 
ELF .36*** .39*** .34*** .37* 
Ticker (ln)   .61** .73 
Ticker (lnsq)  1.09*** 1.06* 
 
When accounting for the effect of the time between events on the likelihood 
of contentious sequences ending, only scarcity type and past government action 
remain statistically significant. The other variables are not robust to model 
specifications that include this event frequency variable. Including this time variable 
has only a minor impact on the effects of scarcity type and past government action. 
When time between events is accounted for, also accounting for random sub-district 
effects (in model four) makes no difference in which variables have a significant 
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effect on the likelihood that violence ends.187 The effects of scarcity and past 
repression change very little between models three and four.  
In hypothesis 4B I theorized that events which were farther apart would be 
more likely to curtail contention, but the results show that events which are farther 
apart actually are less likely to end contention. Furthermore, as the time between 
events extends, the effects of the variables shrinks.  The graph below looks at only the 
statistically significant variables in model four, comparing them to a baseline where 
all the variables are held at their means or modes.188 The baseline effect when events 
are closest together has a 24 percent probability of ending contention, and as the time 
between events stretches out, this probability drops, with all the effects converging at 
zero for the longest periods between events (around ten years). This indicates that as 
events grow farther apart, any recurrence is less likely to be one-off singular 
occurrences; they are more likely to be followed in the next two years by further 
contention. In short, I find no support for hypothesis 4B, instead I find evidence that 
large gaps between events make contention more likely to recur.  
 
                                                 
187 Although as noted previously, accounting for density picks up part of the random sub-district 
effect.  
188 Modal values are for no prior death, structural scarcity, and no current fatalities. Mean values are 
1.05 for past government action, 1.07 for current government action, 2.62 for the log of distance, .67 
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How Do the Variables Affect Contention Over Time?
 
 
From a policy perspective, this indicates that in order to make a difference in 
sequences of contention, action is most effective when it alters policies of inequitable 
environmental distribution or the prior state-society relationship in closely packed 
events. When events grow farther apart, the signaling power of these changes is less 
powerful. 
To summarize, while the effects of past violence decrease slightly over time, 
the effects of past government action are puzzlingly irregular. Furthermore, events 
that are closely clustered in time are more likely than diffuse events to end the 





3.6 Conclusions for Ending Contentious Sequences Model 
All things considered, the second set of models tell us that scarcity type, past 
and current government behavior, and past violence are all important factors in 
whether a sequence of contentious events will end or continue. It identifies a kind of 
gateway in the time-differentiated effect of repression; current repression will “work” 
in some cases, but sequences that “pass through” the gateway undeterred are more 
likely to continue. Substantively speaking, the factor that has the greatest effect on 
whether sequences pass through this gateway is prior violence, although statistically 
there is also an opportunity to be found in those in rare cases where past government 
behavior transformed itself from completely repressive to completely supportive (or 
the reverse). Given past violence, the factor that has the greatest total effect on the 
likelihood of contention ending is past government behavior, even when only half the 
total range (i.e., from neutrality to repression or vice versa) is considered. Overall, the 
basic model described a total potential change in probability of 42 percentage points, 
offering significant opportunities for reducing the likelihood of persistent contention.  
However, these results were not particularly robust to alternative model 
specifications that included spatial sub-district effects, and the effects of time. All the 
variables except for scarcity type dropped out of significance in the model that 
accounted for the cross-sectional nature of the data, with sub-districts explaining a 
large percentage of the variance in multiple final events (in other words, the 
likelihood of multiple sequences beginning and ending at least two years apart). Only 
scarcity and past government action remained significant in the time models.  
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Furthermore, while the effect of prior death declined over time, the effect of 
past government behavior was irregular. Also, as events drew farther apart, the 
likelihood that a given event would end a sequence of contention declined, as did the 
effect of the variables on this likelihood.  
 
IV. Conclusions for Both Sets of Models 
This chapter has tested the effect of select variables on the likelihood of 
violence and continued contention in environmental disputes in Indonesia. The results 
have largely supported my theorized expectations, but in several places they have 
been surprising. This last section will briefly review the findings for both sets of 
models and compare and contrast these findings with each other.  
 
Table 5.25 Overview of Significant Variable Direction 
 Fatalities Continuing Contention 





Past Government Repression 







The majority of the variables tested statistically significant in the basic models 
for each dependent variable. For the basic fatal events model, structural scarcity and 
past violence make violence more likely, but current government repression makes 
violence less likely. Past government behavior was not significant. In the ending 
contentious sequences basic model, on the other hand, structural scarcity, past 
government repression, and past violence all made sequences less likely to end, while 
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current government repression made them more likely to end, upsetting the 
expectations of substitution theory. Current government violence just missed standard 
levels of significance, but the direction of the effect was also contrary to my 
expectations. The table above compares those variables that have a significant effect 
at on the likelihood of fatalities or continued contention in the basic models. (See 
Table 5.25.) The only difference in general relationships is that past government 
repression matters for the ending contentious sequences basic model where it does not 
for the fatal events basic model. In other words, past government bullying, arrests, 
and intimidation lead to more contention, but not to more violence. The strengths of 
the effects of all the independent variables on the dependent variable in question, 
however, are quite different, indicating that while a given variable may make both 
fatalities and continuing contention more likely, it does not do so evenly.  
Overall, my findings uncovered no support for substitution theory. Instead, I 
found gateways of repression, and possibly violence—although the effect of current 
violence was just insignificant for continued contention and void for the fatal events 
model. These gateways appear to reflect a mix of material capability mechanisms 
constraining contention in the short-term, and signaling mechanisms inflaming 
contention in the long term. In the table below I summarize the direction of both my 
theorized relationships, and the results of the statistical analyses for those variables 






Table 5.26 Theory VS Results “Gateway” Variables 
 Violence Continued Contention 
 Theory Results Theory Results 
Current Violence   + -/Insig 
Past Violence + + + + 
Current 
Repression 
- - + - 
Past Repression + Insig + + 
 
The fatal events models were largely robust to alternate model specification 
accounting for variation over time and space, although prior death did drop out of 
significance in model two. However, the ending contentious sequences results were 
not particularly robust to alternative model specifications. Only scarcity remained 
significant in model two, and scarcity and past government action remained 
significant in models three and four. In short, more of the likelihood of repeated 
contentious sequences (spaced apart by at least two years of non-contention) is 
explained by random effects of sub-districts and the density of events than by the 
likelihood of fatal events, which was more accurately predicted by the variables over 
time and space.  
For both sets of variables, the effect of past death decreased as time since the 
event increased, but in the first set of models past government action was 
insignificant, while in the second set it behaved irregularly. In both sets of models, as 
events grew farther apart violence and continuing contention became more likely, 
contrary to expectations.  This surprising finding suggests that at low levels of 
violence and contention, un-clustered events are actually more dangerous, both in 
terms of potential violence and persistent contention, which I will discuss in more 
detail in Chapter 6. 
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Lastly, from a policy perspective, these findings point to methods of short-
circuiting cycles of escalation contention and violence. Past violence and scarcity 
type have particularly strong effects on the likelihood of violence, pointing to the 
importance of avoiding the outbreak of violence (i.e., fatalities) in contentious 
sequences. In some cases where violence has already occurred, altering policies that 
create unequal distribution of environmental goods should help reduce the likelihood 
of violence. Using repression to reduce the likelihood of violence is effective, but less 
so than the other variables, and should be a last political resort since it will also 
increase the likelihood of persistent contention as time passes. When the state uses 
repression to control a situation, prior death is the factor most likely to make the 
contentious sequence persist over time, although in rare scenarios when the 
government has managed to pull a complete about-face from completely repressive to 
completely supportive (or vice versa) past government behavior also plays a large 
role.  In situations where prior death has already occurred, the factor that influences 
continuing contention more than any other, even at only half its total range (a more 
realistic real-world scenario) is past government behavior. This highlights the 
potential role for positive reputation building between state and society in mitigating 
persistent contention.  
In both sets of models, there is a significant opportunity for policy decisions to 
change the likelihood of violence and continuing contention. These findings are 
correlative, however, so to further explore the causal mechanisms at play, the 
following chapter will explore the case of Mesuji, Indonesia.  
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Chapter 6:  Escalation in the Real World 
 
I. Introduction 
In previous chapters I identified low-level violence as an under-studied area 
and discussed the contradiction inherent in the concept of environmental conflict, 
particularly the traditional conflict literature’s lack of mechanistic understanding of 
how and why scarcity yields violence and contention. I then laid out a theoretical 
bargaining process in which claimants interpret signals from government behavior— 
namely inequitable distribution of environmental resources, repression, and violence. 
I described how Indonesia offered a good testing ground for this theory and explained 
the new dataset that makes this examination of low-level conflict possible. Then I 
tested this theory in two sets of logit models, one for each of my two dependent 
variables: violence and a two year end to contention. 
To briefly summarize, the results for the models that tested what makes 
violence (measured as at least one fatality) more likely found that a death in the last 
year and structural scarcity increased the likelihood of violence, while current 
government repression reduced it. These findings were largely robust to alternate 
model specifications accounting for variation across space and time. The effect of a 
prior death—the only significant lagged variable—declined as years passed, but 
surprisingly the likelihood of violence increased as the time between contentious 
events increased.  
The results for the second set of models found that current repression and 
simple types of scarcity increased the likelihood that contention would end for at least 
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two years, while past repression, past violence, and structural scarcity reduced the 
likelihood that contention would end. These results, however, were not robust to 
alternate model specifications accounting for variation across space and time. The 
effects of past violence decreased slightly over time, as expected, although past 
government action had irregular effects, and closely clustered events were 
surprisingly more likely to end the sequence. 
I will now attempt to substantiate these findings with a look at how this 
sequence actually plays out in a violent environmental dispute in Mesuji, Indonesia. 
Mesuji is an example of a sequence in which there were multiple violent events, 
making it a good candidate for illustrating the process through which escalation 
occurred. It was chosen as a case because there is consistent documentation available 
regarding the types of scarcity and the contentious dynamics in play, and also because 
it bears similarities to a number of other sequences of high contention and violence. 
While the process I describe cannot be generalized to all environmental disputes in 
Indonesia, I suggest that it is representative of the high-contention pathway because it 
is visible in many sequences of contention over land, mining pollution, and other 
natural resources, and therefore is of particular interest in understanding the 
mechanisms of escalation.189 In fact, later in the case study we see that these shared 
experiences with other Indonesian environmental disputes lead to cross-dispute 
mobilization and draw a spectrum of environmental disputants to combined 
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contentious events. While the mechanisms uncovered here are common to several 
other conflicts that have become violent, this case is only intended to illustrate a more 
incendiary course of events and not to portray an inevitable path to violence for every 
Indonesian land dispute. Most environmental disputes in Indonesia never escalate to 
violence, and Mesuji cannot represent the process in those cases. Instead it focuses on 
the key mechanisms whereby the relationships established in the statistical analysis 
actually yield undesirable outcomes like violence and chronic contention. This focus 
should offer useful insights for preventing future violence. Lastly, while I do not 
expect that a single case study can provide supporting evidence for every relationship 
identified above, the patterns evident in a highly incendiary case may be the most 
important for curtailing violence and persistent contention. The case study approach 
also allows for a more nuanced approach to conflict dynamics. In a large-N study 
some detail is of necessity lost, but in this case study contention can be broken down 
more finely, assumptions can be relaxed and analyzed, and complicating factors not 
evident in the statistical analysis can be identified.   
To briefly preview the details below, the case study largely supports the 
correlations identified in Chapter 5 and is consistent with those statistical findings in 
their deviations from my theory, although there are a few areas where the case study 
could not clearly support or reject the correlations—the effect of current government 
repression on violence and continuing contention is unclear, as is the effect of past 
violence on fatalities. Structural scarcities and past repression played their expected 
role in increasing the chances of contention and violence.  The effects of current 
repression were overall mixed, but clearly did not support substitution theory since 
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claimants utilized the same strategies before and after repression. Past violence was 
clearly linked to higher levels of contention, but not necessarily violence, and in two 
out of three violent events, current violence did seem to curtail contention. The 
surprising effect of event density found in the statistics may be explained in part by 
the time necessary to mobilize and arm non-professional militants, and in part by less-
information-rich environments. Finally, the case study shows that claimants did not 
pursue only a single strategy at one time, rather the range of acceptable strategies 
varied over time. 
In this chapter I approach contention in two ways—first I provide a narrative 
of the complete history of the Mesuji cases. This narrative not only describes 
contentious events as defined in the quantitative chapter, but also details the specific 
context and non-contentious factors that played a role in the dispute. In addition to 
consensual legal agreements (which occur in this case only at the very beginning), I 
also identify legal claims against another party. Once legal mechanisms have been 
exhausted, claimants moved on to contentious methods—protests without injury or 
property damage at the less contentious end of the scale, followed by riots, property 
damage and burnings, and lastly, killings. While this narrative approach is useful for 
getting the whole picture of what occurred in Mesuji, I also make explicit use of the 
variables and definitions from the quantitative section (Chapters 4 and 5) to compare 
the contentious events in the case study with the generalized findings of the statistics. 
This dual approach to the case study allows me to flesh out the mechanisms of some 
of the relationships identified in the previous chapter, but also grants a broader view 
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in order to identify any salient factors in this case that have not been accounted for in 
the statistical analysis.  
While this case largely supports the quantitative findings, it also identifies a 
handful of complicating factors. These include the cross-district nature of the salient 
locality, manipulation by elites, general profiteering in an atmosphere of ambiguous 
legal standards and poor enforcement, and finally the ways in which the state and 
company interests intersected and diverged.  
In exploring the dynamics of this particular case, it became clear that this was 
not a single sequence, but three intertwined sequences that impacted each other’s 
escalation dynamics. The first was over an area of land called Register 45, while the 
other two occurred nearby, but across district and provincial boundaries. Some events 
in the sequence also occurred in the national and provincial capitals. By taking a 
broader view of the salient locality, the case study allowed a more full analysis of the 
Mesuji sequence of events, raising some important issues for how to approach the 
concept of locality in future research. 
Looking ahead, this chapter will first lay out the background to the disputes in 
Mesuji, identifying the key contextual factors that allowed the disputes to emerge. 
Then it will trace the sequence of both contentious and non-contentious events.  This 
will be followed by a discussion of the role of the variables that were significant in 
the statistical analysis and the central patterns illustrated in this case study. Finally, it 
will identify complicating factors and comment on how these may affect the final 




II. Background to the Disputes 
Most land conflicts in Indonesia have their roots in contradictory, vague land 
laws and the land disputes in Mesuji are excellent examples of how these laws can 
foster disputes. Under the Dutch colonial system, large areas of Lampung—a 
province on the southern tip of the island of Sumatra—were carved out as protected 
forest areas.— In 1940, residents of a local village called Talang Batu signed over 
and were compensated for Register 45, then 33,500 ha (approximately 130 square 
miles or twice the size of Washington, D.C.). However, ten years later when 
Indonesia’s war of independence concluded, the cash-strapped new state began 
issuing logging permits for its protected forests, including Register 45.190 Over the 
next 30 years, much the forest was cleared and inward-migration shifted from largely 
staffing the logging camps to seeking arable farmland, until most people in Lampung 
were small-holding farmers or worked on commercial plantations. The increase in 
population and the shift in land-use to commercial plantations created scarcities in a 
variety of local environmental goods, particularly fish, which had previously fed 
many of the local communities. Additionally, swamp rice production declined and 
was replaced by Cassava, a food product for those too poor to purchase rice.191 This 
shift in land-use and declining economic welfare came hand in hand with a 
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demographic increase from 8 to 60 people per square kilometer between 1980 and 
1993.192  
The growing population pressure was due, in part, to the government policy of 
transmigration, essentially a resettlement policy that moved settlers from Java and 
other areas within Lampung to rural areas to pursue agriculture, either as a small-
holder or on a plantation. This program originally was intended in part to avoid the:  
“spontaneous settlement of migrant farmers in areas designated as government 
“forest” land and instead embark on a programme of reforestation to protect 
sensitive watersheds in the upland areas around Sendang and Gunuung Balak 
in South and Central Lampung respectively.”193 
 
However, ultimately the program played a crucial role in shuttling migrants into 
cleared and corporate lands and increasing deforestation. Land values skyrocketed 
and land ownership became increasingly inequitable.194  
                                                 
192 Rebecca Elmhirst, “Resource Struggles and the Politics of Place in North Lampung, Indonesia,” 
Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 22, no. 3 (2001): 289, doi:10.1111/1467-9493.00111. 
193 Ibid., 288. 
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Figure 6.27 Map of Mesuji Area195  
 
 
In Register 45 this general trend of population pressure and growing scarcity 
was punctuated by the re-writing of the borders of the protected/corporate land. The 
first expansion occurred in 1986 when a planning board “re-measured” the agreed-
upon area and wrote an additional 9,600 ha (37 square miles) into Register 45—
                                                 





including land in and around several local villages. The Indonesian army—
provisioned and assisted by the company that would soon be granted a permit for the 
land—promptly evicted 470 people from one of the villages, despite proof of land 
ownership and permanent residence.196 A second expansion in 1994 “through an 
apparently faulty mathematical calculation” expanded the company’s territory by 
another 1,000 ha (nearly 4 square miles).197 
Lampung residents had little expectation of assistance from government 
institutions. The police rarely got involved in disputes or crimes, and when they did it 
was primarily to extract a bribe. In an interview with a World Bank staffer, a local 
doctor commented, “East Lampung is like a Jungle…It is like a time bomb. It is like a 
war. There is no law here.”198 This lawlessness promoted a culture of vigilantism, 
with thieves regularly being beaten or burned to death by angry mobs. While this 
vigilantism was often a vengeful reaction to crime (either between individuals or 
communities), it was also regularly applied against perceived illegitimate actions by 
the state.199  
Despite this embrace of vigilantism, even against the institutions of the state, 
there was also considerable fear of the state and the military. Suharto’s New Order 
maintained tight central control, and responded strongly punitively to challenges to its 
control. In one case in 1989, the army killed approximately 100 villagers over a land 
                                                 
196 Jones, Mesuji. 
197 Ibid. 




conflict in East Lampung.200 As such, until the fall of Suharto in 1998, farmers did not 
dare to challenge the military or government directly.  Despite this, during the final 
years of the New Order muted peasant unions emerged which were instrumental in 
the eventual re-emergence of contention after the New Order fell. Bachriadi notes,  
“In short, despite sustained repression, violence and arrests, over the 
long term the New Order failed to prevent the re-emergence of 
movements that challenged its supremacy, including in rural areas.”201 
 
Not only did the state express its interests repressively when it bothered to 
engage in Lampung at all, but its policy-preferences were confused by collusion with 
the corporate sphere. The distinction between the growing plantation presence and the 
state was muddied in a number of ways—first, some plantations were in fact state-
owned. Secondly, the government often appropriated tracts of land with little or no 
compensation for residents, and then sold rights to the land to corporations at huge 
profits. And lastly, the police and military routinely served alongside guards to 
enforce corporate rights to this land and they were often fed and supplied by the 
companies.202 Barron et al comment, “Collusion between the public and private 
sectors often makes the actions of the state indistinguishable from those of private 
actors.”203 
In Register 45, a temporary permit was granted to the company PT Silva in 
1991. This was originally a joint venture with a state-owned company but PT Silva 
bought out the public shares in 2004. In 1997 the company was issued a full permit 
                                                 
200 At first the army claimed that the villagers were Muslim fundamentalists, but later admitted to the 
land dispute. Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search for Stability (Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview Press, 2000), 173. 
201 Bachriadi, “Fighting for Land.” 
202 Jones, Mesuji. 
203 Madden and Barron, Violence and Conflict Resolution in Non-Conflict Regions. 
 170 
 
for 43,100 ha (over 165 square miles) for 45 years, “in the name of protecting the 
environment” through tree planting, development, and prosperity.204 This permit came 
with a range of conditions and obligations, and stated that any privately owned land 
that was residential or agricultural was not included in the commercial forest. The 
conditions included minimum planting and coverage rules within certain timeframes, 
which were almost immediately violated in the context of the Asian economic 
crisis.205 
Similar processes of company land acquisition were also happening in several 
other local plots, and would soon become relevant in the Register 45 dispute. In 
Mesuji District of Lampung province, approximately 40km (25 miles) from Register 
45, PT Barat Selatan Makmur Investindo (BSMI) secured a permit for 17,000 ha 
(roughly 65 square miles) to plant oil palm in 1994. However, the residents of the 
four villages in the area claimed that they had not been consulted in the sale price of 
their land, that where consultation had occurred it had been highly coercive, that the 
company took more land than was granted and paid less than even the coerced 
agreements and bribed many officials, and finally that the conditions of the sale were 
not upheld on the company end.206  
A third local dispute erupted just across the provincial border, in Mesuji Sub-
District of Ogan Komering Ilir (OKI) District, South Sumatra province in 1997. 
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December 21, 2013, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/12/30/ethnic-group-plays-victim-
justify-illegal-land-trade.html; Hasyim Widhiarto et al., “Three Different Areas, Actors and Causes,” 
accessed January 26, 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/12/30/three-different-areas-
actors-and-causes.html; Human Rights Watch, The Dark Side of Green Growth: Human Rights Impacts 
of Weak Governance in Indonesia’s Forestry Sector, July 2013, 34, http://www.hrw.org/node/117099. 
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These villagers also claimed that the conditions of the company’s permit had not been 
met.207 Then in 2004 the company was bought out by another, which did not 
recognize the arrangement made between the villagers and the previous company.208  
The conditions and background described above illustrate why society groups 
made their land claims, but not why they escalated to violence when their 
disenfranchisement should have left them less capable of pursuing coercive measures. 
The three claims emerged independently but as the sequence of contention evolved 
they became inextricably linked through mobilization messages suggesting that their 
cases were representative of government behavior in all land disputes across 
Indonesia, although this was clearly an exaggeration. Turning from this largely legal 
backdrop to the sequence of contentious events that followed, the next section works 
through the contentious process once the fall of Suharto prompted a blossoming of 
environmental disputes. 
 
III. Sequence of Contention 
This narrative will detail the events in Mesuji starting with the fall of Suharto 
in 1998. It attempts to draw a complete picture of events, both contentious and non-
contentious, related to the Mesuji disputes, in order to build an informed basis for 
analyzing the effect of the variables later in the chapter. To that end, the timeline 
below is intended primarily to give an overview, with longer lines demonstrating 
more contentious events, and is not to scale in terms of time between events—event 
density will be addressed later in this chapter.  
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Figure 6.28 Timeline of Mesuji Events 
 
 
3.1 Core Mesuji Claims Develop and Escalate 
In May of 1998, Suharto resigned after swift economic decline and months of 
protests in Jakarta.209 The fall of the New Order and the ensuing democratic elections 
opened the door for an avalanche of land disputes—Suharto’s tight control, repressive 
policies, and state violence were suddenly replaced by new hope in government 
                                                 




responsiveness to citizen demands.210 In other words, perceptions about likely actions 
of the government were reset.  
Hoping that their claims would have some legal traction in the new system, 
the residents of Talang Batu (approximately 1,200 families) increased the vigor of 
their claims to the 9,600 ha expanded area of Register 45, lodging a complaint with 
the forestry ministry. This prompted a fact-finding venture which supported the 
villagers’ claims. Political support swung back and forth, however, as forestry 
ministers were replaced in 2000 and again in 2002, and government action ranged 
between supportive and neutral. Finally, in 2002 the PT Silva permit was revoked on 
grounds that the company had not fulfilled the conditions of the permit, but the 
company took the case to court and eventually won. The verdict was seen as rigged—
the company has to-date never lost a court case—and the claimants’ hopes for a legal 
or political solution began to wane.211  
Many of the claimants in the Register 45 dispute had either never been evicted 
in the first place, or had returned after the 1986 eviction. These communities—often 
well-established with roads and schools—had an ambiguous relationship with the 
authorities.— While the government termed them squatters and did not issue them 
identity cards, it also set up polling places in the villages for the national elections. 
However, in 2006 the company issued warnings giving the farmers two weeks to 
leave, and then followed up with a joint operation with the police and military which 
tore down 550 homes in a community called Tugu Roda. The company then 
announced its intention to move on to the next community within the disputed area, 
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but the community organized and with the assistance of other local villages, managed 
to convince the company to delay the eviction.212 While the company and police had 
stepped up their repressive actions against the claimants, the villagers were still 
attempting negotiation; contention was limited to “everyday resistance,” like 
sheltering with relatives, returning to cleared areas, and farming prohibited land.213 
The history of relations between society and state signaled to the claimants that 
political solutions had no hope and they began to end-run regulations with their low-
level resistance.  
Local politicians began to take notice of the dispute, and seeing a potential 
voting block in the settlers, began to court the vote of the claimants. In 2007, the 
settlers also chartered 28 buses and went to Jakarta to demonstrate for ownership 
rights, joining farmers from other provinces in accusing security personnel of 
intimidating settlers.214 This up-scaling of contention was the first serious response to 
the evictions.  
In October 2008, however, the district of Tulang Bawang split, as a part of the 
continuing decentralization process post-Suharto. Register 45 now belonged to 
Mesuji district, with a less friendly political atmosphere toward the settlers.215 There 
were now two areas legally called “Mesuji”—a district in Lampung province and a 
sub-district in Ogan Komering Ilir district where another land dispute was occurring. 
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These two areas border each other, and are divided only by a provincial boundary.216 
This confusing geography later became increasingly relevant as disputes were 
aggregated in the public eye.  
The company continued its campaign to clear the contested area of squatters. 
In August 2008, company forces razed 42 houses in Tugu Roda, many of which 
belonged to settlers who had returned after previous evictions.217 Around this time, 
outside organizations also moved in to help and organize the squatters, recruit new 
settlers to swell the farmers’ ranks, mobilize for their own political ends, and 
capitalize on selling illegal land grants to migrants. These organizations were led by 
PEKAT, a Jakarta-based organization called Defenders of Homeland Unity, but also 
included the Islamic Defenders Front slightly later on, and much later the People’s 
Democratic Party, modelled on the old Indonesian Communist party.218 PEKAT’s 
recruitment strategies started a new era in the conflict—one in which large 
populations of migrants complicated the claims made to the land.  New land buyers—
mostly uneducated, poor farmers—were told that they were buying traditional tribal 
land and were issued false land certificates, often spending their life savings on land 
that was not legally for sale.219 PEKAT settled these new farmers on land that the 
company owned but wasn’t actively cultivating and then used ties with the local 
police force to prevent them from being evicted or arrested. 45 people were arrested 
for selling land illegally between 2008 and 2010, but that was probably just the tip of 
the iceberg. PEKAT also brought another (deeply flawed) suit against PT Silva in 
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2009, losing the case. The new settlers, meanwhile, began to move from unused land 
which was becoming scarcer into areas being actively used by PT Silva.220 The 
general level of contention remained the same, but with greater consequences for the 
company since the number of illegal settlers was rapidly increasing. This method of 
resistance, flooding the area with people, would not register as contention according 
to my definition since it did not occur in discrete events or with explicitly political 
goals by the new land owners themselves, although the goals of PEKAT were divided 
between profiteering and applying more political pressure on PT Silva and the 
government. Nevertheless it caused the company and government to respond 
forcefully.  
The provincial level government formed a security team to protect the 
company trees and stop illegal logging. The team worked with the company—
receiving payment, food, and accommodation for the police forces—to move forward 
on eviction plans.221 In November 2010 the police confronted protesters in Pelita Jaya 
and opened fire, killing one settler. After the shooting, a private security officer was 
videotaped putting a machete in the hand of the dead man at the direction of the 
police in an attempt to make the attack look like self-defense.222 This was a dramatic 
escalation of the conflict. It was after this point that settlers began resisting more 
forcibly, although with little means of doing so effectively and in some fear that the 
new government had shown itself just as willing to use violence to suppress them as 
the old one. 
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In January of 2011, after the police failed to negotiate a peaceful departure of 
the settlers, 52 squatters were arrested, and then in February 1,000 police and 
company guards attempted to evict the rest of Tugu Roda with bulldozers. The 
settlers escalated from their prior level of resistance by setting up roadblocks, burning 
tires and cutting company trees in the roads, and blocking the only major highway in 
the region, creating a 24 km (15 mile) traffic jam. A water cannon eventually 
dispersed the rioters, but about 150 buildings were destroyed in the process. 
Contradicting earlier statements threatening impending clearing campaigns, the police 
once again told settlers that they would delay evictions until the cassava harvest was 
completed. The police continued attempting to convince settlers to leave and making 
the occasional arrest for illegally occupying land.223  
Finally in September 2011, the long-delayed mass eviction was conducted 
quickly and efficiently, clearing out approximately 800 families. A company officer 
commented, “It was a brilliant operation… It lasted less than half a day and cost just 
over Rp. 2 billion ($200,000).”224 This operation highlights the effect that repressive 
strategies can have on material capability to resist, and the power of private 
information since only the state knew if and when they planned to make good on their 
threats to clear the Register 45 population. Unable and unprepared to resist such 
coordinated action, there was little the claimants could do. The Register 45 conflict 
now seemed at an end after the combined repressive actions of the state and company 
against the claimants, however the outbreak of violence in other local land disputes 
quickly changed the dynamic of the dispute. 
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3.2 OKI & BSMI Disputes Join the Fray 
From 2010-2011, talks were held to try to resolve the OKI land dispute just 
across the provincial border, but no progress was made. Meanwhile disenfranchised 
looters attempting to feed their families were regularly harvesting oil palm fruit from 
company trees. The company recruited government help to evict the claimants, and 
these security forces made regular trips to the villages to intimidate farmers into 
ceasing looting in the disputed area.225 A similar process was occurring in the BSMI 
dispute in Mesuji.226  
The OKI dispute had increased in tension through 2010-2011 as “looters” 
were arrested in the disputed area while the company, despite a moratorium on 
planting, utilized the land without punishment. The unequal enforcement and 
repressive tactics by the police signaled to the villagers that the government was 
unlikely to support their claims. Violence erupted in April 2011 after the company 
had failed to show up at a mediation they had called themselves. Two young looters 
(who claimed to only have been driving past the plantation) were stabbed to death 
along with a security guard, followed by a riot where the local villagers killed two 
more security guards and two company officials, leaving a total of seven people 
dead.227  
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In the BSMI dispute, the community filed law suits with the courts early in 
2011 to no effect. They then protested in front of the local parliament, again to no 
effect.228 Starting in September 2011 the residents demonstrated frequently on the 
land concession itself and at the company’s request up to 382 additional Brimob 
(Mobile Brigade, Indonesian Special Forces) soldiers were posted on the land.229 
Legal and non-violent contention had clearly not worked. Violence erupted in 
November 2011, although the exact nature of this violence is disputed. Some claimed 
that looters were shot in the disputed area, one fatally, followed by riots in which the 
company was ransacked.230 Others claimed that the community mobilized in response 
to false rumors that a man had been killed, and that in the ensuing riot, the Brimob 
shot and killed a protester.231 The official fact-finding report supports the second 
scenario, claiming that police reinforcements arrived after the main rioting, were 
blocked and aggressively confronted by the crowds, and opened fire. In any case, 
another death was added to the Mesuji land-dispute tally.232  
This death turned out to be a tipping point. A retired army officer, Maj. Gen. 
Suarip Kadi, appalled by the news of the violent land disputes, reached out to the 
combined Mesuji claimants and arranged a parliamentary hearing for them in 
December 2011.  PEKAT prepared a video for this hearing, exaggerating the violence 
and blaming all of it on security forces, blurring the different disputes together, and 
including unrelated footage. The reaction to the hearing and video was dramatic, both 
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within parliament and once the news reached the larger populace.233 While 
controversy sprang up immediately about the overblown claims and unrelated 
footage, the video served its purpose in helping PEKAT to resuscitate its recruitment 
campaign.234 It also combined the three incidents to portray of a pattern of 
government violence. 
This publicity reignited the Register 45 dispute. Just as the government and 
company had been ready to declare victory, the power of this series of violent events 
negated their success. The numbers of squatters in the disputed area of Register 45 
shot up again, driven by the publicity of the hearing, the growing public acceptance of 
the farmers’ claims, criticism of police and company behavior, and re-energized 
illegal land sales. The long term inflammatory repercussions of violence had 
overcome its short-term repressive effects. The combination of structural scarcity, 
past violence, and past government repression created a situation in which—looking 
at both the statistics and the case study—contention was very likely to persist, and 
more violence was increasingly likely.  
PT Silva’s problems started all over again. But this time the settlers were 
bolder, more willing to escalate, and less willing to engage in legal negotiation. A 
huge set of protests in the provincial capitals and Jakarta were staged almost 
immediately demanding national-level agrarian reform.235  
A fact-finding team was assembled after the December 2011 hearing to 
establish what was going on in Mesuji and this team quickly came back with 
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suggestions for action, including immediate legal action against land speculators, 
stopping the in-flow of settlers from outside the area, and using persuasion to 
convince those who had already migrated in to depart again. It also recommended that 
negotiations be conducted between the inhabitants of the original villages, the 
national and local governments, and the company. Third, it argued for coordination 
meetings between the company and government to ensure that the company abided by 
the conditions placed on its permit.236 In other words, it suggested that the 
government equitably apply and enforce its laws. Unfortunately, the government did 
little to act on these recommendations.  
A month later 3,000 people had moved into the tent city at Tugu Roda. When 
representatives of the provincial government went from house to house trying to 
convince the settlers to leave, they were threatened with violence. The government 
made clear its plans to go forward with evictions, but at the last minute backed down. 
The settlers, meanwhile, made their communities more permanent, and burned and 
looted the company trees, clearing 11,000 ha (roughly 42 square miles) of trees in a 
year.237 The government did make attempts to arrest those suspected of perpetrating 
the illegal land sales and organizing the resistance, but what was purported to be “the 
biggest round-up in the province’s history” only scratched the surface.238  
Adding to the settlers’ sense that no real action was going to be taken on their 
behalf was the lack of punishment of the police and military officers involved in the 
three initial killings. Some officers simply never responded to summons, while others 
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stood for disciplinary hearings in which the worst punishment for a guilty verdict was 
a suspension of promotion or 21 day confinement.239 The government, however, was 
also unwilling to expend significant resources to repress the rekindled contention. 
Essentially, looking back to the statistical results, the government did everything 
wrong to reduce the likelihood of persistent contention—it did not remedy inequitable 
policy and, against a backdrop of past violence and repression, it did not repress the 
growing contention.  
In response to government intransigency and inaction, contention took another 
escalatory step—from regular protest to regular rioting that intentionally inflicted 
large amounts of property damage. The claimants also began to reject legal olive 
branches and became more active in resisting and protesting arrests. They grew 
increasingly accustomed to vigilante justice in the environment of lawlessness that 
characterized the area. General Saurip Kadi summed up the state of mind regarding 
state support with his declaration of interest in the Mesuji struggle.  
“The government is not siding with the people [struggling to survive] but with 
the corporations that get permits for thousands of hectares… If people go to 
court they always lose.”240 
 
Forcing political change thus required an escalation in tactics.  
In February 2012, riots and arson broke out at the BSMI plantation with 
protesters citing lack of government action on their claims and the fact-finding 
recommendations. Rioters burned extensive areas filled with company buildings and 
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property and the company was forced to close its doors for several months. Damages 
totaled over 1 billion Rp ($110,000).241  
In June 2012, intra-community tensions were mounting. Some communities 
were receiving power from the state electricity company while others were not, 
perpetuating the feeling among original communities that they were being treated 
unfairly in favor of newer arrivals to the Register 45 area. The original villages 
requested power from the electrical company to no avail.242 Following a set of arrests, 
another riot took place in front of the PT Silva offices, demanding the release of the 
prisoners. A guardpost was burned down, but the police successfully dispersed the 
crowd. A larger demonstration was arranged, and this time participants were offered 
cash to attend—more buildings were damaged and the police chief agreed to release 
the prisoners. However, after the protest, the organizers did not pay the waiting crowd 
and were hacked to pieces with machetes.243 While this violence was not part of the 
land dispute properly—the deaths were vengeful and not political—they were 
certainly the product of the dispute and insecure environment.  
Given the increasing lawlessness of Register 45, the police were eager to 
enact another major clearing campaign, but a large unrelated clash elsewhere in 
Lampung drained their resources and budget, so the evictions had to be delayed.244 
Upcoming elections had also turned problematic squatters into potential votes in the 
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eyes of several politicians who suggested that the settlers be given rights to the land 
and a vote in local elections.  
Additionally, the settlers, anticipating another clearing operation, had stocked 
up on arms—rumored to include 500 firearms as well as a number of knives and 
spears.245 This clearly identifies a key mechanism through which expected state 
violence and repression leads to future violence—by arming themselves in self-
defense following prior violence, the settlers created an highly charged environment 
in which government repression was more likely to set off significant violence. This 
mechanism requires time—building their armory was not an overnight activity. This 
may point to the reason why more diffuse events are actually more likely to become 
violent—the effective use of violence requires time and preparation, particularly for 
actors whose primary activity is not militant like the farmers in this case, as opposed 
to national armies or even irregular militias that practice constant preparedness.  
The local police chief expressed concern that if the delayed eviction operation 
had gone wrong, “it would just strengthen the solidarity among the squatters and lead 
to huge demonstrations.”246 The police began to express discomfort with repressive 
tactics, pressing decisions on central state authorities and denying responsibility.247 In 
hindsight, delaying a clearing campaign that would most likely have become violent 
may have been the key factor that eventually allowed the dispute to de-escalate. A 
member of the government fact-finding team commented to the press: 
“I have advised the central government not to use repressive means to 
evict the illegal occupants in Register 45, as it will only cause many 
casualties. With the use of the repressive means, the number of victims 
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is feared to be much higher than those last year because the forest 
encroachers have become increasingly powerful.”248 
 
Other experts on the dispute agreed that renewed large-scale repression in Mesuji was 
likely to yield bloodshed.249 
In September 2012, timing their protest to occur at the same time as other 
land-riots in Medan (a city in North Sumatra, where a number of other land disputes 
were playing out) claimants in Lampung and South Sumatra blocked the major 
highway through Bandar Lampung, the Lampung provincial capital. The settlers also 
began to reject efforts by officials to measure and map the area, a project that had 
once been locally supported—blocking surveyors from entering the area.250  
Increasingly part of a national dialogue about land grabbing and plantations, 
the claimants more frequently joined larger protest movements, including riots in 
provincial capitals across Sumatra and a “long march” to Jakarta from December 
2012 to January 2013.251  They also increasingly protested against arrests of their 
leadership, prompting a 400-person increase in police presence in September of 
2013.252 This increase came on top of an earlier enhancement in Mesuji’s security 
forces—in mid-2012 it finally received its own police station and staffing, rather than 
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relying on that of Tulang Bawang, its mother-district.253 However, police forces were 
also slow to recover from the strain on their resources caused by the unrelated 
Lampung dispute.  Despite the slow renewal of capability, the state forbore 
conducting large-scale campaigns and violence did not re-emerge.   
 The government continued to plan for, and broadcast their plan for a major 
eviction campaign in Register 45, but “after a flurry of arrests in August [2013] that 
seemed to be a prelude to a major crackdown, no one was evicted and a package was 
worked out to allow most of the squatters to stay.”254 Although it is impossible to say 
what a counterfactual case might have yielded—if the police had been able to 
organize and fund another large eviction campaign earlier in 2012 or 2013—experts 
on the subject predicted a blood bath if large-scale evictions continued in an 
environment of structural scarcity, and prior violence and repression.255 Instead, the 
last period of the dispute was characterized by de-escalation and non-violence.  
While we cannot say conclusively that the contentious sequence has ended—
two years have not passed since the last event—contention currently seems unlikely 
to resurface in Mesuji. This, therefore, concludes the accounting of the events in 
Mesuji. The section below discusses the patterns and variables as they relate to my 
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IV. Patterns & Key Variables 
The Mesuji sequence described above (combining three mini-sequences 
occurring over Register 45, OKI, and BSMI) features the explanatory variables in a 
few different ways. Largely this sequence supports the quantitative findings, although 
in a few places the case study is unclear. This section will now work through each 
variable, establishing whether the case study supports the theorized relationship and 
the statistical findings, and identifying where the case study can explain surprising 
findings.  
In Mesuji there is no variation on the scarcity variable—all three disputes are 
about distribution of environmental goods and access to land—but the causal link is 
quite clear between the unfair distribution of land and the original claim. The 
assessment that the government is unlikely to legally support the claimants either 
through the courts, legislation, or enforcement is rooted in this inequitable treatment 
toward company and society groups. Even when there was a moratorium on company 
use of disputed land, the police continued arresting villagers while doing nothing to 
punish the company for its illegal actions. In both the case study and the statistics 
results, structural scarcity increases the likelihood of violence and continuing 
contention by signaling the commitment of the government to maintaining the 
inequalities in distribution of environmental goods. 
The case also illustrates how past government behavior determines how 
society groups estimate the odds of achieving their ends without escalation. Claimant 
assessments of the likelihood that the government would support their claims 
devolved from hope that the new, post-Suharto government would support them to 
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the assessment that escalation would be necessary after the state used repressive 
tactics to quell their demands. This process is particularly clear in the multiple events 
in Register 45 where villages analyzed previous behavior—clearings in other local 
villages for example—and increased their level of resistance accordingly by building 
roadblocks, burning buildings, and forcefully resisting eviction. In short, past 
government repression does motivate future contention and lead claimants to prepare 
for violence.  
While it is difficult to predict the counterfactual likelihood of violence had the 
state not used repression, it is evident in this case that aside from the fatal events, all 
contentious events were a delayed reaction to repression. The only cases where 
dissent and repression happened simultaneously were those that were violent. In 
Register 45 repression did appear to be working to reduce capability of the claimants 
and drive them from the area until violence elsewhere changed the dynamics of the 
conflict. In the OKI dispute, however, government repression did not appear to have 
reduced violence, but instead seemed to trigger the violence. This is likely due to the 
presence of past government repression and structural scarcity, both of which 
increased the likelihood of violence through signaling government intransigence and 
commitment to resisting the claimants’ demands. Similarly, late in the contentious 
sequence in Register 45 repression in the form of arrests did not prompt large-scale 
violence—although it did perpetuate contention—but experts in the dispute 
contended that a large clearing operation would prompt a bloodbath. This makes the 
effect of current repression on the likelihood of violence and continued contention 
unclear. Lastly, supporting the findings of the statistical section, and counter to my 
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theory, I found no evidence that substitution strategies were used to side-step state 
repression—the same tactics were used before and after repression by the 
government. 
Past violence in this sequence of events plays a clear role in increasing the 
level of contention and causing it to persist. After the violent events, dissent 
graduated from small acts and protests to intentional property damage and rioting. It 
is unclear whether the various violent acts across Mesuji can be attributed to 
claimants having interpreted signals from the Register 45 violence to calculate the 
likelihood of their success without violence. However, past violence certainly 
convinced the occupants of Register 45 that arming was necessary, and had police 
resources not been distracted, violence would have likely emerged again. Largely this 
supports my theory, although relaxing assumptions regarding the salient locality 
requires better documentation of the attribution process—which is not currently 
available. In other words, we have no decisive evidence indicating whether or not the 
OKI and BSMI dispute actors considered Register 45 in their strategic choice process.  
Although the OKI dispute escalated to violence abruptly after the violence in 
Register 45, there is no clear evidence that these villagers were aware of the recent 
death in the Register 45 conflict, or that it influenced their collective attribution 
process. However, since the prior incident made national news and the two sites are 
local to each other it would be reasonable to assume that they knew of the fatality. 
This may be merely a lack of documentation of the attribution process, nevertheless, 
the role of prior violence on this outbreak of violence is un-confirmed.  
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Current violence’s effect was insignificant in the statistical analysis and 
remains unclear in the case study. Current violence does appear to have quelled future 
contention to a certain degree after two out of three violent events. In Register 45, 
contention probably would not have continued if other events hadn’t intruded—
contentious action was at a halt until the mobilization efforts after the parliamentary 
hearing over a year later. In OKI, likewise, contentious actions ceased after the 
violence. In BSMI, however, riots and burnings continued only a few months after the 
violence. Overall the effect of current violence is unclear.  
My theorized expectations regarding dense events were not supported by the 
quantitative results and this case study begins to offer a few potential answers for why 
dense events are surprisingly less violent and less likely to continue. The revelation 
that the residents of Register 45 were arming in the wake of government repression 
and past violence highlights a likely mechanism that links event density with 
violence. This arming and mobilizing process is one that takes time, particularly for 
claimants that do not regularly arm and mobilize for battle. This differentiation—of 
the actors involved, farmers versus soldiers—may explain why violence would 
cluster in time at the civil conflict level, but not in low-level contentious sequences. 
Soldiers constantly emphasize preparedness, whereas farmers require time to acquire 
the people and arms necessary to resist violently. Also, when dense repetitious 
contentious events take place, all participants gather more information—as the police 
demonstrated an unwillingness to engage violently toward the end of the Mesuji 
sequence, the claimants became assured that these were “safe” tactics unlikely to be 
answered with extreme action and violence. Density, then, is another word for an 
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information-rich environment in which the preferences, commitments, and limitations 
of each side are clearer, and thus fewer mistakes and miscalculations are made.  
The figure below translates the events in the timeline at the beginning of this 
chapter—separated into the three disputes at Register 45, OKI, and BSMI--into the 
definitions used in the quantitative section. Removing the extraneous non-contentious 
events and representing the events across time paints a picture in which violence 
occurs early in the contentious process and before events become increasingly dense.  
This would seem to contradict expectations that contentious escalation is a product of 
aggregate past contentious events, and supports the argument that violence is more a 
function of preparation and poor information. 
 
Figure 5.29 Density of Contentious Events in Mesuji 
 
In short, this case study provides mixed support for my theory and statistical 
findings. Although there was no variation on the scarcity type in the case study, 
structural scarcities were clearly linked with the demands of claimants. Past 
repression also played a clear role in signaling government commitment and 
determining whether claimants chose to escalate.  The effect of current repression on 
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violence and continuing contention was inconsistent in the case study, although there 
was no support for substitution theory since claimants utilized the same strategies 
before and after repression. Past violence has an unclear effect on violence in the case 
study, in part due to documentation problems, but it was clearly linked to higher 
levels of contention. Current violence did appear to reduce continuing contention 
after two out of three violent events, although the statistical finding on this variable 
was insignificant. The effect of timing lined up with the statistical findings—and the 
case study offered a potential explanation for this surprising finding—in the case of 
Register 45 the claimants needed time to mobilize and arm. While they did not in the 
end engage in further violence, the potential for violence was very high and was only 
avoided by a lack of large-scale government repression.  
 
V. Complicating Factors 
In addition to illustrating the mechanisms at play in the correlative 
relationships, this case study illuminates a few critical previously-overlooked 
considerations that influenced violence and persistent contention. Three factors arise 
from this case study, which did not appear in my original theory but should be 
considered in future analyses. First, what is considered “regional” or “local” and 
therefore relevant in the calculation of the government’s likely actions in similar 
disputes in the same area was not determined by sub-district, district, or provincial 
lines. Instead proximity, aided by a confusion in local media of similar regional 
names, rendered the disputes relevant to each other—the three inter-related disputes 
are not far from each other, but occur in two different provinces. In my quantitative 
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analysis, I use sub-district level data to address a gap in the research identified in 
prior studies. Prior research has indicated that environmental conflict may occur 
primarily at the local level, but most conflict studies focus on a minimum of 25 battle-
deaths, and there is little research available at lower levels of violence. However, this 
approach may miss some cross-border associations that are quite salient. In short, 
while local analyses are necessary, caution must be used both in defining the locality 
and in becoming too local—analysis within such a small area may risk missing key 
patterns.  
Two proposed methods of addressing this complicating factor are, first: to use 
proximity and geo-referenced data, assuming that a certain circumference around a 
given dispute will include all associated disputes as well. This assumption is not 
necessarily a good one because large cities, and particularly political seats or 
provincial and national capitals may attract protests from outlying areas. Or second, 
to pursue small-N process tracing that would allow each salient locality to be 
determined case-by-case and not by an arbitrary legal or geographic determinant. The 
first approach presents additional challenges for gathering data, while the second 
presents problems for generalizability. The relocation of protests out of the immediate 
area of the dispute may also account for the strong cross-sectional effect of sub-
districts in the statistical analysis. If the provincial and national capitals tend to 
aggregate protests from all around the country, the political salience of these locations 
may be what is driving the spatially uneven distribution of events.  
The second complicating factor is elite political mobilization and 
manipulation, as well as profiteering and in-migration. While political theorists often 
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cite elite manipulation as a key factor in conflict, the role of profiteering by minor 
players in an under-policed area has not been adequately explored.256 In this case the 
vagueness of the land laws, and the contradictory claims opened the door for others to 
attempt to profit by staking their own claim or selling false land permits. Similarly, 
the ambiguous status of the settlers presented a political opportunity for local 
politicians, national political parties on the market for constituents, and Islamist 
organizations recruiting for their own ends. While in this case Islamist ideology does 
not appear to have taken hold in Mesuji, the connection between unsatisfied claims 
and extremist organizations hunting for recruits merits further investigation. Overall, 
profiteering should be accounted for by future theories of low-level violence and 
contention. 
Lastly, the role of the sometimes contradictory interests of companies and 
states complicated the logic of when repression was a useful tool, and the perception 
of the state as an unbiased arbiter in the eyes of the claimants. The fact-finding report 
concluded that the company payments to the police, army, and Special Forces could 
potentially “endanger the neutrality and professionalism” of the state’s security 
forces.257 This lack of neutrality and professionalism certainly plays into claimants’ 
analysis of whether the state will support or repress their claims. Furthermore, the 
police were clearly aware of the dangers of their more aggressive actions, from the 
warnings mentioned above regarding the possible negative consequences “if the 
operation went wrong,” to an increasing hesitancy to actually use force to move 
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armed and hostile settlers and a disengagement by local forces, claiming that the 
central state must lead.258 This tendency is also visible in the frustrations of the 
company later in the dispute. One official from PT Silva commented, 
“After the tents started going up we wanted to stop them, but the police asked 
us to withdraw out of concern that there would be a clash. They said, “trust 
us.” So we pulled back, and more came in. Then they started building huts, 
burning our land and taking our trees. Our workers were even invited to cut 
down trees. We went to the district police chief and said, “what now?” He 
assured us they were capable of dealing with it. We went to the provincial 
police and to the top in Jakarta but they were all getting the same message 
from the district chief… In the end, no one did anything.”259 
 
However, despite the government’s awareness of the possible negative repercussions 
of their actions, unproductive and incendiary actions were sometimes taken at the 
behest of the company. 
It may in fact have been this lack of action later in the process that was 
responsible for the de-escalation of the conflict. The most violence occurred earlier in 
the process, when the police appeared to be more in the pocket of the companies, 
prior to the national exposure and censure of the parliamentary hearing. While some 
of the clearing operations at the request of the companies did appear to have 
successful repressive effects on contention, others ignited further contention. Hence, 
while my analysis has argued that the claimants see little difference between the state 
and the companies, that they are often indistinguishable from each other, there is a 
crucial divergence of interest. One is only focused on private profit and the other has 
to balance security as well as national economic growth. The diverging interests 
between company and government driving security actions have led to both 
fluctuating incoherence in state policy as well as poor decision-making regarding 
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repressive actions. Future research should explore whether policies determined by 
government-company partnerships are more likely to yield violence and contention 
than those developed solely in the interests of the state. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
This case study has attempted to illustrate the relationships identified in the 
statistical analysis in a close examination of three inter-related disputes in Mesuji. 
The patterns evident in the case study of a highly incendiary sequence of events 
largely supported my statistical findings with the exception of a few relationships 
which did not clearly support or reject the correlative finding. The case study 
diverged from the statistical findings in the current government repression variable, 
which reduced the likelihood of violence and continuing contention in the 
quantitative analysis, but had an unclear affect in the case study. The effect of past 
violence on fatalities in the case study was also under-documented in terms of its role 
in the communal attribution process, so cannot fully support the positive correlation. 
However, overall the case study supported and illuminated the statistical analysis—
the effect of structural scarcities on the likelihood of violence and continuing 
contention was supported and fleshed out, and the signaling mechanism linking past 
government repression and past violence with continuing contention was also 
verified.  
Structural scarcities were clearly linked with the demands of claimants, and 
past repression also played a clear role in signaling government commitment and 
determining whether claimants chose to continue contention—all as expected.  The 
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effect of current repression was unclear however, but consistent with the statistical 
findings clearly did not support substitution theory since claimants utilized the same 
strategies before and after repression. The effect of past violence on the likelihood of 
violence in the current event was also unclear, in part due to documentation problems, 
but it was clearly linked to higher levels of contention. Current violence did appear to 
reduce continuing contention after two out of three violent events, although the earlier 
statistical finding on this variable was insignificant. The surprising increased 
likelihood of violence in diffuse cases may be explained in part by the time necessary 
to mobilize and arm non-professional militants in Register 45, and in part the 
tendency of violence to occur in less-information-rich environments. 
Lastly, this chapter identified three complicating factors from the case study—
the cross-border nature of the salient locality, the role of manipulation and 
profiteering, and the effect of diverging state and company interests. These factors 
should be accounted for in future theories of violence and contention in 
environmental disputes. 
In a single case study we cannot expect every variable to behave as expected 
in every event, but this analysis has helped flesh out the mechanisms that link 
structural scarcity and past repression to violence and contention, and has also 
provided mixed support for other causal relationships, suggesting limitations on the 
effects in some cases. Largely, while there were some unexpected deviations from my 
theory, the case study did not decisively contradict any of my statistical findings, 
although in some variables the evidence was mixed or unclear. Furthermore, the case 
study has provided a more grounded view of the factors that mattered in this highly 
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incendiary case, and suggested other factors that should be considered in future 
analyses.  
In the following chapter I will tie together the entire project, identify 
opportunities for mitigating violence and persistent contention, and suggest areas for 








What makes violence or continuing contention more likely in low-level 
environmental disputes? This dissertation fit itself into a gap in the literature, 
addressing conflict below 25 battle deaths and the contradictory expectations of the 
general civil conflict literature and environmental conflict research in an effort to 
provide insights into which factors could potentially short-circuit the roots of violent 
conflict. Low-level conflicts are increasingly common as large inter-state wars have 
given way to civil conflict, insurgency, terrorism, and rioting. As climate change 
propels the world into even greater degrees of environmental change, environmental 
conflict is also becoming increasingly common. We must expand research that 
explores low-level violence and environmental disputes in order to understand how 
best to curtail violence and persistent contention. In this dissertation, I proposed a 
bargaining theory of violence and continuing contention in environmental disputes in 
which desperate claimants and the government signal their intentions and 
commitments through violence, repression, and inequitable distribution of 
environmental goods and services. This bargaining process is constrained by changes 
in material capability and influenced by the frequency of interactions.  
To test these propositions, I utilized statistical analysis to establish general 
patterns and correlations, and followed this with a case study to clarify and expand on 
the mechanisms at play in these relationships. I transformed and expanded the NVMS 
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dataset from Indonesia, sequencing events within sub-districts and coding each event 
for current and past variables in that sequence. Indonesia was an appropriate site of 
inquiry and a strong test case for my theory because of the availability of new data 
and detailed event coverage, its diversity and variation across the salient variables, 
and as a representative example of environmental competition and contention which 
is occurring increasingly throughout the developing world. Using this new data, I ran 
two sets of logit models with different binary dependent variables—the first 
explaining when environmental disputes are more likely to become fatal, and the 
second explaining what factors are most likely to end a series of contentious events. 
In each set of models I also explored how time and space impact the likelihood of 
violence or continuing contention. Lastly, I explored the mechanisms of contention in 
a highly incendiary single case in Mesuji, Indonesia.  
The first set of models found that structural scarcities and a death within the 
last year increased the likelihood of violence, while current government repression 
reduced the incidence of violence. These findings were largely robust to alternate 
model specifications accounting for variation across space and time, although the 
effect of prior death did appear to be somewhat dependent on the sub-district. I also 
found that while the effect of past violence declined as the years passed, contrary to 
expectations the likelihood of violence increased as the time between events stretched 
on.  
The second set of models, testing which factors made contention more or less 
likely to continue, found that current repression and simple types of scarcity increased 
the likelihood that contention would end for at least two years, while past repression, 
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past violence, and structural scarcity reduced the likelihood of contention ending. 
This second model uncovered an intriguing pattern—the effect of current repression 
was contrary to the expectations of substitution theory, and instead worked like a 
gateway. In other words, fewer contentious sequences continue in the face of current 
repression, but those that do tend to persist. Current government violence fell just shy 
of standard levels of significance, but also decreased the likelihood of continued 
contention.  The results of the second set of models, however, were not robust to 
alternate model specifications accounting for variation across space and time. Only 
scarcity remained significant in model accounting for spatial variation, and scarcity 
and past government action remained significant in the models that accounted for just 
time, and both time and spatial variation. The effects of past violence decreased 
slightly over time as expected, although past government action exerted an irregular 
effect, and closely clustered events were surprisingly more likely to end the sequence 
of contention.  
To further explore these findings, I turned to a case study to illustrate several 
of the correlations identified in the statistical analysis. Mesuji, Indonesia provided a 
well-documented case of violent conflict over land, combining three intertwined 
sequences of low-level disputes connected by the salient locality. Many of the 
characteristics of this case are also evident in other environmental disputes in 
Indonesia that escalated to violence. While the mechanisms at play may not be 
generalizable to less incendiary environmental disputes, I argue that this case offered 
a good representation of common patterns in high-conflict cases.  
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The case study largely supported my statistical findings with some areas 
where the evidence was mixed or unclear. Structural scarcities were clearly at the root 
of the demands of claimants and past repression also played a clear role in signaling 
government commitment to opposing claimants’ demands and in determining 
whether claimants calculated that they needed to escalate—all as expected.  The 
effect of current repression was unclear, but did not support substitution theory since 
claimants utilized the same strategies before and after repression. The effect of past 
violence on the likelihood of violence in the current event was also unclear, in part 
due to documentation problems, but past violence clearly caused higher levels of 
persistent contention. Current violence did reduce continuing contention after two out 
of three violent events in the case study, although the statistical finding on this 
variable was just outside traditional levels of significance. Diffuse events did seem to 
be more prone to violence, because of the time necessary to mobilize and arm non-
professional militants, and probably also because violence tended to occur in less 
information-rich environments. Lastly, I identified three complicating factors from 
the case study which suggest areas for future research: the cross-border nature of the 
salient locality, the role of manipulation and profiteering, and the effect of diverging 
state and company interests.  
 
II. Generalizability 
In Malaysia, Kenya, Indonesia, Vietnam, Sudan, Liberia, Cambodia, and 
Sierra Leone land conflicts have already kindled dissent and violence.260 Throughout 
the developing world, other types of environmental change have also contributed to 
                                                 
260 “Global Land Grab Could Trigger Conflict, Report Says.” 
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violence.261 We cannot expect every type of environmental change, scarcity, or 
abundance to impact security in the same way, but across the most basic and 
necessary resources (water, land, food, etc) structural scarcities should yield more 
violence than simple scarcities. Nor can we expect that all states and institutional 
configurations and strengths will allow this type of dispute to emerge—the 
environmental conflict literature tells us that “violence is never the outcome of nature 
alone,” but instead a product of the institutional capacity to address demands and 
“socio-political relations.”262 This suggests why these patterns are most likely to hold 
in the developing world, particularly in areas where land tenure is weak and laws are 
vague and contradictory. Furthermore, where there is a high level of state capacity, 
conflict is less likely to emerge for two main reasons: more effective non-contentious 
processes of dispute resolution and a more effective state repressive apparatus.263 In 
short, the patterns revealed in my analysis are generalizable within a context of 
developing countries with poor state capacity.    
Pervasive trends of land-grabbing in countries around the world are 
exacerbating this problem. As competition over increasingly scarce land continues, 
more impoverished farmers will be removed from their land and therefore their 
livelihoods.  
                                                 
261 Hendrix and Salehyan, “Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa,” January 2012; 
Raleigh and Kniveton, “Come Rain or Shine”; Bernauer, Böhmelt, and Koubi, “Environmental Changes 
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Deligiannis, “The Evolution of Environment-Conflict Research”; Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel, 
“Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Human Conflict.” 
262 Giorgos Kallis and Christos Zografos, “Hydro-Climatic Change, Conflict and Security,” Climatic 
Change 123, no. 1 (March 1, 2014): 77, doi:10.1007/s10584-013-0893-2; Wolf, Yoffe, and Giordano, 
“International Waters.” 
263 Chenoweth, Lawrence, and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Rethinking Violence 
States and Non-State Actors in Conflict. 
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“Population growth is placing rising demands on arable land, water 
and other natural resources; similarly, environmental degradation, 
exacerbated by climate change, intensifies perceived ‘land scarcity’. 
Furthermore, the globalization of economies has generated a surge in 
investments related to land and other natural resources in many parts 
of the globe, notably in Africa; land markets are expanding and land 
values are rising. Consequently, people and their livelihood systems 
are brought into increased contact and competition: competition 
between users and land-uses increasingly results in confrontation and, 
at times, in violent conflict.”264 
 
The disputes that grow out of these dispossessions have economic, 
environmental, and security impacts, disrupting the welfare of individuals and the 
stability of the state.265 Interacting factors can lead to a downward spiral of poverty, 
insecurity, and environmental degradation.  
“…high rates of landlessness or the inequitable distribution of land, 
leads to instability within countries. We see this today in Pakistan 
where an estimated 300 families preside over huge swaths of the 
countryside and lord over the majority of the rural population. And we 
can find this in our history books, in the chapters on devastating civil 
conflicts from Mexico and Russia, to China, and Vietnam——each of 
these bloody conflicts was fought by hungry peasants eager for their 
share of the land.”266 
 
This dissertation helps to address what the literature is only beginning to 
explore—why some low level environmental disputes enter a downward spiral with 
patterns of violence and persistent contention and how some escape the cycle. While 
the data and case study both focus on Indonesia, I anticipate that future research will 
reveal similar patterns in other parts of the developing world. The variables and 
hypothesized relationships are certainly all applicable in other countries, and in many 
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This project has attempted not only to fill gaps in the academic literature, but 
also to address what factors foster an escalation to violence or give birth to a spiral of 
persistent contention. Isolating what reduces violence and contention can facilitate 
peace, prosperity, and environmental protection. The timing of government action in 
contentious sequences can also influence the success of mitigation strategies. I have 
identified a number of opportunities for breaking cycles of violence and contention 
and for cutting them off before they build momentum. 
Structural scarcity strongly increases the likelihood of violence compared to 
simple scarcity. Since structural scarcity distinguishes itself from simple scarcity by 
the unequal distribution of environmental goods and services, adjusting state policies 
to avoid these distributional issues should help assuage the driving force behind these 
environmental disputes. The state may need to negotiate with multiple groups of 
claimants to reach an agreement on what distribution of goods is equitable for all 
parties, and provide assistance if an equitable solution does not provide the necessary 
environmental goods and services for survival.  Although the commercial benefits of 
bending regulations to suit the interests of the state and its cronies may seem tempting 
in the short-term, long-term development and foreign investment will be damaged by 
persistent contention and violence. A specious, short-sighted strategy of inequitable 
 206 
 
distribution of environmental goods offers more long term costs that it is likely worth 
in terms of potential benefits of economic development.  
Avoiding violence and fatalities in contentious interactions between security 
forces and protestors is key to preventing downward spirals. This kind of violence 
may temporarily repress contention—although statistically the effect of current 
violence is just outside standard levels of significance—but as time goes by that 
violence will reverberate through the conflict, exerting a particularly strong effect that 
makes both future violence—to an even greater degree when events are 
chronologically diffuse—and continuing contention more likely.  Violence and 
chronic contention pose a series of problems for states, including hobbling economic 
development, sapping state resources, and decreasing state legitimacy. Even when 
states are determined to control violence and contention, violent policies may end up 
costing the state more in the long term than their short term repressive effect can 
justify. Nor should states determine that the contentious sequences most at risk for 
violence are those that feature dense frequent events as Davenport claims they are 
prone to do—in fact the sequences most at risk of bursting into violence are those that 
feature diffuse events.267 Furthermore, since violence at such a low level can be 
caused by only a handful of police—perhaps losing their cool in the face of an angry 
mob, disobeying orders, or even aiming to ‘set an example’—control over security 
forces is important to avoiding these precipitous deaths.  
In situations where violence has already occurred, this study reveals that the 
government’s past record of supporting, ignoring, or actively opposing the aggrieved 
group influences continuing contention more than any other factor. This holds true 
                                                 
267 Davenport, “Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression.” 
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even if governments only adjust their policies from entirely repressive to a neutral 
average, or from neutral to supportive—a more likely scenario than wild policy 
swings between completely supportive or completely repressive actions. This 
highlights the importance of developing a positive reputation and perhaps even 
employing confidence building measures to promote engagement within official 
dispute resolution mechanisms and to allay persistent contention. 
Similar to violence, using repression to temporarily reduce the likelihood of 
fatal violence is weakly effective, and should be a last political resort since it will 
create the same counterproductive result described earlier, increasing the likelihood 
of persistent contention as the material effects fade and the signaling impact takes 
hold once the repression is past. When the state uses repression to control a situation, 
prior death is the factor most likely to make the contentious sequence persist over 
time, although in rare scenarios when the government has pulled a complete about-
face from completely repressive to completely supportive (or vice versa), this past 
government behavior also plays a large role. This time-differentiated effect of current 
repression and past repression creates a gateway through which fewer sequences pass, 
but those that do are more likely to become juggernauts of contention. In addition to 
the divergent direction of the effects of repression in past and present, the strength of 
these effects is much greater when it increases the likelihood continuing contention. 
The effect of past government action is nearly twice as strong as the effect of current 
government action, and current government action is not robust to variation over 
space and time, where past government action remains significant even when time 
and sub-district are accounted for. However, past government action had an 
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indeterminate effect on violence, whereas current government action reduced the 
likelihood of violence significantly and robustly. Therefore, current government 
repression can be a tool in repressing potential violence, but given the strong negative 
repercussions for future contention, it should be used only as a last resort.  
The case study raises some further questions about the efficacy of repressive 
action—in some of the events, violence appeared to be avoided by a lack of 
government action. Through their absence, government forces denied protestors an 
opportunity for violence. The context for the Mesuji case study showed that past 
violence and repression had convinced claimants that escalation was necessary to 
make the state take their demands seriously, and they took time to mobilize and arm 
themselves. Contention escalated from protests to rioting and property damage, but 
after the first round of deaths, no further violence occurred. Ultimately, budget 
constraints forced security forces not to take action, and so the mobilized and armed 
claimants did not pursue violence on their own. Even when all the variables were at 
their most incendiary and violence was on the verge of emerging on a larger scale, 
this lack of government engagement was critical in avoiding bloodshed. This may 
explain why past government support or opposition toward the claimants did not have 
a significant effect on the likelihood of violence—its effectiveness is determined by 
other contextual factors. My case study indicates that one of these factors is a 
collective attribution process that leads claimants to mobilize and arm, and the time to 
do so before another repressive crackdown. Had another repressive event occurred in 
Mesuji—in other words, had the security forces moved in as planned—past 
repression would certainly have had a contributing effect on violence because 
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claimants were already armed, mobilized, and convinced that they needed to fight 
back to avoid eviction and the destruction of their homes.  
Overall, my research indicates that there are significant opportunities for 
reducing the risk of violence and persistent contention in environmental dispute 
sequences. Since violence tends to persist once it has started—prior violence being 
one of the strongest indicators of violence in any given event—cutting off these 
sequences at their roots has the potential to help avoid larger-scale violence as well, 
and avoid the downward spirals of failing security, economy, and environment that 
haunt the developing world. 
 
IV. Future Research 
This project has begun to answer the question of what prompts violence and 
continuing contention in low-level environmental disputes, but it has also raised a 
number of further questions that merit exploration in future research projects.  
The lack of previous research at this low level of conflict makes itself evident 
in the misbehaving control variables. These control variables were largely borrowed 
from the civil conflict literature, but did not transition to low-level conflict 
particularly well—the direction of their effect was often unexpected, and often they 
were insignificant. As the body of research at lower levels of violence builds, aided 
by better sub-national data, this problem should be addressed. One of the challenges 
in this research is how to manage the concept of a “salient locality.” This study has 
shown that administrative and legal boundaries are not always a good determinant of 
which local events are related to each other, nor do events within a certain distance 
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necessarily capture all related events—multiple events were relocated to Jakarta or 
provincial capital because of the political salience of that area. As researchers respond 
to the call for more research on low-level conflicts, they must develop creative 
solutions for addressing this problem, likely mixing quantitative studies (which of 
necessity miss some of the details of each event) with case studies (that relax some of 
the assumptions and definitions necessary in a more generalized study to capture un-
operationalized but significant factors at work in the conflict).  
There are significant variations in how violence and persistent contention are 
distributed across Indonesia. Some sub-districts are more likely to see violence and 
continuing contention, even controlling for the factors I have included in this study. 
What explains this spatial variation? Future research should attempt to identify if 
there are omitted variables that explain why some sub-districts are more violence- and 
contention-prone than others. 
I anticipated that current violence would make contention more likely to 
continue due to substitution strategies and the signaling power of fatalities, but the 
coefficient of this variable lay in the opposite direction indicating a mechanism 
similar to current violence in reducing the material capabilities of claimants to engage 
in future contention. However, this coefficient was just outside traditional levels of 
significance and the significance was very sensitive to the other terms used in the 
model—logging a distance variable rendered the variable insignificant when it had 
been significant before the transformation. It seems likely that the effect of current 
violence on the continuation of contention is conditional on other factors not included 
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in this study. Future research should attempt to identify the contexts in which current 
violence reduces the likelihood of persistent contention.   
Two of my lagged variables showed a steady decline in effect as time passed 
and one was insignificant, but the effect of past government action on continuing 
contention did not decline or increase steadily over time. This irregular pattern is 
surprising and puzzling—why should the effect of past government action increase 
between one and two years, and then decrease by five years out? Is this a peculiar 
quirk of this data and the change in total number of cases between two and five years? 
Is the mechanism at play one that requires two years to build steam for future 
contention? Follow-on studies are necessary to address these outstanding questions.  
This project has also illustrated the occasional inconsistency of government 
behavior, particularly when government-corporate partnerships cloud the preferences 
of the state. This suggests that a new avenue of inquiry into whether these 
relationships are linked with conflicts and contention might be fruitful.  
I noted in my case study that the effect of violence may operate in part 
through drawing national and international attention to a dispute, softening the 
government stance under the spotlight of attention and criticism. While this 
mechanism seems to have played some role in Mesuji, it is unclear whether this is a 
generalizable pattern and under what conditions such pressure is effective. 
Subsequent large-N analysis should analyze the degree to which national and 
international media coverage impact government behavior and the likelihood of 
violence and continued contention.  
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There is still much work to be done, but this project has attempted to shine 
some initial light into the factors that contribute to low-level violence and persistent 
contention. Continuing our pursuit of how these factors work, and what other 
considerations are yet missing will help humanity to avoid the tragedies of violence 
and persistent unrest which destroy lives, economies, and environments.  
 
V. Conclusion 
In Indonesia and across the world, claimants in environmental disputes are 
making decisions regarding whether they will escalate their demands in such a way 
that necessitates or facilitates violence or a persistent sequence of contentious events. 
In Kenya, one farmer commented: 
“This land ownership is giving us a headache. We know there are 
people who have sold our land when it isn't theirs to sell. They are 
criminals and we will fight them, with guns and with sticks," said Ali 
Saidi Kichei of Ozi village, which last month sent a delegation to the 
Kenyan capital, Nairobi, to demand a meeting with the Kenyan 
minister for lands. "We lived in paradise, in peace," he said. "Now 
what? No water, only salty water, land thieves and water thieves, and 
children with empty stomachs.”268 
 
What influences the likelihood that violence and persistent contention actually 
ensues? This dissertation has argued that strategic interactions—in the form of 
violence, government behavior, and scarcity type—signal the likelihood that the 
government will support claimant demands, and thus determine whether desperate 
claimants decide they must escalate to maintain access to environmental goods and 
services necessary for survival. I also argued that there were material constrains from 
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current repression and violence, and that timing mattered. I found support for the 
claims that prior violence, structural scarcity, and past government repression 
increase the likelihood of continued contention, and the same variables except for 
past government action also increase the likelihood of violence. Current government 
repression reduced the likelihood of both violence and continued contention. Timing 
also mattered, although dense events were surprisingly less likely to yield violence or 
continued contention. As such, it demonstrates that bargaining theories of conflict are 
salient even for low levels of violence, although not all of the expectations from the 
civil war literature carried over smoothly. It also indicated that there are significant 
opportunities for reducing the likelihood of violence and persistent contention 
through policy changes, potentially reducing the suffering of individuals, the 
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